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Foreword and Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was born out of a few, simple questions. First, why is it that we know so much 
about political regimes today, and yet so little? After decades of comparative politics 
research, we have robust findings as to what pushes important political actors into choosing 
a particular political regime as compared to another; and yet they are constantly called into 
doubt. The same can be said about our knowledge on what makes political regimes more 
stable, or more liable to change. Why is it so? 
From that initial question, others followed. Amid the rebirth of autocratic studies, over the 
last decade many scholars were intent at classifying autocracies according to their 
institutional setting (for example into civil, military, royal, and personalistic autocracies), but 
only a few were trying to understand whether causes varied not just along institutional types, 
but also along “liberalization” types. Why was it so? Was it possible to split the political 
regime spectrum along a less liberal / more liberal dimension? And what would this entail 
for correlates of democratization as compared to correlates of liberalization? Were they the 
same, or different? 
With these and other questions in mind, I set out on a journey to grasp what I meant when I 
thought about “political liberalization” processes, and what specifically was it that bothered 
me from the existing literature on autocratic regimes. Overall, this literature is excellent, and 
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has greatly expanded our knowledge on the causes of stability and instability in non-
democracies. I perceived it as a quantum leap from interval-level measures of democracy and 
autocracy, which I thought were lacking validity when it came to justify the positioning of 
political regimes along the whole spectrum, and especially in the middle ground. I found any 
classification on the “degree” of democracy or autocracy of a polity to be too loose to be 
valid. 
Also, I was much less interested in exploring the “variations within democracy” according 
to their degree of liberalization: I regarded such studies to be related more with questions of 
how institutions worked in practice than with their specific components, and I thought they 
were too dependent on the investigator’s operationalizations, conceptualizations – even 
beliefs.  
Witnessing the rebirth of the autocratic literature catalyzed my interest for two reasons. First, 
my generation grew up within the cultural milieu of the “unipolar moment” of the Nineties, 
which brought with it the great (though not always sincere, or consistent) push for global 
democratization. But we matured academically during a period of stuck democratic 
transitions and autocratic retrenchment. 
Initially, I wanted to know what had gone wrong. Then, after some time, I decided to give up 
describing incomplete transitions as “gone wrong” at all: there should have been a reason 
why some countries moved away from repressive autocracy, did not completely democratize, 
and at the same time found some sort of stable middle ground that allowed them to resist in 
that state for decades. They were not “hybrids”. They were not “mixed systems”. They were 
not a residual category. They had to be something else. 
The second reason why I was drawn towards the study of autocracies was that I perceived 
the renewed push to understand autocratic regimes as a huge leap forward as compared to 
many other studies that, at least to me, appeared to be excessively driven by normativity. As 
partially open autocracies proved to be more resilient than expected, scholars had to accept 
to know much less than they thought, and possibly that their own beliefs had been misguided. 
 ix 
 
Problematizing our knowledge about autocracies was our way forward. This thesis is my 
outcome in that quest. 
Chapter 1 reviews the comparative politics literature on political regimes, from the end of 
World War II up to the most recent past. It attempts to shed some light as to how the discipline 
evolved, in terms of research questions, research design, and methods. It then delves deeper 
into the classical findings on the correlates of political regime type, placing them into five 
general categories, and finds that most of the mechanisms described to justify their inclusion 
into the democratization literature make them suitable candidates to be included into my 
“liberalization” research question. 
Chapter 2 attempts to formalize political regime choice as a two-player game with signaling. 
It starts from the assumption that an autocrat and the median citizen have different 
preferences over the distribution of resources within a polity, but that the autocrat is uncertain 
as to the precise preferences of the citizen unless it receives a signal. This explains why some 
autocrats may choose to endow their polity with institutions (such as elections, parliaments, 
less biased courts, and so on): interested in maximizing the probability to remain in power, 
autocrats trade off regime strength for knowledge that may help them reduce their total costs. 
The game maps outcomes onto a tripartite political regime space: repressive autocracy, open 
autocracy, and democracy. I simulate comparative statics and draw some hypotheses from 
them, while I draw others from the literature. In particular, the model suggests that one should 
find more liberal political regimes at average levels of inequality, while resource rents 
accruing to the state may push in both directions – meaning that they may either push towards 
more liberal or less liberal political regime types. Other key hypotheses are drawn from the 
modernization theory, the regime diffusion literature, and studies on democratic (time-
clustering) waves. 
In Chapter 3, I survey interval-level indexes of democracy and autocracy and then pick up 
the two that appear to be the most robust. The first is a version of the Polity index, as corrected 
for a huge weakness that may skew results, especially when the index is employed in panel-
data settings. The second is the Unified Democracy Score index, which is a meta-index that 
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collects information from a host of other indexes of democracy, trying to gauge “expert 
consensus”. The chapter serves more as a review of the literature on research questions and 
research designs, and sets the stage for a deep dive in the most recent studies on autocratic 
types. 
In Chapter 4, I survey the literature on autocratic types, highlighting its great strengths and 
some of its weaknesses. I then search for measures of degrees of liberalization, or “regime 
openness”. Being unsatisfied with existing measures, I build my own. To construct my index, 
I look at both institutional and de facto conditions within each polity. Institutional features 
comprise the mode of effective executive and legislative selection, the status of the legislature 
and the degree of legalization of political parties. De facto features include the actual 
existence of parties, the actual existence of an opposition, and the way in which parties are 
actually represented within the legislature.  
I then use my interval-level measure to divide the political space into a tripartite typology 
that tries to map onto the typology in Chapter 2, by identifying closed autocracies, open 
autocracies, and democracies. For robustness, I build more than one typology employing 
different thresholds, and show how descriptives vary as thresholds change. 
Chapter 5 focuses on measuring the political leverage that governing actors derive from fuel 
rents. I survey the political resource curse literature, and show how most of the 
operationalizations that have been used to gauge the political leverage of fuel rents are 
misguided or unsatisfactory. I therefore develop my preferred measures, building them up 
from a host of different sources and employing multiple imputation techniques (see below). 
At the end of this process, I regard my measure as not just valid but much more reliable than 
alternatives. I conclude describing how fuel rents, and the political leverage actors may derive 
from them, have evolved in space and time. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 I develop empirical models to test the hypotheses derived in Chapter 2, 
together with other related questions on the stability of political regimes. The first part is 
dedicated to multiple imputations, which allow me to do away with listwise deletion or 
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simple imputation techniques in cases of missing data, which are an even worse problem in 
a panel data setting. 
Empirical findings confirm most of my hypotheses, allowing me to adjudicate between 
competing theories on the correlates of political liberalization. My findings also generate 
novel and controversial insights over the modernization, regime diffusion, and “regime 
waves” literatures. Most importantly, I find that some correlates of liberalization can interact 
in crucial ways with regards the choice of political regime and the timing and likelihood of 
transitioning to that specific regime. 
To make just one key example, I find that higher economic well-being makes it much more 
likely for a polity to choose more liberal political regimes – in accord with the modernization 
theory –, but at the same time it greatly decreases the probability of regime transitions. This 
raises the possibility that some polities remain “stuck” with unwanted political regimes, as 
forces can push both ways. This, in turn, underlines the crucial role of agency. Under specific 
circumstances, single personalities or groups of people may act to catalyze change and move 
the polity in a more liberal direction, or to stifle any liberalization move in the first place. 
Chapter 1. Political Regimes 
Democracy, Autocracy, and Their Correlates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1. The study of democracy and autocracy 
 
The study of political regime types, their features, their assets and liabilities dates back to 
antiquity and classical philosophy. Political philosophy thinkers frequently pondered about 
which political institutions and overall political regimes worked best for polities as a whole, 
for citizens, or for rulers. 
Classical thinkers inextricably linked regime types to morality. Plato contrasted Socrates’ 
own thinking to that of the sophist Thrasymachus, who appeared to defend an idea of justice 
as “nothing else than the interest of the stronger” (Ferrari 2000) – a position clearly resonating 
with modern and contemporary thinkers, and with sceptics of all ages. It takes most part of 
The Republic for Plato (and Socrates) to defend a universal idea of justice and, from there, 
propose and defend the best political order that would fit such high moral standards (the 
republic of the philosopher-kings). 
Aristotle, with his two-fold tripartite classification of political regimes (good: monarchy, 
aristocracy, constitutional republic; perverted: tyranny, oligarchy, democracy) and his 
practical reasoning that distinguished between his ideal preferences towards monarchy and 
his pragmatic preferences for a constitutional republic, also betrays an underlying normative 
reasoning. 
Even less than three centuries before our time, David Hume, sceptical philosopher par 
excellence who went as far as disputing the most fundamental politico-philosophical concept 
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of his times, i.e. the social contract theory of political obligation, seemed to be very little 
troubled to assert in his Essays, in an act of absolute normativity, that “free governments” 
should be preferred to “absolute governments”, and that the best government is a federal 
“well-tempered” (representative) democracy (Haakonsen 1994). This stands as evidence that 
the moral push towards a universal ideal of the “best” political institution for any polity in 
the world remained a consistent feature of centuries of political thinking. 
It is only normal, then, that normative thinking continued to pervade the comparative politics 
discipline, and still does to a certain extent. The fall of the USSR and nascent democratic 
transitions both in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa unleashed a wave of optimistic 
thinking (for Sub-Saharan Africa, see e.g. Lindberg 2006 for one of the final optimistic 
stories, soon-to-be overwhelmed by the course of current events, Lynch and Crawford 2011), 
that peaked into a prominent Western liberal thinker foretelling the imminent “end of history” 
and the “universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government” (Fukuyama 1992). 
Historically, it has taken the emergence of multiple “anomalies” at the positive level, and 
multiple failed attempts at bringing to life and propagating a social ideal of a “best of all 
possible worlds” at the practical level, for most scholars in a scientific discipline to start 
doubting engrained ideas before finally embracing change. Kuhn, frequently regarded as the 
scholar advancing the theory of “scientific paradigms” and abrupt paradigm shifts, 
emphasized this point more than once in his most renowned endeavour (Kuhn 1962), 
generalizing it to within-traditions paradigm shifts: “[anomalies] can also be retrieved from 
the study of many other episodes that were not so obviously revolutionary”, and concern “the 
far smaller group of professionals affected by them”). 
In what could be described as the most recent case of a “paradigm shift” in the study of the 
nature and evolution of political regimes, it took the realization that the post-Cold War 
democratization push had produced at best only a gentle “fourth wave” (after the so-called 
“third wave” of the Seventies-Eighties, see par. 1.2.5), at constant risk of falling back towards 
less liberal political regimes, for the literature on autocratic regimes to be brought back to the 
fore. 
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Scholars and policymakers alike had to come to terms with the fact that it may be much more 
difficult, complex, or even ultimately impossible to pinpoint the features of the best political 
regime, for all ages and all peoples, and that even in the face of high economic growth, 
secularization and the expansion of public discourse thanks to the internet in some countries, 
this could make democratization much less likely than was expected at first.  
Most of all, it took the failure at “exporting” idealized versions of political regimes to allied 
and hostile governments alike, by advertising their merits while playing down transitional 
and implementation risks, for scholars to widely recognize that autocracies (or “failed” 
democracies) might deserve another go and should not be regarded just as simple precursors 
to better, complete, or perfected political regimes. 
These short-term undercurrents also brought to the fore the realization that, as centuries have 
gone by, what the highest thinkers of their age regarded as almost ideal examples of 
“democracy” (e.g., Athens for Greek philosophers) would fall far short of any contemporary 
definition of democracy – even to a minimal (or procedural) definition that only required free 
and fair elections. Slavery, the exclusion of women from politics, and the frequent limiting 
of political decisions to the wealthy restricted political participation (and civil rights) in 
ancient “democracies” to levels that we only encounter in autocracies today. As we come to 
realize that political regimes’ normative appetite can change wildly over time, we are also 
progressively brought to recognize that democracies do not tend to significantly outperform 
autocracies under many respects – including economic growth. 
On the face of these complexities, this section aims at looking briefly at the evolution of 
scholarly thinking on political regimes and institutions since the end of the Second World 
War. I will then shift to a reflection over social sciences in general, and the interactions 
between structural and agency explanations of political outcomes. Finally, I will trace in 
broad strokes the state of the literature on political regimes today, identifying avenues for 
further research. 
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1.1.1.  Comparative politics and the study of political regimes after WWII 
 
Normative thinking, the thought of what “ought to be”, is always present in human activity: 
not even science can be regarded as devoid of normativity, even when scholars do their best 
to leave preconceptions and biases aside and try to observe things “as they are” and not “as 
they should be”. Moral judgment and ethical preferences run below every choice we make – 
even below the choice of embarking upon the study of social sciences in the first place. 
Theory and empirical analysis can never be completely insulated from pre-judicial choices 
during study design, concept definitions and operationalisations, sample and variables 
selection, data collection, et cetera. 
Given that it is impossible to free oneself from any moral judgment, it could be argued that 
trying to do so when referring to “social facts” would either be naïve, morally wrong, or both. 
However, to the very least, the aim to set up “social sciences” requires that one strives for a 
certain detachment from her/his object of study. But while the attempt to approach the study 
of political regimes in a sufficiently accomplished and scientific way could be traced back to 
at least John Locke (Tuckness 2016), and others may trace it even to Hobbes or Machiavelli, 
the thought of these scholars is actually imbued in normativity (Burelli 2015). Indeed, it 
would not be before the rationalization (and data collection) attempts by Max Weber and a 
number of other sociologists and ante litteram ethnographers that comparative politics would 
start to settle down into something more similar to a science, and to be institutionalized within 
academia. 
When the first wave of post-World War II political scientists embraced behaviourism, a 
deluge of data took the discipline by storm. However, these studies mostly focused on 
personality types and social groups. The natural outflow of this tsunami had social sciences 
progressively diversifying. In the first decades after WWII, the discipline was still 
commanded by “political sociologists”, who prioritized the development of theory and 
higher-order concepts above the study of men or, at most, social groups (Mitchell 1967). At 
the same time, the advent of bipolarity and the onset of the Cold War spurred the development 
of game theory and its first applications to international politics (Schelling 1960). 
Comparative politics, still far from being termed this way, began to consolidate around a 
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“political sociology”, which Lipset and Bendix (1959) came to define as the analysis of “the 
stability of a specific institutional structure or political regime – the social conditions of 
democracy”. Also, social scientists started to focus more and more over contemporary 
politics in order to identify their discipline as a separated field from historical studies (Munck 
2007 reminds us of the motto of political scientists of the time: “History is past Politics and 
Politics present History”), and to focus upon state institutions in order to differentiate their 
research subject from sociology. Correspondingly, the latter veered towards the study of 
social groups and distanced further from state actors. 
Narrowing the subject matter was important in order to establish the field of political science. 
This is also one of the reasons why domestic politics and international politics were separated 
by such a sharp divide at first. On the one hand, it is true that the question of whether specific, 
measurable ideological, cultural or socio-economic forces could influence the choice of 
social groups between radically different institutional regimes, such as democracies or 
dictatorships, continuously resurfaced over time (see the seminal Moore 1966). On the other 
hand, most often the comparative political field focused its “comparisons” on sufficiently 
similar alternatives: usually, different institutional features of democratic systems. This 
ultimately remains the focus of the discipline to this day (see Lijphart 1999/2012, William 
Roberts Clarke 2013). 
As comparative politics slowly evolved, the study of political regimes continued to be 
confined to the study of a subset of regime types and polities. For some scholars, authoritarian 
countries were uninteresting simply because they were too different to be comparable to 
domestic politics in democratic regimes. For others, authoritarian countries were just a 
deviation from the optimal path (see below). Other times still, the problem consisted in an 
utter lack of data, not just in correlates but even in the bare knowledge of the specific 
“patterns of authority” experienced by non-democratic countries. Even when data existed, it 
was sparse at best, and anyway most countries had gained independence just five or ten years 
earlier, having been colonies beforehand. 
As time passed, however, important attempts at capturing differences along the autocracy-
democracy spectrum started to emerge. One of the most systematic, the Polity study, was 
launched by Ted Robert Gurr in the late Sixties and resulted in a book exploring “patterns of 
Chapter 1. Political Regimes 
6 
 
authority” in most of the independent countries of the world at the time. The aim was to 
provide social scientists interested in the study of political regime types with a structural, 
systematic analysis of the institutional settings and the practical conditions characterizing 
authority within each single country (or “polity”; Eckstein and Gurr 1975). The first edition 
of the Polity dataset was released in 1978. 
Five years earlier, Freedom House started publishing its Freedom in the World index, which 
also attempted at gauging different levels of political rights and civil liberties in the world – 
relying upon a systematic expert survey. 
As for the release of data updated with sufficient frequency, in 1968 Arthur S. Banks started 
publishing and circulating widely the Cross National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and 
Textor 1963), while Charles L. Taylor released new versions of the World Handbook of 
Political and Social Indicators (Taylor and Hudson 1972; Munck 2007). 
As comparative politics grew as a separate subfield of political science, normativity still 
remained profoundly engrained within the scholarly community. The degree of normativity 
within the discipline could be gauged just by looking at the titles of some the most important 
books produced in the last decades of the Cold War on the subject of political regime types 
and their correlates. Take, for example, Juan Linz’s (1978) The Breakdown of Democratic 
Regimes and, on the other hand, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter’s (1983) 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Democratic regimes break down, while authoritarian 
countries “transition” towards democracies – overall, a better world for everyone. If such 
inclination could be justifiable in terms of rights gained or even just total lives lost due to 
repression, it still was not a conclusion reached via science, but through normative judgment. 
Meanwhile, however, even comparative politics was getting more scientific. Empirical 
studies started to be produced ever more frequently. But it was not until the end of the Cold 
War that an entirely new discipline emerged, and consolidated to be almost consecrated as 
the landmark of the discipline: democratization studies. 
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1.1.2.  The end of the Cold War: rational choice and democratization studies 
 
The last years of the Cold War and the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union brought about a 
profound shift in the comparative politics field. First, an increasing number of countries was 
transitioning towards democracy. In the earlier part of the Eighties, the share of autocratic 
countries over total independent countries continued to remain constant, or even slightly 
increased as new countries emerged from former colonies and, often, adopted autocratic 
regimes more frequently than democratic ones. But by the end of that decade and the early 
Nineties, the collapse of the strongest Communist regime and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, first, and of Yugoslavia in a few years, disclosed a unique opportunity for countries 
whose societies appeared to be ready for liberal democracy and a free market economy after 
decades of oppression, censorship, and material deprivation. 
Before democratization studies could properly take off, another advance had to be embraced 
by the field. Indeed, the huge developments brought about by the spread of rational choice 
theory to political science (Tsebelis 1995), and the steady development of large-N 
quantitative methods (Achen 1983, King 1991) had been slow to penetrate a field which was 
still largely monopolized by former sociologists and historians, scholars generally interested 
in case studies or small-N studies at best who looked with mistrust at how economics was 
taking over the whole field (Przeworski 1991 could be thought of as an “early adopter”). 
Moreover, it was still difficult to study autocratic countries with a fair degree of precision, 
due to a profound lack or unreliability of data, caused by the level of closure of autocratic 
regimes at the time. A negative feedback loop had made social scientists even less interested 
in collecting data for those countries. Autocratic countries were the object of politics, of 
diplomacy, progressively more of historical studies; less so of political science scholarship. 
It would take around a decade for data to gradually start dripping in (for example, the first 
edition of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators was launched in 1997) and for 
formal game-theoretic, rational choice models to appear more frequently and be employed in 
the study of political regime choice. Consequently, large-N studies increased both in quantity 
and quality. 
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Even in the face of science “pervading” the field, the logics and ideology of democratization 
studies were still the probable outcome of a normative push. As the US appeared to emerge 
as the undisputed (“lone”) superpower in the post-Cold War world, Washington’s penchant 
for its own version of liberal democracy proved a compelling attractive force for other 
countries. The US appeared to be no more constrained in the support of democracy and 
human rights by the logics of the balance of power and the need to preserve the bipolar order. 
Such neoliberal push, which throughout the Eighties appeared to be increasingly contrasted 
by proposals for a New International Economic Order, was immediately propelled to mantra 
by Bretton Woods international economic institutions. The IMF’s conditionality norms are 
most famous for their push in favour of free market reforms, but they also called for political 
liberalization, at least to a certain extent (Stone 2008). 
Also thanks to this turn in the international milieu, in the early Nineties scholars and 
observers alike watched as one by one many countries transitioned towards democracy. 
Setbacks were still pervasive, but an indisputably higher share of countries was rallying 
around the liberal banner – or at least trying to do so. 
As new data on autocratic countries increasingly became available, democratization studies 
were born. Researchers tended to focus on how democracy occurs and on whether, and how, 
it had been or could be supported from abroad (i.e., by specific third countries or by the 
international community, usually identified with the United Nations).  
Przeworski (2000) aimed at systematising the knowledge within the field by settling debates 
on the main correlates of democracy and democratization. At the same time, the first seminal 
works on the theory of political regime choice and dynamics were springing up, laying game-
theoretic foundations to comparative politics questions (Persson and Tabellini 2000), and 
reaching political regime studies a few years later (Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 
2006). 
Broadly, democratization studies trace back the causes of regime change to three different 
factors: structure, process, and culture. Structural theories highlight distributional shifts due 
to socio-economic changes that can empower actors that were previously at a disadvantage, 
or the role of external actors that may influence the regime change process. Here, broad socio-
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economic conditions are key, and the place for agency is muted in favour of theory 
generalizability. 
Process theories, instead, study paths and actor’s interactions that brought about regime 
change, emphasizing the steps that were conducive to (more) stable democracy and those that 
resulted in failed attempts at democratization. Cultural studies, finally, highlight the role of 
individual or collective agents, especially elites, that became pro-democratic and tried to shift 
the domestic balance of power in their favour. In section 1.2 I will show how these general 
frameworks of analysis can differ in their conclusion over the correlates of democracy and 
autocracy, but also how they frequently overlap. 
Apart from these broad differences, what is important from the point of view of the whole 
discipline is that democratization studies slowly but consistently brought again to the fore 
the acknowledgment that political institutions are endogenous to the political process. While 
domestic political scientists tend to take the most fundamental institutions of a polity as 
given, these studies question whether some determinants can bolster or undermine them, 
affecting their overall durability. 
It could be stated that, on the one hand, domestic political scientists are interested in equilibria 
when institutions are stable (broadly static, or changing slowly over time), and exogenous 
shocks are generally limited to changes in the number or preferences of veto players within 
a given institutional setting, or to even more specific policy changes. On the other hand, 
studies of political regime choice are interested in times of “constitutional crisis”, as their 
shocks concern the whole “political space” – the very framework within which political life 
takes place and is organized within a polity. 
 
 
1.1.3.  A renewed interest for autocratic types and their correlates 
 
Finally, over the last decade, a renewed push in the understanding of autocratic regimes has 
started to blossom, and is now in full bloom. Historical causes of this shift can be traced back 
to the increasing number of “failures” of transitions towards democracy, as autocratic regime 
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“failures” (even those that were facilitated or directly brought about by international military 
interventions, like the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003) did not lead 
to stable democratic regimes. 
In fact, most transitions stopped at the “open autocratic” stage (according to my later 
categorization – see Chapters 4 and 6), or simply to autocracy by most of the existing 
dichotomous measures of political regime type. These failures made both political actors and 
scholars much more aware that democratization processes are frail, especially during the 
transition phase. Democratization attempts can upset consolidated cultural traditions, be met 
with resistance by previous elites (whether they were at the government or at the opposition 
in the previous regime), and generally take time and considerable political, military, and 
financial resources. 
International events showed that previously democratizing countries could remain stuck in 
the middle of the process (at least as early as Zakaria 2003), sparking a doubtfully helpful 
literature proposing to add to the democracy-autocracy partition a third category of poorly-
defined “hybrid” regimes (Levitsky and Way 2002, who then went on to postulate the 
definition of “competitive authoritarianism”; a refining of the concept would ultimately result 
in the much more useful idea of “electoral authoritarianism”, see below). 
Some countries failed to consolidate their democratic transition, while others relapsed into 
autocracy, often following coups d’état (see, e.g., the very recent example of Thailand in 
2014). Today, Freedom House findings appear to confirm that at the same level the 
democratization process appears to have been blocked for years now, or even being in retreat 
in some regions (Freedom House 2014). Confronted with autocratic retrenchment in 
countries as diverse as Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Russia, and Peru, studies started to focus 
on the obstacles that these countries encountered in the democratization path in this and 
previous decades. The very focus of democratization studies started to shift. Ultimately, 
scholars grudgingly had to come to terms with the fact that, in spite of all the gains democracy 
could in theory grant to the general welfare of a polity, democratization had not turned into 
a one-way road, and setbacks deserved to be studied in their own right. To the very least, 
studying democratization setbacks was needed to deepen knowledge on social, economic, 
and political processes that hindered the consolidation of democratic transitions. 
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Thus, a renewed blossoming of autocratic studies was born out of the resilience of autocratic 
regimes in the face of democratization “waves” (Merkel 2010) and the rediscovery of the 
troubles that specific democracies experienced in transitioning from previous autocratic 
regimes (Linz and Stepan 1996). The new studies were built around the quest to uncover 
factors that made autocracies more durable (Brownlee 2007). These were accompanied by a 
normative change which was subtle at first, but appears to have strengthened over time: 
today, democracy and democratization scholars appear to have put their preferences aside, 
acknowledging with pragmatism that some countries are much harder than others to be 
“converted” to the “benefits” of democracy, or even questioning whether these benefits are 
present in the first place (Clark et al. 2012). Autocracies deserved to be studied also in order 
to understand what factors increased the likelihood that their citizens, as well as power groups 
that generally have a crucial role in democratization processes such as the military and the 
business elite, continued to prefer the current autocratic regime or were not able to overcome 
collective action problems in the same way than other countries did. 
At the same time, studies of regimes that were neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic 
took off from the acknowledgment that international efforts to promote democracy produced, 
at best, countries that were stuck in this limbo, or terra incognita. These moved, again, from 
normative questions: how was it that countries would not democratize in the face of (at the 
time, at least) clear and measurable benefits for the population and, possibly, even their 
leaders? Second, being a weird mix of “pure” ideal types, how long would it take for these 
hybrid countries to “decide” which way to lean, i.e., to fall back towards autocracy or to 
properly democratize once and for all (Ottawa 2003)? 
After all, studies on the stability of hybrid regimes (or “anocracies”, as they came to be called 
early on by scholars relying upon combined scores from the Polity index) appeared to show 
that these regimes were more prone to civil war and political instability (Muller and Weede 
1990, Krain and Myers 1997, Hegre et al. 2001). Therefore, they were expected to transition 
sooner or later towards more stable regimes, either outright autocratic or more fully 
democratic. 
The unexpected resilience of such middle-ground regimes instead encouraged further debate 
(Gandhi and Vreeland 2004). After more than a decade has passed from early attempts at 
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new conceptualizations and categorizations, it seems high time to trace a brief outline of the 
literature produced by this new strand of comparative politics studies. 
First of all, scholars needed a way to typify the political space into new categories, 
partitioning the autocratic field into new dimensions which did not necessarily mirror the 
unidimensional “level of autocracy” proposed by quantitative indexes such as Polity. The 
increasing dissatisfaction with univariate measures that tended to clump all autocracies 
towards very similar autocracy/democracy scores was problematic to scholars who, having 
thoroughly studied autocracies and having focused on specific case studies, found 
considerable variation in terms of institutional configurations, leadership types, the specific 
role of elites and other veto players, or the way in which governing figures/groups legitimized 
or ring-fenced their power from outsiders (and from democratization pushes). 
Back to the drawing board, researchers focusing on autocracies started to re-elaborate and 
refine previous typologies, peculiarly discarding the presence of strong ideologies as a 
defining trait of autocratic political regimes. Classic post-WWII typologies of political 
legitimacy in authoritarian countries, such as Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965), in fact relied 
upon the presence or absence of strong ideologies in order to tell apart totalitarian regimes 
(those displaying ideologies that are imposed upon a mobilized population) from 
“traditional” autocracies (in which rulers only aim at maximizing the benefit they can extract 
from office, but do not display a characteristically identifiable ideology).On the one hand, 
these studies drew inspiration from the rise and fall of totalitarian regimes in the first half of 
the 20th Century, which had spurred a flurry of literature – mostly on political philosophy, 
such as Hannah Arendt’s – on the means through which these regimes legitimized their stay 
in power. On the other hand, such typological subdivision had clear political, normative 
motives: for Brzezinski in particular, who at the time was supporting Lyndon Johnson’s 
presidential campaign, they were also intended to justify the US’s condescending behaviour 
towards some autocratic (personalistic) regimes, while condemning others – which also 
happened to be US’ enemies. The fact that both Brzezinski’s and Jeane Kirkpatrick (1982) 
books, the latter embracing which embraced the same typology and underlying political 
framework, were written by actual or future high-rank US government officials only serves 
to restate the obvious. 
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Following a similar line of reasoning, however, other scholars were able to make important 
scientific contributions. Wintrobe (1990) attached a political economy model to the 
distinction between ideological and non-ideological dictatorships, tying the difference 
between one and the other type of autocrats to the level of repression they employed: 
traditional (what he called “tin-pot”) dictatorships were characterised by rulers that only 
wished to minimise the costs of remaining in power in order to collect the benefits of office 
(thus employing repression at a minimum, “rational” amount), while in totalitarian 
dictatorships the leader maximises power over the population. 
While totalitarian dictatorships appear to have faded as a viable possibility today (Acemoglu 
et al. 2010) the model’s ability to explain the much lower longevity of military rule compared 
to other types of autocratic regimes (Nordlinger 1977) can be regarded as an early success in 
favour of political economy models of political regimes. 
Over the last decade, however, the “new institutionalism” school did away with ideology 
entirely, arguing that the stability and durability of an autocratic regime strongly varies with 
autocratic regime types subdivided according to the degree of institutionalization or other 
non-ideological features. 
First, these scholars argued, it is possible to distinguish between personalistic dictatorship, 
military juntas, single party/corporatist systems, and bureaucratic/technocratic political 
regimes. Some are more institutionalized than others, and their stability and durability partly 
depends precisely on such institutionalization level. 
As regards political institutions, part of the literature on autocratic regimes maintained for a 
long time that they are just places that facilitate the distribution of rents to allied or potential 
opponents (Collier 1982), or window-dressing tools for the autocratic leadership to maintain 
power (Linz 1973, O’Donnell 1979). While this might be one of the purposes for the very 
establishment of some political institutions (such as legislatures) in the first place, recent 
literature has tried to “take institutions seriously”. The aim is to rationalize the reasons why 
such institutions exist and resist in authoritarian regimes, while at first glance they may 
appear to risk undermining the legitimacy or the cohesiveness of the ruling elite. This 
literature treats institutions, and especially formal political institutions (legislatures, parties, 
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and elections), as places or events where compromise and co-optation can occur between the 
ruling elites and the potential opposition (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). 
Formally, there are mainly two mechanisms through which institutions might prop up the 
chances for autocratic regimes to “survive”: 
 
a) more institutionalised regimes depend less on leaders. Therefore, when these leaders 
die or are ousted, succession mechanisms are already in place and can be relied upon 
in order to legitimize succession (Geddes et al. 2014). This decreases the likelihood 
of intra-elite infighting resulting in attempts at overturning the current political 
regime, and/or a lower likelihood of protests by the general population; 
b) institutionalized autocratic regimes may include some acceptable “venting 
mechanisms” for the opposition (elites and citizens alike) to express their discontent 
in a manageable way for those in power. In particular, the literature emphasized the 
peculiar and important role played by: limited participation to some governing 
decisions (Magaloni 2008), the presence of legislatures that allow a limited presence 
and organization to the opposition (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006), free but not fair 
elections (Levitsky and Way 2002, Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009), or a limited 
tolerance for political protests or expressions of political dissent (Magaloni and 
Wallace 2008, Kendall Taylor and Frantz 2014, Rød and Weidmann 2015). 
 
In a word, countries that might at first appear to be more prone to transition towards 
democracy, or at least to experience more instability being not entirely autocratic and 
presenting a certain degree of partially liberalized institutions, under certain conditions might 
instead be best suited to withstand political, social, economic or other shocks and, therefore, 
to survive through critical periods. 
Namely, each autocracy (and, one might add, any political regime) has three ways to survive 
changing conditions: being consistently considered as legitimate; repressing or managing 
dissent; and co-opting political opponents. Legitimacy, repression, and co-optation are the 
three tools that governing elites must juggle in order to remain in power and, more generally, 
political regimes must rely upon to survive. Clearly, under democracy the “legitimacy 
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channel” is the most resorted to, being enforced through the periodic holding of elections, a 
higher degree of checks and balances constraining governing actors, and legal rules to 
terminate governments that may fail to respect the meta-political norms of that particular 
polity. However, co-optation mechanisms are certainly at work even in durable and stable 
democracies, while repression must clearly be left as a tool of last resort when all else fails. 
Under autocracy, instead, co-optation and repression are far more frequent, while legitimacy 
tends to be far more difficult to garner and preserve (Gerschewski 2013, Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2007). 
Now that more than a decade has passed from this latest blossoming of autocratic survival 
and its correlates, one may regard this literature as already almost “classic”, with datasets on 
autocracies like Geddes et al. 2014 being cited over 150 times in less than two years from 
publication. This field of research however still has to grapple with the fact that, while 
scholars have focussed on democratization trends and on autocratic survival, very few studies 
appear to have been interested in studying whether common causes may induce a country to 
“liberalize” in a general sense. 
Sticking to a bipartition of the political regime space, at least ideally, between autocracies 
and democracies, some comparatists have been blind to liberalization trends, instead 
referring to countries that did not fully democratize as being “stuck” in a nobody’s land. 
Other scholars decided to categorize countries that did not fit neatly within the bipolar policy 
space as just “hybrid”: this, in turn, appeared to create a lack of interest in studying 
similarities and differences within this residual category. Finally, autocratic studies have 
“appropriated” these hybrid non-democracies and started to place them in different categories 
in order to study their resilience in the face of different institutions, behaviour, origins, or 
comprehensive political “setting” of a country. 
This points to a road that still has to be followed to its very end. To my knowledge, scholars 
have yet to attempt to place “pure” autocracies and “hybrid regimes” over a spectrum of 
different levels/degrees of political liberalization, and then study whether: (a) the correlates 
of democratization are the same as, or similar to, the correlates of liberalization; (b) the 
mechanisms that may push autocrats may decide to liberalize are similar, and to what extent, 
to mechanisms that bring about democratization. 
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This is precisely what I will try to do from Chapter 2 onwards. Before that, however, my aim 
is to delve deeper in the correlates of political regime type as identified in past and current 
literature on the correlates of political regime type. This is important in order to preliminarily 
check whether some mechanisms and correlates identified as fit to influence the decision of 
the actors of a particular polity to democratize or not, may be already fit (or only require 
minor adjustments) in order to study the mechanisms and correlates of liberalization trends 
in general. 
Although I try to stray from normative judgment, as stated before no scholar can be regarded 
as being only a “positive scholar” – certainly not so in a social sciences setting. Therefore, I 
prefer to interpret my work also under an ethical/moral light, and to set my preferences 
straight instead of being subtly guided (and possibly biased) by them. Normatively, my 
opinion is clear: liberalization is always to be preferred, whether this brings to proper 
democratization, or whether it simply brings an authoritarian country to employ a more 
tolerant strategy in order to guarantee its survival. Pragmatically, not all countries or all elites 
may prefer democratization, or be able to enforce and preserve democratic institutions in 
practice. 
I must also acknowledge that it is true that, by partially liberalizing, a country may be 
anticipating some liberalization today but postponing democracy in the future. This is the 
reason why the total inter-generational “liberalization level” is difficult to calculate: what is 
a country giving up tomorrow by ensuring some degree of liberalization today, and how 
should we value liberalization within an autocracy as compared to democratization? 
However, it is precisely this uncertainty that makes me be more prone to favour (any kind 
of) liberalization today than proper democratization in an uncertain and possibly very distant 
future. 
I believe that, even normatively, scholars should re-evaluate liberalization conditions and 
make do with what they find in the world today. Our preferences for a world free of tyranny 
and oppressions should be acknowledged, but not get in the way of our scholarly research. 
Our studies should be as theoretically sound and as empirically robust as possible. 
Our quest is to describe how the world is and why it is so; not how we would want it to be. 
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1.2. Correlates of political regimes and political liberalization 
 
Over the course of the last century, comparative politics scholars have advanced a huge 
number of tentative explanations for what causes a country to democratize, what enhances 
the likelihood that it stays democratic in the medium-to-long run instead of “falling back” 
into autocracy, and more recently what tends to stabilize political regimes in general. 
The movement towards a progressively more scientific comparative politics literature, and a 
growing focus towards medium- and large-N studies (see section 1.1.2), uncovered a number 
of correlates of democracies and autocracies, ranging from domestic political, institutional, 
social, economic, and ethnic variables, to regional and international factors, to more 
structural effects such as the structure of the international system or wave-like regime change 
chains. 
At the same time, very few variables have been found to correlate with specific regime types 
in a consistent and unequivocal manner. This is certainly something not unique to the 
comparative politics literature: it is typical of studies in fields as diverse as psychology, 
medicine, or even the hardest sciences of all, such as theoretical physics, to uncover 
contradictory results, as debates rage on for decades at times. However, social sciences are 
most prone to controversy given that human behaviour is hard to predict and even harder to 
study. This is all the more the case whenever controlled experiments are impossible or 
unethical to undertake, so that causation is much harder to tell apart from spurious correlation 
(Desposato 2015). 
Debates notwithstanding, in the following section I will outline some of the most robust 
correlates of democratization, the mechanisms proposed by authors to explain their 
importance, and their robustness to statistical testing. 
First of all, however, a preliminary caveat. Given the difficulty to ascertain causality, 
researchers have employed various methods with different degrees of success in order to 
dismiss spurious relationships and, hopefully, leave just causal links. The first and most 
consistent method adopted is to employ panel data instead of cross-sectional data, and justify 
the jump from correlation to causation by lagging independent variables so that correlates 
occur before the outcome variable. This is called Granger causality, from the Nobel laureate 
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in economics Clive Granger. Granger (1969) proposed that the belief of causality and not just 
correlation could be reinforced by the ability of any variable to predict future values of 
another. To be sure, this method has huge liabilities: the direction of causality could be the 
opposite, and one would still find a significant correlation in the series in case of slowly 
moving variables. However, this is the first and the most common test in comparative politics 
– again due to the difficulty, outright impossibility or unethicalness of controlled 
experiments. History occurs just once and we cannot rerun it, changing one or more correlates 
while keeping others fixed – in other words, we never have a counterfactual at hand. 
Although some movement towards “natural experiments” and the employment of 
instrumental variables in order to control for endogeneity has seen some progress over the 
last two decades, finding an instrument or a natural experiment still requires considerable 
time, effort and most of the times still results in controversy, requiring it to be thoroughly 
defended through a number of assumptions. 
This is why it is important to stress that correlates and causal mechanisms are intended here 
as facilitating conditions. Statistically, those variables we believe to bear upon the choice and 
stability of political regimes should be found to increase likelihoods, but leave an important 
– and generally very wide – space for agency. It will always be possible to find “deviant” 
cases of democracy and autocracy, i.e. countries that are democratic in spite of a lack of 
facilitating conditions or an abundance of hindering conditions, or vice versa countries that 
are autocratic in spite of the presence of many factors that would facilitate democratization 
(Doorenspleet and Mudde 2008). Unobservable structural factors, together with agents’ 
preferences not captured in their utility function (see Chapter 2), play a role in establishing 
whether facilitating conditions will ultimately act as a “trigger” for regime change, or 
whether things will remain as they stand despite them: as I will find in Chapter 2, and show 
extensively in practice in Chapter 6, political regimes prove highly resilient to changing 
conditions. 
All this underscores the puzzling place for case studies in the today’s comparative politics. 
Indeed, case studies, or even comparisons among a relatively limited number of countries in 
the world, tend to become more useful in the earlier stages of analysis and theory 
development, as heuristic tools that help scholars to identify hitherto missing explanans. 
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They may also serve as a way to complement large-N quantitative studies, when variables 
are difficult to measure, or when the underlying mechanisms are conceivably too complex to 
be modelled – although in the latter case a much bigger burden of proof falls onto the case 
studies’ authors, considering the increasing availability of indicators for the most diverse 
research fields, and recent advances in formal modelling. 
Given that case studies move from national or regional histories and try to simplify and 
contrast them in order to highlight possibly overlooked factors or general dynamics, they 
tend to lose relevance in the later stages of a proper comparative politics study, mainly due 
to the observational biases that they induce in a field that is already plagued by the paucity, 
or absence of viable experimental conditions. 
In particular, the mere selection of cases to be contrasted is an intellectual operation that is 
based more on previous knowledge, precedent, and intuition than on systematic analysis. The 
frequency with which the United Kingdom and France’s paths towards modern democracy 
have been called upon since the earliest stages of comparative political studies mirrors the 
eagerness with which, today, scholars call upon the two countries’ different (average) 
relationships with their colonies to explain some current features of post-colonial nation 
states. 
While this does not imply that fundamental insights cannot emerge from new case studies, it 
does appear to stack the cards against them as useful to infer some “general laws” on the 
structural determinants of political regimes and their stability. In short, case studies per se, 
and the generalizations that may be derived from them, appear no more than relics of a pre-
scientific past of the discipline. 
As human inquiry and ingenuity are constantly limited by the ability of the human mind to 
consider more than a handful of factors together – and typological models in political science 
clearly display the same limitations through the ubiquitousness of two-, or at best three-
dimensional scatterplots (Dahl 1971, Huntington 1991) –, only statistical models, with all 
their issues arising from linearity assumptions, multicollinearity problems, and omitted 
variables biases, can be deemed useful in testing hypotheses in a joint and systematic way. 
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1.2.1.  Path dependence and long-run conditions 
 
The first set of conditions liable to have a bearing upon political regimes is rooted in history. 
In particular, this strand of research focuses on studying the development and consolidation 
of persistent institutions that tend to reinforce a particular set of norms and conditions thought 
to be preconditions to the development of properly democratic institutions. 
Particularly fertile proposals appear to come from the literature of path dependence and 
“critical junctures”. According to this literature, there are peculiar moments within a polity’s 
history that tend to determine its future in terms of the likelihood that it will develop 
democratic institutions, together with a set of other more specific institutions, regimes, and 
norms. In these peculiar, defining moments, often occurring in a period of high instability or 
quasi-revolutionary conditions, political institutions are particularly flexible and pliable, and 
can be moulded much more easily by actors that can model them after foreign examples, or 
according to different principles than the ones that dominated under the previous regime. 
Once some forces are set in motion during these peculiar critical-juncture periods, they tend 
to be self-reinforcing, setting a country upon a particular path that it will be difficult to make 
it stray from further down the road. 
The literature on sociological path dependence, which is sometimes referred to as historical 
institutionalism, draws heavily from economics (Arthur 1994, Mahoney 2000, Beyer 2010), 
and sometimes the authors in comparative politics even assume that the same mechanisms 
may be at play in determining the conditions within a polity than there may be in other fields 
that are clearly much more path-dependent, such as technology. Think, for example, to the 
Qwerty keyboard: after a period during which different kinds of keyboards competed for 
market share, the Qwerty keyboard ultimately emerged victorious. Although this keyboard 
may not be more efficient than others with different letter dispositions, by the time other 
optimisation attempts were done, operators had already become so proficient with the Qwerty 
setting that no other method could prove to be better and, even if it could, Qwerty keyboard 
were so ubiquitous that the cost to replace typewriters (and, later, computer keyboards) and 
training people outweighed any potential short-term gain. Another example may be car 
driving technology. 
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For path dependence to occur, initial economies of scale and positive feedback loops must 
reinforce a condition and tend to make it so hard to change that it sticks there for a very long 
time. In other words, they help a custom, condition, or institution to become “locked in”. 
However, sociologists and historians have few examples of institutions self-reinforcing 
themselves and becoming engrained due to some sort of increasing returns, economies of 
scale process. Generally, institutions tend to be born out of unlikely events and get more and 
more engrained not through their “efficiency”, but because humans tend to get used to them. 
One might explain Christianity, or in fact any religion, through processes of “inertia and 
resilience” whereby small sects have had to fight for survival for decades or centuries, but 
then suddenly become predominant and even taken for granted (Schwartz 2004, Boas 2007). 
These institutions become “locked in” only after a certain set of particular conditions has 
realized that had little to do with increasing returns, but is in fact rooted in contingent 
decisions by powerful actors: in the case of Christianity, think of how Christians were 
emarginated for over two centuries, and then officially persecuted starting in 250 CE by 
emperor Decius. After around half a century, these policies were reversed by Galerius in 311 
and Constantine I in 313, and Christianity finally became the state church of the Roman 
Empire in 380. Similar processes have characterized most heresies: it is very hard to tell 
which will be persecuted until being almost totally wiped out, and which instead will catch 
on and become a widespread alternative, possibly to the point of being officially recognized 
by whole societies or states (Koenig 2012). 
Ultimately, this literature explains the locking in of institutions with the passing of time and 
historical junctures.  
By their mere existence, some institutions tend to raise the cost of their own demise. Some 
studies within the democratic consolidation literature argued that proportional (versus 
majoritarian) representation and parliamentarism (versus presidentialism) may contribute to 
stabilizing democracy by providing losers of an election with the best chances to influence 
politics and, after some years, to wield more power directly by winning elections (O’Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986; Linz and Valenzuela 1994). At a higher level, Przeworski (1991) argued 
that proportional representation and parliamentarism would have a stabilizing effect by 
discouraging elites from trying to overthrow the elected government and install an autocratic 
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regime instead: overall, according to him, parliamentarism “reduced the stake of political 
battles” and, this way, contributed to stabilizing democracy. 
Some articles have argued against this form of stability-inducing consolidation, either 
because they found that institutions deemed to be stable were in fact subject to change much 
more frequently than thought at first (Alexander 2001), or because consolidated democracies 
were found to employ a wide variety of voting systems or government-parliament 
relationships. 
Another strand of the literature emphasizes less path-dependence and more long-run 
conditions that build up and prepare a polity to democracy. Studies underline the role of 
culture, pre-state and/or colonial history, and sometimes religion. 
Superficially linked to path dependence, these studies in fact approach the problem of the 
historical causes of autocracy and democracy by a wholly different angle. Path dependence 
postulates that an abrupt change, whose effects may be small in the short run, puts a country 
on a different path that is then self-reinforcing and becomes difficult to reverse.  
When they highlight long-run conditions, instead, scholars point at features of a polity that 
may have been centuries in the making. Sometimes, such conditions pertain to single polities 
or ethno-social groups, but most of the times scholars highlight that common causes may 
affect entire regions or areas of the words, shaping their institutional preferences and 
ultimately their attitudes towards democracy. 
Inglehart and Welzer (2003, 2005) found that orientations to trust, tolerance, and 
participation shaped the likelihood of each polity to adopt democratic institutions. At the 
same time, “patterns from a deep past” appear to correlate with contemporary political 
cleavages, discourses, partisan affiliation, and ultimately institutional choice in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Ekiert and Ziblatt 2013) and Western Africa (Owusu 1997) 
More generally, some scholars tend to argue that culture may shape conceptions of political 
legitimacy. For example, Hinnebusch (2006) states that “it is plausible to argue that Islamic 
traditions accept authoritarian leadership as long as it is seen to serve the collective interest, 
that is, defends the community from outside threats and delivers welfare to which people feel 
entitled, and as long as it is seen to consult with the community (shura)”. 
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Colonial dependence is also seen to possibly shape the future of a polity. Early studies, such 
as Crenshaw (1995), highlighted the importance of “proto-modernity” and the pre-industrial 
past that would lay the foundations to pluralism (something similar to Inglehart, see above), 
finding that colonial dependence and the imposition of democracy by the past colonial leader 
were in fact conducive to democratization. More recently, however, other studies (Wejnert 
2014) appear to throw this finding into doubt. A similar question on the long-run role of 
colonial rule upon the likelihood of democratization may also be retraced in the debate on 
the effects of institutions on economic performance, whereby some argue that different 
colonization policies adopted by the colonial ruler have a direct effect on current income per 
capita (and, this way, on democracy through the modernization hypothesis, see below; 
Acemoglu et al. 2001), while others found even longer-run effects of geographic location 
over levels of income per capita (Sachs 2003; Haber and Menaldo 2011b). 
Finally, Moore (1966) offers an interpretation that has to do with less long-run effects, but 
still spans decades if not centuries. According to him, social structure explains the political 
paths that states embark upon. Social structural analysis posits that democracy can be viable 
only when dominant classes and civil society achieve a balance, so that the state is influenced 
by dominant classes but not totally captured by them. For democracy to come to life, the 
dynamics of socio-political life need to bring to the emergence of a democratic coalition. 
Historically, this has been a mix of the middle class and the working class, where the former 
is concerned with expanding political liberalization, while the latter aims at broadening 
participation and substantive equal opportunities. Where dominant classes continue to 
subordinate lower classes, the outcome is a right-wing autocracy; while where workers (and 
agricultural farmers) revolt in a revolution, succeeding in overthrowing the dominant class 
and seizing power, left-wing authoritarianism results. 
All these long-run causes can be easily generalizable to degrees of “liberalization”, even short 
to democracy. In fact, just by looking at the Polity IV time series, one can see that the current 
stable European democracies took a long time to democratize and fell far short of democracy 
by contemporary standards for long periods of time. The liberalization process took decades, 
if not centuries, amid setbacks and democratic retrenchment. The UK and France offer two 
models of progressive or “revolutionary” democratization, and appear to show that only 
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where democracy has time to develop and then consolidate, will it be less at risk of 
experiencing a “failure” towards a new autocratic experience (Tilly 2004). 
Though fascinating, it is very hard to test theories of long-run determinants of political 
regimes. For one, these long-run causes constantly interact with contingent conditions, and 
it is often hard to separate potential equilibria that are “shocked” in the short term when, as 
it is the case here, political regimes prove to be quite durable and resistant to change (so that 
once they are shocked it may take years before they go back to their stable-state equilibrium). 
It is therefore hard to test whether some long-run equilibria are indeed present, or whether 
any institution is contingent upon present conditions that share nothing with the past but 
similarities due to the inertia and slow-movement of the correlates of political regime type 
and regime stability. 
 
 
1.2.2.  Socioeconomic factors 
 
In 1959, Seymour Martin Lipset found a strong, positive correlation between democracy and 
the level of income per capita in a cross-section of countries in the world (Lipset 1959). Thus, 
the modernization theory was born. Just a few years later, Lipset managed to sum up his 
theory in a few, simple words: “All the various aspects of economic development – 
industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education – are so closely interrelated as to form 
one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy” (Lipset 1963). 
The correlation between democracy and income per capita has proven to be so durable that 
it has become the mainstay of comparative politics handbooks, and of multiple attempts of 
testing it – sometimes with the specific purpose to refute it. Indeed, almost two decades ago 
Przeworski and Limongi (1997) found that income per capita could not predict transitions 
towards democracy: while the correlation resisted in explaining levels of democratization, 
and also appeared to enhance the likelihood that an already-democratic country would not 
fall back into authoritarianism (they called this “exogenous democratization”), it did not 
correlate in any meaningful way with the likelihood to democratize given that a country was 
not democratic yet (or “endogenous democratization”). 
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Their finding was contradicted by Boix and Stokes (2003), who replicated the earlier study 
but corrected it in different ways, finding support for the modernization theory in both its 
exogenous and endogenous form. A second study form Epstein et al. (2006) also found 
support in favor of the modernization theory, but its reliance upon the uncorrected Polity IV 
index, and its focus upon partial democracies as opposed to full democracies, may have 
slightly biased their results – a replication with the corrected version of Polity that I present 
in section 3.3 might be in order. 
Meanwhile, Acemoglu et al. (2008) found that the relationship held steadily at the between-
country level, but failed to materialize at the within-country level. To them, this proved that 
the relationship was either spurious, or could not in any case explain the trajectory towards 
democratization undertaken by countries given changes in their income per capita. 
Eventually, Fayad et al. (2012) appeared to disprove their findings by employing a method 
that did not include country fixed effects, therefore preserving a sufficient level of variability 
and not discarding information from the dataset, while at the same time offering a method to 
control for time-invariant omitted variables. 
While results conflicted, one great conceptual advancement today is that we are able to look 
at the modernization hypothesis from at least two different angles: does income level per 
capita make countries more likely to democratize, or does it simply support democracies into 
not falling back towards autocracy? Or is the relationship more complex still? 
A second interesting relationship between democracy and socio-economic factors is that 
between democracy and inequality. The literature is highly diverse, and tends to come up 
with contradictory results. Acemoglu et al. (2013) find that, contrary to the tenets of 
theoretical models with a representative agent of the median voter, democracy does not tend 
to decrease inequality at all times, but does so only at certain conditions. At the same time, 
higher inequality does not tend to lead to democracy more often – for example due to popular 
revolt, or the emergence of a more pro-median voter elite that musters support from her. 
Theoretically, the link between democracy and inequality has been covered by two 
competing theories. Boix (2003) argues in favor of the fact that democratization should 
decrease inequality, so that higher inequality should be found in more autocratic regimes. On 
the other hand, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that the relationship between 
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democracy and inequality should follow an inverted U, predicting that only countries with 
average levels of inequality should tend to democratize. 
A plethora of other demographic, economic, or social conditions have been proposed or 
found to influence the likelihood of a country to democratize: among them, it is possible to 
include education (Glaeser et al. 2006), ethno-linguistic fragmentation (Merkel and Weiffen 
2012; but see Fish and Kroenig 2006), poverty (Sabatini and Arias 2007; but Krishna 2008 
disproves it, showing that the relationship is mediated by changes in education levels), and 
urbanization (Lechler 2014). While for all these cases some scholars have found results 
contradicting the relationship, these correlations appear to be among the most robust to be 
found in the literature. 
An important question that may be asked is: does democracy precede or follow these socio-
economic correlates? In his essay, Kaplan (1997) argues that “democracy emerges 
successfully only as a capstone to other social and economic achievements”, while Ikenberry 
(1999) thinks that democracy is instrumental at making countries grow more peaceful and 
economically interdependent, thus improving the very socio-economic conditions that 
correlate with it. 
Clearly, issues of timing and reverse causality constantly plague all questions of correlation 
between democracy and any other factor. But it is even more urgent to disentangle cause 
from effect when correlates can vary rapidly over the short term, as in the case of economic 
growth. The question here is: assuming that democracies tend to grow faster than non-
democracies, do they do so because they are democracies, or is it that given that they grow 
faster, they had a higher likelihood to democratize in the first place? 
Looming in the background is a further question still: do democracies really tend to grow 
faster than non-democracies? Some authors argue as much (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), 
but the existence of important counterexamples since the last quarter of the 20th century 
works against their theory: how to explain, for example, Singapore, South Korea (starting to 
grow rapidly before democratizing), South-East Asian countries and, most of all, China? 
While growth in autocracies that depend on the export of primary commodities could be 
explained away once accounting for fluctuations in their price and decomposing resource and 
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non-resource growth (Fayad et al. 2012), Acemoglu and Robinson’s argument stumbles in 
explaining catch-up economic growth in relatively resource-poor autocratic countries. 
The debate in the literature notwithstanding, all these factors, from slow-moving 
demographic conditions such as urbanization levels, to those changing much more rapidly, 
such as economic growth, appear to be liable to being extended to a test for liberalization 
conditions, and not just democratization per se. It would be especially interesting to 
understand whether correlates of democracy and autocracy are robust to liberalization 
movements even within autocracy – and whether theory may help us in tracing the 
relationship between socio-economic factors and liberalization levels, or between them and 
the likelihood of further liberalizing. 
 
 
1.2.3.  Domestic actors’ characteristics and their structural relationships 
 
Correlates of political regime type and regime stability may not just depend upon long-term 
or more contingent conditions of a particular country, but also on the relationship between 
relevant political actors within it. According to Vanhanen (2003), for example, democracy 
does not depend on a high level of socioeconomic development. Instead, it “presuppose[s] 
the distribution of economic and intellectual power among various social groups and their 
elites”. 
Possibly the most famous theory relating the structural relationships between domestic actors 
to effects upon the choice of political regime is the selectorate theory.  
The selectorate theory gives up the distinction between democracies and autocracies, 
resorting instead to a classification over a two-dimensional space: the size of the selectorate 
and the size of the winning coalition. The former comprises the subset of citizens that can 
have a say in selecting the leader; the latter, instead, is the subset of the selectorate whose 
support the leader needs to remain in office (Bueno De Mesquita 2003 et al.). While the 
theory does not tell democracies and autocracies apart, it is actually fairly straightforward to 
map typologies of the bipartite democracy-autocracy space onto the bipartite space of 
selectorate and winning coalition sizes. This mapping shows that there is a notable difference 
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between democracies and autocracies, especially in terms of the size of the winning coalition: 
in democracies, winning coalitions are much larger because to remain in office leaders need 
the support of the median voter. The theory goes on to predict that countries with relatively 
larger winning coalitions will tend to provide more public goods while autocrats will provide 
a mix of public/private goods depending on the ratio between the selectorate and the winning 
coalition. 
One huge benefit of such a theory is that it suggests the need to cut across the political space, 
going beyond typologies of regime types based upon certain institutional or leadership 
conditions, such as the by-now classic tripartition of autocratic regimes between military, 
civilian, and monarchic (see Gandhi and Przeworski 2007 and Cheibub et al. 2008, to which 
Geddes et al. 2014 add the personalistic category). The selectorate theory suggests a 
compelling way forward, and highlights a narrow gap in the literature that still needs to be 
filled by competing theories. 
Although very convincing, the selectorate theory is hard to test, because it is very difficult to 
gauge intangibles such as the size of the selectorate or the winning coalitions in autocracies, 
and it is hard as well to measure how the two vary year after year within a country (Gallagher 
and Hanson 2015). Also, earlier empirical findings derived from this theory have proven to 
be very sensitive to different operationalizations, and highly model dependent (Clarke and 
Stone 2006). 
Therefore, while I am persuaded that domestic actors’ structural interactions may shape the 
present and future path of a polity, included the choice of political regime, I am also 
convinced that the discipline is in need of further theoretical modelling that is liable to bear 
useful results or to uncover previously overlooked (or poorly modelled) relationships. The 
last decade has not been stingy with modelling attempts, as mentioned in section 2.2. Though 
important findings and insights can already be found in the current literature, I will argue that 
there is still space to shed novel insights upon the theoretical mechanisms of political regime 
choice, and to do so by modelling the specific relationships between a polity’s actors, as other 
parameters vary. To me, this appears to be the best way to account for the structural role of 
agency, while clearly leaving some or even most space to the role of specific actors within a 
Chapter 1. Political Regimes 
29 
 
polity, or to personal traits of relevant political figures, that are impossible to generalize and 
even less to incorporate within a model. 
The role of “relevant figures” should constantly and thoroughly be explored: but this is more 
the duty of historical studies than it is comparative politics’. Meanwhile, in the following 
paragraphs I simply focus on the identity of potentially relevant actors within both a 
democratic and an autocratic polity. 
First of all, the elites. Italian scholars Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto posited that power 
in a society is always fought over by a political oligopoly, composed of a number of elites. 
According to John Dewey, indeed, power will always be contended by elites, and 
democracy’s purpose is to manage the unresolvable equation between a power that is too 
disperse, and one that is too concentrated. Striking the proper balance is both hard and 
essential, and meanwhile a polity evolves around the current concentration of power – that 
one may formalize as the preferences of the ruling elites and the citizens’. 
Among elites, in comparative politics one in particular stands out for its role: the military. 
The latter is often found to be either guiding the process towards democratization, protecting 
it from other forces; or (as a whole or as a subset) is found to be the author or guarantor of a 
coup d’etat that ushers in a new period of autocratic rule. Even in a democracy, the peculiar 
equilibrium in civil-military relationships has been extensively investigated in the literature 
(Finer 1962, Nordlinger 1977, Sundhaussen 2002). 
Finally, and aside from specific groups that may merit scrupulous study, leaders are important 
per se for the survival and features of a specific political regime – especially for autocracies. 
While studies trying to account for differences in leaders’ psychology (Post 2004) do not 
properly belong to the comparative politics literature, recent studies on autocracies have 
focused on a leader’s way of demise from office, trying to account for systematic differences 
that may explain why they are ousted, how, and what makes them more or less resilient 
(Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2014). 
To conclude, the literature on the characteristics, preferences, and role of various domestic 
actors appears to be important especially in modelling relationships in a more complex, 
refined, and precise way than it would be possible to do in plain words. While models will 
never be able to account for the wide variety of citizen-elite, or of civil-military relations, 
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they are important to scholars as “mediators” of other correlates. Otherwise, correlates could 
only remain theoretically un-modelled, which entails that a researcher could never be 
confident that a linear relationship between democracy, or liberalization levels, and specific 
correlates is the best test for her/his theory, or that any other different functional form should 
be preferred to it. 
 
 
1.2.4.  International and regional conditions: diffusion and contagion 
 
Scholars of comparative politics have often found themselves grappling with the fact that 
their discipline shares some elements with domestic political studies (classical political 
science) and others with international relations studies. Moreover, while initially 
comparatists were mostly composed of scholars interested in comparing the domestic 
political systems of two or more countries (or some specific institutions within them), it 
appears that nowadays more and more persons are drawn to study comparative politics after 
studies with a more “internationalist” profile (Golder and Golder 2015). I include myself 
among the latter category. 
This is probably why, while scholars periodically acknowledged the need to account for 
international factors shaping or influencing the choices of domestic political actors (Rustow 
1970, Ross and Homer 1976, O’Donnell et al. 1986), this relationship was seldom taken into 
serious account until about three decades ago. Starting from the Nineties a growing interest 
on the interaction between domestic and regional or international conditions gave rise to a 
small but important niche investigating political regime diffusion. This renewed interest 
possibly originated from the observation of current international events, showing that for 
most countries affected by conflict in many regions of the world, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the Middle East and North Africa, or South Asia, political borders did not act as a watershed, 
and violence frequently spilled over from a country to its neighbours (Lake and Rothchild 
1999, Gleditsch 2002). At the same time, diffusion arguments were bolstered by what 
appeared to be an acceleration of globalization processes (which would increase the 
frequency and intensity of interactions between countries) and a lowering of barriers between 
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nation-states (increase of visa-free travel zones, international migrants and international 
tourists alike). 
The hypothesis that political regime types, like conflict, tend to cluster in space has sprung 
out from the empirical observation that some areas of the world are more prone to 
democratize or remain democratic, while others are much more prone to remain autocratic or 
for democracy to remain fragile and constantly at risk of falling backwards towards 
autocracy. From here, a plethora of studies originated and were produced over the last two 
decades in order to assess whether regional diffusion processes were ongoing, both in terms 
of conflicts, and in the likelihood of choosing a certain political regime type – and the chances 
that it survives in a “hostile” or “benevolent” regional environment (see the appendix to 
Chapter 6 for a broader literature review and for an extensive discussion of the results and 
the problems involved in the study of regime diffusion). 
The studies of regional processes that produce political regime clusters has however come 
up against a series of hurdles that need to be overcome in order to tell whether the observed 
clustering is the result of actual regional and international factors, or whether it is simply the 
result of the spatial clustering of other correlates of political regimes, such as GDP per capita, 
ethnolinguistic fragmentation, inequality, and so on. This issue, known as Galton’s problem, 
has frequently been addressed (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008), but it is hard – if not near to 
impossible – to come up with satisfying solutions, especially in the face of the actual 
clustering of correlates of democracy and autocracy, which complicates the disentanglement 
process. To this day, it remains very hard to test whether regional diffusion processes are 
actually at work or whether it is the clustering of domestic correlates that causes “second-
stage clustering”. Despite all this, even if it were caused for the most part by the clustering 
of domestic conditions, it would nonetheless be interesting to study why the correlates of 
democracy tend to cluster in space themselves. 
Moving to a higher level of abstraction, that of the international system, international 
relations scholars have frequently posited that some configuration of international power 
(between unipolarity, bipolarity, or multipolarity), and the peculiar position and role of each 
country within each system, could shape domestic actors’ preferences towards particular 
political regime types, or constrain their choices by removing some alternatives from their 
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decision set. Boix (2011), for example, argues that “the structure of the international system 
affects the resources and strategies of pro-authoritarian and pro-democratic factions in client 
states”, and that “[t]he proportion of liberal democracies peaks under international orders 
governed by democratic hegemons (…) and bottoms out when authoritarian great powers 
(…) control the system”. 
Indeed, it has been frequently recognized that the perceived strategic value of some countries 
within a definite international system made them an important target for outside attempts at 
influencing or outright imposing political regime types upon them. At the same time, great 
powers tend to promote their own regime type, imposing it upon less powerful countries 
(Owen 2002), while under other conditions they tend to ignore a country’s regime type in 
order to preserve the international balance of power (Levitsky and Way 2006). 
In Chapter 2, I will try to model these conditions by positing that an abrupt change in the 
international system (in my sample, from bipolarity to unipolarity) changes the utility 
function of domestic actors. In particular, I will assume that autocratic leaders will tend to 
perceive increased benefits in leading the liberalization process themselves – irrespective of 
whether the final result is actual democracy, or just the opening up of a previously closed 
autocracy. This should occur in particular during the “unipolar moment”, the decade between 
1991 and 2001 during which the United States could pretty much act as the undisputed 
hegemon of the international system, benefiting from the fall of the Soviet Union which 
allowed Washington to come out as the winner of the Cold War period. Sure, even during 
that decade the US experienced several setbacks, such as in Somalia, Rwanda, or the post-
conflict reconstruction of Former Yugoslavia. But its role in promoting democratization, as 
deep-rooted interventionist and pro-democratic ideas took seat within the US foreign policy 
establishment, was pervasive, also aided by the expansion of liberal economic international 
organizations (Pevehouse 2002) and the use of foreign aid conditionality in order to 
encourage progressive liberalization of the target country (Dunning 2004).  
After at least 2001, however, the US’ focus shifted from democracy promotion to direct 
regime change attempts in some hostile countries (Afghanistan and Iraq) and appeasement 
with other regional autocratic allies such as the Gulf countries. At the same time, rapid 
economic growth in some authoritarian countries (China and Singapore, not to mention 
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resource-rich hydrocarbon exporters) appeared to show that democratization was not 
inevitable in order to prop up growth. China, in particular, acted as a strong counterbalance 
to pro-democratization movements, while its emergence also marked the end of the unipolar 
moment as its economic and military might has grown over the last decade and a half. 
Both diffusion processes and the domestic effect of international structure and agency are 
liable to generalizations from democratization to levels of liberalization. In fact, it is striking 
how easily such arguments can be extended to comprise general movements towards a 
progressive opening of closed autocracies. On the one hand, autocrats wishing to preserve 
their power might pretend to initiate a democratization process, while stopping well short of 
properly democratizing their countries but still managing to “appease” both neighbours (in 
cases of democratic diffusion and regional pressures) and liberal superpowers. On the other 
hand, liberalization processes are often the only gradual, coordinated way that governing 
elites have in order to lead a sufficiently orderly democratization process, as sudden 
democratization might threaten to undermine their power or outright unseat them. 
Therefore, liberalization processes appear to be natural extensions of democratization 
processes even with respect to regional diffusion and international determinants of domestic 
pressures towards liberalization or autocratic retrenchment. 
 
 
1.2.5.  Time windows, waves, and sequencing 
 
A final source of “contagion” found in the comparative politics literature on democratization 
has less to do with regional diffusion and more to do with time. This strand of literature 
postulates that there exists a precise timing, not specific of a single polity but of the 
international environment as a whole, that can determine the fate of attempts to 
democratization, by increasing or decreasing the likelihood of their success. 
In his famous 1991 book, Huntington described what he called a “third wave” of 
democratization that he assumed had started during the Seventies and was still ongoing. In 
order to explain this renewed push towards democratization, he pointed at changes in 
socioeconomic and ideological conditions, highlighting the role of the Catholic Church in 
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Communist countries such as Poland, coupled with international efforts to promote 
democracy by Europe and the US (Huntington 1991). This way, Huntington was explaining 
a trend as driven by a change of different factors, so that the wave was mainly exogenously 
driven by a wave-like change in the correlates of democratization. 
However, it may be interesting to investigate whether waves, either towards democratization 
or autocratic retrenchment, are robust to controlling for the simultaneous change in other 
correlates. 
This is equivalent to asking whether observed global waves towards democratization and 
back are completely determined by the change in other correlates, or whether a “time shock” 
domino effect is present, so that the trend cannot be entirely explained away by other 
correlates. In other words: are time effects significant, and do they tend to cluster in waves? 
Is the “third wave” evident along the whole 1970s-early 1990s time window suggested by 
Huntington, or is it significantly smaller? Are any other waves, either towards 
democratization or autocratic retrenchment, evident in recent decades, or was that a rare and 
peculiar event?  
This is similar, but significantly different from “democratic diffusion” approaches that rely 
upon geography or network linkages (Starr 1991), and suggests the significance of time 
windows rather than changes in the configuration of neighbours’ political regimes. 
Teorell (2010) finds some support for waves occurring over time, but he also associates wave 
effects to regional effects, while I am interested in disentangling them, possibly controlling 
for both in the same multivariate setting. 
Here, a “wave” can be explained as contagion through time, meaning that something 
happening in some parts of the world (arguably nearer than farther, but not necessarily so) 
increases the likelihood that it also happens elsewhere. In particular, once a certain threshold 
in the number of events is reached, emulation processes and a continuation of initial 
favourable conditions (conducive either to democracy or autocracy) may self-sustain, 
generating a ripple-like effect before dying out due to the exhaustion in the number of 
political regimes sufficiently near the “transition threshold”. The distance from this transition 
threshold provides the required negative feedback that makes the wave come to an end, 
instead of reproducing to infinity. Apart from distance from the threshold due to the 
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combined effect of correlates of democratization, emulation/learning processes may work in 
both ways: for example, in case of democratization waves, they may stimulate increased 
repression in countries that still have to democratize, or heighten fears in citizens, opposition 
elites and the military, in seeing that liberalization processes are stumbling elsewhere or do 
not coincide with initial expectations of rapid and complete democratization. 
In the end, it appears natural to extend the “waves” hypothesis to a liberalization context, 
instead of relegating it to full democratization processes or complete authoritarian 
breakdown. This way, the nuances in a complex process might emerge more easily, and they 
may allow to uncover time trends that would be much harder to come about in a stark, 
bipartite democracy-autocracy setting. 
 
 
1.3. Conclusion 
 
Over the last three decades, comparative politics has made huge strides. At the same time, 
within the discipline the political regime choice-and-change literature has progressively 
caught up with more domestic-oriented research areas in its level of refinement and 
formalization. However, many gaps still need to be filled before the literature on political 
regimes can be deemed to have matured, finally and fully. 
More specifically, as this chapter has shown, most of the processes and mechanisms that 
were proposed to explain the different likelihood in the success of democratization processes 
can be extended to more nuanced liberalization or anti-liberalization trends within each 
country, and this is a gap that strangely appears not to have been filled yet. 
To study processes of liberalization does not imply giving up a normative preference towards 
full democratization. However, it does entail an acknowledgment that, in many countries of 
the world, conditions may not be ripe for outright democratization, as regime changes 
towards democracy have often failed to take root and consolidate, resulting in authoritarian 
breakdowns that were sometimes even less liberal than the existing regime preceding the 
democratizaiton attempt. 
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To say that conditions for a country may not be “ripe” appears to suggest that there are 
specific stages of maturity for every polity, and that democracy is only fit for countries that 
are “mature enough”. In fact, my work aims at shedding some light upon those factors that 
correlate strongly with liberalization trends, and is especially focused on uncovering common 
correlates of liberalization and democratization. Whenever these two processes are related, 
one can be confident that progressive liberalization of autocratic regimes may lead to higher 
chances of democratizing later on – and, possibly, to a higher likelihood of stabilizing and 
consolidating fledgling democracies. On the opposite, when factors that facilitate 
liberalization are instead found to hamper full democratization, this finding will help paint a 
much clearer picture as to the set of conditions that may increase the likelihood of autocratic 
liberalization but hinder full, outright liberalization. 
At the end of the day, studying the correlates of liberalization processes opens up a crucial 
and untrodden path. Throughout the following chapters, I will attempt to formalize the 
political economy game that describes political regime choices, draw a set of hypotheses 
liable to empirical testing, operationalize types of regimes over degrees of liberalization, and 
empirically test hypotheses related with the correlates of democratization and liberalization.
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2.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I identify an important gap in the extant comparative politics literature and 
suggest a way forward. The gap consists in the lack of formalization of some of the 
mechanisms through which a polity’s main actors interact in order to determine a country’s 
future in terms of its choice of political regime. This gap is particularly evident in the 
“political resource curse” literature. 
In fact, theories on regime choice, stability and change, together with their determinants, have 
been the subject of a wealth of research in recent years (see section 2.2). This huge body of 
literature starts off from the premise that, in order to have a clearer picture of the mechanisms 
at play when different actors contend for power, and in order to explain their preference for 
a specific political regime (and its economic consequences, especially concerning the 
redistribution of the resources produced by its labor and capital endowments), we need to 
take a step back and have a look at the bigger context in which the political regime change 
“game” is played.  Only through a formalization of the preferences, utilities, and strategic 
choices of the main actors in this regime change game can we hope to catch a glimpse at how 
a host of political and socio-economic factors affect the socio-political processes involved in 
polity creation – including the choice of political regimes in which thousands of other sub-
games are played daily. 
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I first review some of the main attempts at formalizing regime change in the contemporary 
political economy literature, discussing their features and gaps. Most of the recent attempts 
go a great length at uncovering some of the relationships between regime type and specific 
variables, such as inequality or economic development. However, what tends to be 
overlooked has to do with the way in which informational asymmetry may affect the very 
way in which the “regime choice” game is played. Most importantly, we often lack a 
formalization of the ways in which powerful elites may want to measure the level of political 
dissent by citizens, and of the fact that autocratic leaders tend to be most uncertain about the 
level of support they may enjoy at any specific moment – absent some kind of signal. 
Therefore, I propose an original way to recover political regime equilibria under a formal 
setting, given the peculiar features of a particular polity. My formal model sheds insights on 
some of the important mechanisms that we may expect to bear some significance throughout 
history, and which I will put to the test in Chapter 5. In section 2.6 I derive a set of formal 
hypothesis from the formal model, compare them with some pre-existing literature, and 
develop more hypothesis to be tested in the empirical models in Chapter 5. 
 
 
2.2. The lack of formalization in the ‘resource curse’ literature 
 
In the past four decades, the ‘resource curse’ literature has progressively differentiated into 
three theoretical strands. These strands are only loosely independent, as it is often the case 
that scholars conflate one another when discursively explaining the full effects of natural 
resources over politico-economic outcomes, or assume that one effect follows another in a 
stepwise manner (Ross 2012). 
The first of these strands is the classic ‘economic curse’ literature (alternatively referred to 
as the ‘Dutch disease’ or ‘oil curse’ literature), in which scholars study the effects over a 
country’s economic growth of a high dependence on exports of commodities in general. 
Given the strong empirical relationship found between some particular exported commodities 
and the tendency to follow boom-and-bust cycles and to depress domestic economic 
development of the non-export sector (crowding out investment there; see Arezki and Ismail 
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2010, Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009), this field has specialized towards hydrocarbons 
and extracted minerals dependence. Generally, natural resource dependence is supposed to 
stifle domestic economic growth by decreasing the likelihood of its sustainability in the long 
run, as countries tend to focus on the export of a single primary commodity (or a small set 
thereof), leaving diversification and import-substitution aside. Moreover, dependent 
countries often rely on domestic subsidization of that very commodity, thus losing external 
competitiveness, supporting higher levels of domestic unemployment, and depressing long-
term growth (Arezki and Ismail 2010, Corden 2012, Davis 1995, Frankel 2010). 
A second strand, the ‘conflict studies’ literature, focuses on factors linking natural resources 
to higher levels of domestic (sometimes even regional or international) conflict. Highly-
dependent countries are thought as more prone to experience domestic instability or conflict 
in general, because the more natural resources are present and readily available, the more this 
worsens both ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ processes (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Fearon 2005, 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004). 
Finally, it is possible to identify a ‘political regime strand’. Theorists here ponder on the 
possibility that natural resource-dependent countries may use their non-tax wealth (rents) in 
order to coopt their citizens, or pay the security apparatus to repress them more effectively 
without increasing taxes. This way, they may avoid fueling further discontent before 
repression can be enacted, or may more easily commit to promises to pay rises once 
repression has proven successful. The ultimate consequence is that, given that leaders enjoy 
more latitude thanks to natural resource rents, regimes in these countries tend to be more 
durable autocracies and/or less durable non-consolidated democracies, and therefore expect 
highly-dependent countries to face worse prospects at democratization or higher likelihood 
of authoritarian backslides (Ulfelder 2007, Wright et al. 2013). At the same time, other 
scholars suggest that the presence of non-lootable natural resources may increase the stakes 
of capturing the government through violent (or at least non-constitutional) means, thus 
undermining regime stability and potentially counterbalancing the benefits of power through 
the higher likelihood to face leadership challenges (Ross 2012, Tsui 2011). Scholars find 
even more reason for contention when ‘regime durability’ is replaced by terms such as 
‘regime stability’, as this tends to conflate the mere expectation of a decrease in the likelihood 
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of success of protests or coup attempts in undermining regimes in resource-dependent 
countries with the mere frequency of protests and coup attempts alike (irrespective of their 
likelihood to succeed). 
Here, I focus on the regime strand of the literature. In this field, theoretical mechanisms have 
remained starkly underdeveloped for decades compared to the “economic curse” strand, 
which relies on carefully detailed and fairly complex economic models (for a review, see 
Auty 2001, and Caselli and Cunningham 2009). In general, and irrespective of a growing 
literature over the last 15 years, mechanisms explaining the “political regime” game remain 
underdeveloped also compared to the domestic politics literature, with its focus on electoral 
competition, veto players, coalitions, and political agency (including delegation). 
It is not hard to retrace the reason why regime change has had to wait for a while before 
formalization attempts barged into the field. For one, the movement towards formalization 
took off from domestic politics in a democratic context, and chiefly from electoral politics, 
exactly because of its highly institutionalized, rule-based setting. The latter enhanced the 
plausibility of any further simplification: think of how realistic Downs’ (1957) classical 
model can appear at first when compared to the predominantly two-party nature of the 
contemporary US political landscape. It was therefore somewhat straightforward to reduce 
this setting to a specific set of players, preferences, allowed moves, information distribution 
and (potentially) timing of move disclosure. 
Second, as the setting was already pretty well-defined, with a limited number of actors 
present (President/Congress/electorate; a certain number of relevant parties; a “transmission 
belt” between the government, a specific ministry, and its bureaucracy), this enhanced the 
feasibility of any model. This made possible to preserve some of the complexity of a real-
world context and still reach some meaningful equilibria given a set of free parameters and 
not too many (hopefully plausible) assumptions. 
Under this light, it is also not difficult to understand why, in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the perceived exceptionality of the international strategic and political context – 
which had been abruptly reduced to a contest between two superpowers and two opposing 
political and economic blocs after the long multipolar era – pushed seminal economists and 
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sociologists to finally attempt to crack the code of international interactions (von Neumann 
and Morgenstern 1954; Schelling 1960). 
Between the huge development of the domestic politics and the international relations fields 
(with a starkly lower degree of sophistication for the latter, save for some notable attempts; 
see Signorino 1999, 2002), and constant incursions by political economists formalizing the 
resource curse, the comparative politics field has remained relatively untouched by formal 
theory until the last decade. 
When studying the determinants of political institutions of a particular polity, and what 
makes that outcome different from another in terms of political rights, civil liberties, electoral 
competition, etc., historians and sociologists have swept the comparative field. Few political 
scientists or political economists regarded the field as ready for formalization, possibly 
believing that political regime processes could not easily avoid narrative-driven 
generalizations that fit more with historical accounts and leave little to systematic 
comparison. All this happened while studies of civil wars, domestic conflict, and regime 
change were increasingly turning towards data-driven analyses, creating a mismatch between 
the growing number of empirical models and the lack of formal theories able to formally 
justify their choice of parameters and the formulation of hypotheses around them. 
At the same time, some of the most appealing theories developed to explain political regime 
outcomes in a comparative context remained too disconnect from empirical testing. Take the 
“selectorate theory” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). It is safe to assume that every political 
leaders’ main aim is to remain in power, and that he can also do this while maintaining 
support from his “winning coalition” (the subset of a country’s population who directly 
support him while in power) and from the “selectorate” (the subset of people whose express 
or implicit consent the leader needs in order to avoid being deposed). 
At the same time, the operationalization of such a vague and dynamic set of the population 
as the selectorate might prove too much for the theory, so that attempts at testing it always 
appear to suffer from huge measurement biases. On the other hand, some of the most 
important implications of the theory, such as the fact that autocratic leaders are expected to 
focus more on private goods, while democratic leaders are expected to focus more on public 
goods, while having been tested (Bausch 2014), appear trivial at best and can suffer from 
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second-order measurement biases. In this case, it is very hard to distinguish between private 
and public goods – think of military expenses, which might be classified as public goods if 
they contribute to national defense, but would be very private goods when they are aimed at 
increasing repression capacity or at redistributing income towards a loyal military. 
Despite this disconnect, during the last decade a growing number of seminal papers by 
political economists has contributed to the formalization of models of political regime change 
(Wintrobe 1998, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2006, Cox 2009, Dal Bò and Powell 2009, Acemoglu 2010, Besley and Robinson 
2010, Magaloni 2010, Boix and Svolik 2013, Edmond 2013). These days, scholars interested 
in studying the effects of natural resource dependence over regime stability and durability 
can turn towards a constantly expanding set of analytical and mathematical tools in order to 
close the gap between data and theory, and to support the development of comparative 
politics into a full-fledged, formalized, data-driven field where hypotheses can be derived 
from theory and are liable to empirical testing. 
In our case, informal (i.e., narrative) theoretical mechanisms seem to suggest that natural 
resource dependence might enhance as well as stifle the likelihood of autocratic regime 
survival. One might hope that the progressive formalization of the theory upstream might 
lead to better model specification of econometric models downstream and, possibly, to better 
data collection. 
 
 
2.3. Models of political regime choice 
 
During the last decade, as the last ‘wave’ of democratization fizzled out (it is now regarded 
as at risk of receding, Freedom House 2014), the focus of comparative politics scholars 
appears to have shifted from explaining democratization and democratic consolidation 
processes towards a more neutral and less normative stance. The renaissance of autocratic 
studies has made progressive inroads, and with it has come a theoretical refinement of half-
a-century-old concepts, coupled with a more precise and systematic unpacking of what is 
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hidden in the grey area that the Polity IV index classifies as “anocracy” and “autocracy” (see 
sections 3.1 and 3.2). 
As for autocracies, an important recent advancement in the literature concerns the decision 
to move away from the study of transitions from autocratic towards democratic regimes, and 
vice versa, in order to focus on the durability of autocratic regimes and the intra-regime 
durability of autocratic leaders. Studies have focused on transitions between different types 
of autocratic regime (e.g. from civilian to military authoritarian governments; Geddes et al. 
2014), on the length of tenure of different autocratic leaders (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 
2014), and on the way in which power is passed along the line (in an institutionalized manner 
as opposed to a violent/unconventional removal of the previous leadership; Frantz and Stein 
2012). 
This recent impetus overlaps with a renewed interest in redefining the full spectrum of 
political regimes and the political institutions that characterize each regime. For example, 
after a lull that lasted almost two decades, the study of electoral (as opposed to ‘liberal’ and 
‘substantive’) democracies has finally regained center stage, and is being complemented by 
the study of multiparty electoral systems and other political institutions under autocracy 
(Gandhi 2008, Hadenius and Teorell 2007, Levitsky and Way 2010). In short, scholars today 
are really trying to “unpack” autocracy and see what kind of generalizable concepts may have 
been disregarded by the literature on the ‘degree’ of democracy that rely upon univariate, or 
at most bivariate, indices. 
Meanwhile, formal models of regime change and survival are slowly emerging and being 
refined. Reaching high levels of mathematical complexity, formal models aim at offering a 
simplified (but hopefully plausible) version of reality, and therefore require whoever builds 
them to make a precise choice about what to include in the formal structure of the model and 
what to leave out. As a general caveat, it should be noted that the consequences of adding or 
removing just a single model parameter can be hard to track, and even models with high 
levels of generality and few moving parts can degenerate quickly towards unstable equilibria, 
or offer no simple way to reach non-degenerate solutions without increasing the number of 
assumptions that underlie them. 
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One of the main basic assumption of political economic models is that conflicts between 
citizens and (military or civilian) elites arise out of a divergence about distributional 
preferences over incomes. Elites prefer to increase the share of administered incomes that 
will end up in their own pockets, for a number of reasons that also entail increasing the 
chances to remain in power. Citizens, on the other hand, would prefer an equitable 
distribution of incomes and the use of the remaining portion to generate public goods. In a 
sense, therefore, elites and citizens are seen as possessing diverging interests over one or 
more policies. 
Many variables can have an effect on incomes. Incomes are generated through a production 
function, which is also a function of the tax rate. The tax rate is used by the elite(s) to extract 
a share of the income to be used by the government administration. It may entail producing 
public goods or financing private gains. Also, some resources may accrue to the government 
without taxing the citizen (too much): models refer to these as rents. Again, the leader will 
have to decide how to distribute these rents. 
Formal models always rely on representative agents, i.e. collective actors representing a 
group of people that are considered to share similar, usually in terms of access to political 
power (e.g., citizens, oligarchic elites, the military, etc.). A representative agent has to 
embody the preferences of the socio-economic and political category it represents. In order 
to justify this logical jump from collective actors to a single representative agent, political 
economy models cannot enjoy the luxury of “micro founding” their models in the way current 
state-of-the-art economic models do (Smets and Wouters 2003, Woodford 2008). 
They therefore need to assume that preferences at the micro-level interact in such a way as 
to make it possible to aggregate them at the macro-level most of the times. For the 
representative agent for the citizens, we must therefore suppose that there is a “median 
agent”, or a “median voter”, who embodies the policy preferences of citizens at a median 
income level and at a median level of many other characteristics. For elites, we must suppose 
that intra-elite conflict is absent, and that there is a (collective or single) representative leader 
taking all the decisions. 
While both assumptions might appear highly implausible, we unfortunately would otherwise 
be unable to capture complex dynamics – without the model spiraling out of control –, 
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without making many more assumptions along the way, thus limiting the degrees of freedom 
of many moving parts that we would like to keep free. As with any model, there is a natural 
tradeoff between accuracy and efficiency – between complexity and solvability. 
If we are willing to commit to a representative agent model, we can see where it may bring 
us and what kind of testable hypotheses we may derive from it. Given a distribution of 
preferences over policies, a natural consequence of political economy models is that the 
representative citizen is always better off in a democracy than in any kind of autocracy, 
because in a democratic regime – by voting into office his preferred candidate – he could set 
a policy nearer to his preferences than under any other regime (although principal-agent 
problems might get in the way and skew the results somewhat). In turn, the autocratic leader 
does not want to be ousted, and will do whatever it takes (including repressing and/or 
coopting the citizen(s)) to survive, until costs exceed available resources. Therefore, 
representative agents clash over policies and, ultimately, over the power to decide upon and 
implement such policies. As a consequence of all this, if and when democratization occurs, 
it is the product of strategic interaction between political actors, and the elite always has a 
say in it. This is something we can justify from history, given that it is very rare to find 
historical cases in which democratization occurred through a bottom-up revolution (even the 
great sociologist of revolutions, Charles Tilly, recognizes exactly that, see Tilly 1978; also 
see Skocpol 2015). 
Generally, formal models of regime change try to formalize a full economy, complete with 
taxes and decisions over the redistribution of resources (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 
Alesina and Tabellini 2007, Acemoglu et al. 2010). On the one hand, in my proposed model 
I will not do away with redistribution; on the other, I acknowledge that conflicts can depend 
on a much more complex function of actors’ needs and perceptions. Therefore, one may want 
to allow for a model that refers to ‘political ideal points’ in general, and not just to economic 
ones, even at the cost of sacrificing some economic complexity. 
Also, in most previous models, actors usually possess perfect information about present 
policy preferences of other actors in the game (an exception is Svolik 2009). Uncertainty is 
introduced through indefinitely repeated plays of the same game into the future, and 
equilibrium is induced by modelling the agents’ time-discounting features. Often, at the start 
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of each subgame one or more actors are allowed to change their “type” based on a stochastic 
process, so that future payoffs and the future balance of power between actors remain 
uncertain and cannot completely be determined in advance. 
In my model, instead, I introduce uncertainty by modelling an informational asymmetry 
between the representative agent of the citizens and the representative agent of the elites (the 
autocrat). Citizens continuously see the autocrat taking political decisions, so that despite 
propaganda they can be assumed to have a much better idea of the position of the autocrat’s 
ideal point. In the model, this is simplified to perfect knowledge. On the other hand, the 
autocrat cannot “see” the citizens play by default, unless he allows them to express (signal) 
their preferences in some way – e.g. through protests or some form or another of media 
freedom. Therefore, depending on the features of the political regime, the representative 
agent can only have a certain idea of where the citizen’s ideal point may lie on the policy 
space, and only occasionally and in very limited circumstances will he become aware of the 
true (median) preference of the citizens (Rozenas 2012). Signaling games of this kind have 
appeared very seldom and only very recently in the comparative politics literature: in my 
literature review, I was only able to uncover two (Dal Bò and Powell 2009, and Edmond 
2013). 
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2.4. The workhorse model: signaling and the survival of autocratic regimes 
 
I model the political economy game as a two-player game: a representative agent for the elite, 
the autocrat A (which can be thought of as whoever effectively holds power, be it a sole 
dictator, or an oligarchic regime or a military junta), and a representative agent for the 
citizens, i.e. the “median citizen” C. Both agents are assumed to move within a 
unidimensional policy space, and to have quadratic utilities centered around their ideal point. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Visualizing the unidimensional policy preference space 
 
 
 
Their utilities therefore directly depend on the distance between their ideal preferences and 
the actual policy 𝑥 that is offered and implemented. The general form of their 
(unparameterised) utility function is thus: 
 
𝑢𝑎(𝑥) = −(𝑥 − 𝑎)
2 
𝑢𝑐(𝑥) = −(𝑐 − 𝑥)
2 
 
The game assumes that between the autocrat and the citizen there is a distributional conflict, 
i.e. that the autocrat would rather concentrate as much rents and wealth in his hands and those 
of his winning coalitions, than distribute them to the general population in the form of public 
goods. I assume that there is no previous status quo, but that players are playing in order to 
determine the policy outcome: each political regime starts out as a tabula rasa, and players 
are playing (negotiating) the constitutional setting for the polity in that period.  
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As stated above, I also aim at incorporating informational asymmetry within the game: 
namely, I assume that the autocrat is uncertain over the exact preferences of his citizens. The 
autocrat must choose whether to trade off a portion of his power (more precisely, a portion 
of the probability of him remaining in power in case of a violent removal attempt) in order 
to receive a sufficiently precise signal from the citizens and narrow down uncertainty, or to 
retain all his power but remain uncertain as to the citizens’ policy ideal. There is a definite 
benefit to receiving more precise information on citizen’s preferences, because this way the 
autocrat can have a clearer picture of the risks it faces and decide upon whether to use 
repressive or cooptation methods in order to keep consensus and remain in power, or to lead 
a democratic transition instead so as to avoid to be violently ousted. 
I assume that whoever is in power, whether the autocrat or the median citizen, receives a 
direct benefit from him staying in power. The citizen (here representing the whole democratic 
opposition) may attempt to violently remove the autocrat through a revolt, but must take into 
account that he will incur a cost, as well as the autocrat, and that this cost will be higher for 
the side who loses. This is a one-shot game, therefore it is played only once (an extension 
towards an infinite-horizon game might be an avenue for future research). 
The game starts with the autocrat, A, choosing a political regime type between three 
possibilities: democracy (D), repressive autocracy (RA) or open autocracy (OA). If the 
autocrat chooses to stay in power in one of the two types of autocracy, RA or OA, he receives 
a direct benefit, R > 0, which incorporates part of the state’s economic activity, including 
rents. If the game ends in D, the citizens get a direct benefit, Dc, irrespective of how the game 
ended there (through the autocrat’s choice or a successful citizens’ revolt). If the game ends 
in D because the autocrat chose to democratize, however, the autocrat himself earns a benefit, 
Da. This is because we are assuming that, if the autocrat chooses a democratic regime, he 
will lead the transition instead of being ousted by rivals (either angry citizens amid a climate 
of social revolt, or militaries leading a coup). Therefore, the autocrat should see his chances 
to preserve some influence increased, either by maintaining government posts, or through an 
increase in relevance of the institution it leads in the transitional phase and, possibly, in the 
new democratic period. This may be the case in democratic transitions driven by the military 
– see e.g. Turkey during the Eighties, or many other occurrences in Latin America. 
Chapter 2. Modelling the Survival of Autocratic Regimes 
49 
 
In each subgame, one of the actors (the autocrat in RA or in OA; the citizen in D) chooses a 
policy offer x ∈ ℝ, which is a function of economic, social, and political states, describing 
an offer of “general politico-economic conditions”. We assume that, in case of violent 
removal of the autocratic leader and transition towards democracy, the policy offer chosen 
by whoever is in power is sufficiently close to the median citizen’s preferences that it can 
still be represented by the citizen’s ideal point, so that for our purpose of diversifying between 
democratic and autocratic conditions we can safely assume that the policy choice and the 
citizen’s ideal policy point coincide. However, in case of democratic transitions led (or at 
least initiated) by the previous autocratic leader, the representative of the citizens will still 
have to make a compromise policy offer to the autocrat, so that in that case the policy is free 
to move away from the median citizen’s ideal policy point. The policy offer is implemented 
straightforwardly in RA and D, so that there is no negotiation occurring between actors, while 
in OA the dynamics are slightly more complicated (see below). 
As anticipated above, both players have an ideal point, which represents the best policy that 
could be implemented in their view (see Figure 2.1). Moreover, their utility functions decline 
proportionally with the squared distance from their own ideal point. The autocrat’s ideal 
point, a, is perfectly known to both players: as long as the representative citizen’s uncertainty 
around the autocrat’s ideal point is much smaller than the autocrat’s uncertainty around the 
citizen’s ideal point, this simplification appears reasonable. On the opposite, I assume that 
the citizen’s ideal point, c, is not known to the autocrat, who instead has only a vague idea of 
where it may lie in the policy space: he is sure that it lies on the opposite side from 0, as the 
model assumes that the political relationship between the autocrat and the citizen is always, 
at least latently, conflictual (no “benevolent dictator” or “enlightened absolutism” can really 
exist here). The autocrat has a precise idea of what the citizen’s maximum preference, cmax, 
might be, and we assume that he generally guesses right, so that cmax > c. This does not mean 
that the autocrat can guess as low as he wishes: cmax is, in fact, a representation of how the 
information asymmetry may affect the game, and it cannot be controlled by the autocrat any 
more than he could force citizens to not rebel just by being confident that they will not. The 
autocrat’s best guess of the position of the citizen’s ideal point is assumed to be a random 
draw from a uniform probability distribution between 0 and cmax. 
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Once the autocrat (or the citizen) has chosen his own policy offer, the other actor can choose 
to revolt (if it is the citizen) or to try to stage a coup (if the autocrat). The choice of resorting 
to violent means is always costly, so that the actor employing violence faces a certain cost ki 
> 0, and an additional cost ji > 0 if the protest or coup is not successful in deposing the 
opponent from power. Autocratic strength can be measured by the probability that the 
autocrat remains in power in RA (α) or in OA (β), or the likelihood that a coup against 
democracy D succeeds (γ). We assume that regime strength is strictly higher in a repressive 
autocracy than in an open one: this is so because, while the autocrat gains insights on the 
citizen’s preferences by allowing them to signal opposition, in OA citizens can organize and 
coordinate more freely. This is a liability to the autocratic regime in terms of effectiveness 
of the citizens’ coordination efforts to solve collective action problems (for theoretical and 
empirical elaborations on this issue, see e.g. Cox 2009). 
Therefore, if the autocrat chooses a repressive regime (RA) or to lead a transition towards 
democracy (D), there is a single policy offer and a choice between accepting the offered 
policy or resorting to violence (see Figure 2.2). Namely, in RA the autocrat will choose x, 
and the citizen/opposition will choose whether to try to remove the dictator and impose their 
own 𝑥 = 𝑐; in D, the citizen will choose x, and the autocrat will choose whether to stage a 
coup. 
If the autocrat chooses an open autocracy (OA), the structure of the subgame is a little more 
complicated. I suppose that in this case the citizens have a way to signal their support or 
opposition to the autocrat, and at the same time the autocrat will know with precision the 
citizens’ policy ideal point. Thus, the subgame begins with the autocrat proposing a set of 
two ‘policy choices’ to citizens. The two offers are conditional on what the citizens will 
choose to signal when they will have the opportunity to do so. If the citizens signal opposition 
to the autocrat, they receive a policy concession, xopp. If the citizens choose to signal support, 
they will receive xsupp plus a direct transfer r. The latter is a direct economic “concession” 
whose level is set by the autocrat. The autocrat uses r to “reward” the citizens of their support. 
If the median citizen signals support, however, the policy offer will be more distant from its 
ideal point, because we assume that the autocrat will take advantage of the knowledge that 
the citizen is willing to compromise some of its “policy” outcome (and the expected outcome 
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in case he revolted and won) to gain a sure reward/rent, r. Therefore, we assume that xopp > 
xsupp. 
To sum up, in OA the citizen chooses whether to signal opposition or support, and he knows 
that, depending on his choice, the autocrat will automatic implement one of the two offered 
policies. As soon as the citizen chooses between these two actions, the autocrat will be able 
to know the position of the citizen’s ideal point and will have more information on the cost-
incentive structure of the citizen, thereby adjusting its strategic behavior to the new 
knowledge about the citizen. 
Before proceeding further, I explicitly discuss three important assumptions of this model. 
The first assumption, which was already stated before, is that I expect that while there is a 
gain to the autocrat for choosing an open autocracy in which he gets a signal from his citizens 
as to the precise position of their ideal point on the policy space, there is also an important 
cost in that the characteristics of an open autocracy make the autocrat more prone to be ousted 
in case of revolt. This may occur, for example, because political coordination is easier: while 
the autocrat gets to know the citizens’ ideal point, many citizens get to know the ideal point 
of many other citizens as well (for example as an outcome of not-too-rigged elections, or 
with the occurrence of popular protests that the autocrat chose not to stifle). 
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Figure 2.2 – Extended form representation of the one-shot game 
 
Note. Payoffs are expressed as functions of key parameters. For the full specification, please 
see below the discussion in the relevant subgame section. 
 
Therefore, I assume that the probability of a revolt being unsuccessful in OA (or alternatively, 
of an autocratic regime being strong under OA) is strictly lower than under RA: 
 
Assumption 1. β < α < 1. 
 
Secondly, I need to remove trivial cases from my analysis. For one, if the autocrat has a 
policy preference that is too far away from the citizen’s ideal policy preference, then the 
autocrat will always choose a repressive autocracy RA and set the policy offer to its own 
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ideal point, irrespective of the likelihood that the median citizen’s removal attempt is 
successful (and anyway minimizing that likelihood by choosing RA instead of OA). I 
therefore need to assume that: 
 
Assumption 2. 𝑎 >  −√
𝑘𝑐+ 𝛼𝑗𝑐−(1−𝛼)𝐷𝑐
1−𝛼
− 
𝑘𝑎+(1−𝛼)(𝑅+𝑗𝑎)
4𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
 
Finally, if the expected benefit from democracy to the citizen under OA is higher than the 
costs of revolting (including the expected costs of losing) under OA, the citizen will always 
revolt under any autocratic regime, so that the autocrat will have no incentive to compromise, 
and will therefore either choose a repressive autocracy and set the policy offer to his own 
ideal point (x = a) or democracy and put up with x = c. 
I therefore need to assume the following: 
 
Assumption 3. 𝐷𝑐(1 − 𝛽) < 𝑘𝑐 + 𝛽𝑗𝑐 
 
In order to solve the game, I first need to find each subgame perfect equilibrium, employing 
comparative statics. Instead of then finding the full-game solution employing perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium, which would both be cumbersome and prone to errors as I solve it step 
by step, in section 3 I will resort to simulations and graphical representations, in order to 
show most potential solutions that could materialize assuming some fixed values for most 
parameters and letting two of them vary freely. 
 
 
2.4.1.  Repressive authoritarian subgame 
 
Once the autocrat chooses a repressive authoritarian regime, he will implement the policy x, 
the citizen chooses whether to revolt, and if he does he will succeed at regime change with 
probability 1 – α. When policy x is implemented, the autocrat’s utility will be a function of 
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the distance between its ideal point and the policy, and the direct transfer R: R – (x – a)2. The 
citizen’s utility will be a function of the distance between c and x: – (c – x)2. 
We also know that, in case of violence (i.e., in RA, citizens trying to violently remove the 
autocrat), each actor incurs a cost ki, and that there will be a variable cost ji incurred by 
whoever loses. In case the citizen tries to oust the autocrat but is unsuccessful, the autocrat 
keeps R and keeps on implementing x. Otherwise, if the citizen manages to oust the autocrat 
and install democracy, the autocrat loses R and the citizen gains Dc (see Figure 2.3). 
 
Figure 2.3 – Extended form representation of the repressive autocracy subgame 
 
Note: the figure only represents outcomes. Payoffs are described in the main text. 
 
 
 
Therefore, utility functions are the following. For the autocrat: 
𝑢𝑎
𝑅𝐴(𝑥) = {
𝑅 − (𝑥 − 𝑎)2,                                                        𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
−𝑘𝑎 + 𝛼𝑅 − (𝑥 − 𝑎)
2 + (1 − 𝛼)(−𝑗𝑎),               𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
 
 
For the citizen: 
 
𝑢𝑐
𝑅𝐴(𝑐, 𝑥) = {
−(𝑐 − 𝑥)2,                                                             𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
−𝑘𝑐 + 𝛼[−𝑗𝑐 − (𝑐 − 𝑥)
2] + (1 − 𝛼)𝐷𝑐,         𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
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Statement 1. In the RA subgame there is a single, unique equilibrium. 
Let l =√
𝑘𝑐+𝛼𝑗𝑐−(1−𝛼)𝐷𝑐
1−𝛼
 . 
1. The autocrat chooses the policy x = 𝑥∗, where: 
 
𝑥∗ = 𝑎 +
𝑘𝑎 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝑅 + 𝑗𝑎)
2𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
 
2. There is a removal attempt of the autocrat by the citizen if and only if: 
 
|𝑐 − 𝑥| > 𝑙 
 
 
 
 
Proof of Statement 1: 
By backward induction, the citizen will try to remove the oligarch if (and only if), given x: 
 
−𝑘𝑐 + 𝛼[−𝑗𝑐 − (𝑐 − 𝑥)
2] + (1 − 𝛼)𝐷𝑐 > −(𝑐 − 𝑥)
2   →  
−𝑘𝑐 − 𝛼𝑗𝑐 − 𝛼(𝑐 − 𝑥)
2 + (𝑐 − 𝑥)2 + (1 − 𝛼)𝐷𝑐 > 0  → 
−𝑘𝑐 − 𝛼𝑗𝑐 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝑐 − 𝑥)
2 + (1 − 𝛼)𝐷𝑐 > 0  → 
(1 − 𝛼)(𝑐 − 𝑥)2 > 𝑘𝑐 + 𝛼𝑗𝑐 − (1 − 𝛼)𝐷𝑐 → 
(𝑐 − 𝑥)2 >
𝑘𝑐 + 𝛼𝑗𝑐 − (1 − 𝛼)𝐷𝑐
1 − 𝛼
  → 
|𝑐 − 𝑥| >  √
𝑘𝑐 + 𝛼𝑗𝑐 − (1 − 𝛼)𝐷𝑐
1 − 𝛼
= 𝑙 
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The autocrat chooses x so that it maximizes his own utility, which is: 
 
𝑢𝑎
𝑅𝐴(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑐 ≤ 𝑥 + 𝑙)[𝑅 − (𝑥 − 𝑎)2]
+ 𝑃(𝑐 > 𝑥 + 𝑙)[−𝑘𝑎 + 𝛼𝑅 − (𝑥 − 𝑎)
2 + (1 − 𝛼)(−𝑗𝑎)] 
 
By construction, the autocrat will never choose a policy which is further to the left from his 
ideal point (i.e. x < a), and he will choose something different from its own ideal preference 
point a if and only if this sufficiently reduces the likelihood that citizens try to depose him. 
Also, whenever the distance between 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 and l is too high (i.e. if a lies within this distance), 
the citizens will not try to depose the autocrat and the autocratic leader will again be able to 
set x = a. 
When this is not the case and solutions are not trivial, the policy x will be chosen in order to 
maximize the autocrat’s expected gain: this is a first-order condition. The maximum utility 
of choosing 𝑥 ≠ 𝑎 should then be compared with the utility that the autocrat would derive 
from choosing 𝑎 and risk a removal attempt from the citizens. 
Given that the autocrat’s belief depends on a uniform probability distribution, we know that: 
 
𝜕𝑃(𝑐 < 𝑓(𝜀))
𝜕𝜀
=
𝑓′(𝜀)
𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
 
The denominator of the function is the length of the uniform distribution, which is 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 0 
by construction, and identifies the autocrat’s uncertainty about the citizen’s ideal point 
position. 
So the first-order condition (solving for the maximum of the function – therefore taking the 
partial derivative on the policy x and solving for it) is: 
 
𝜕𝑢𝑎
𝑅𝐴
𝜕𝑥
= 0 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 
−2(𝑥 − 𝑎) +
𝑅
𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
−
−𝑘𝑎 + 𝛼𝑅 + (1 − 𝛼)(−𝑗𝑎)
𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
= 0 
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𝑥 = 𝑎 +
𝑘𝑎 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝑅 + 𝑗𝑎)
2𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
= 𝑥∗ 
Given that the second derivative of this function is negative, this unique solution also 
represents a maximum of the function. 
It is now simple to ascertain that the choice of x* grants a higher utility than setting x = a. 
Indeed, by substituting the solution inside the autocrat’s utility function, it is easy to verify 
that this holds true whenever Assumption 2 also holds (i.e., the autocrat has a policy 
preference that is not too far away from the citizens’, given all other utility parameters). 
 
Interpretation. 
Once the subgame equilibrium has been found, note that the policy x implemented by the 
autocrat tends to be a non-monotonic function of cmax. This is because, as long as the 
autocrat’s uncertainty remains quite low, the autocrat can increase x enough to guarantee that 
the citizen will not try to remove him most of the times. But the more cmax grows, the more 
the autocrat should choose a policy further from his ideal point in order to have a chance that 
the citizen does not revolt, and even then he would be less and less certain that his own 
concessions would avoid an ousting attempt by citizens as the maximum policy compromise 
the autocrat would be willing to choose would still tend to make only a marginal contribution 
to the citizens’ utility function. Therefore, once a certain threshold is crossed, the marginal 
benefit of increasing x to avoid an ousting attempt starts to decrease, because each marginal 
increase in x is incrementally less likely to help the autocrat avoid ousting attempts. 
Also note that the citizens will increasingly attempt to remove the autocrat, the more the 
distance between the implemented policy and their collective ideal point grows, so that (by 
construction) the more the two players of the game’s preferences diverge, the more likely it 
is that the citizens will attempt to oust the autocrat. 
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2.4.2.  Democracy subgame 
 
This subgame works in a symmetrical way as the RA subgame. This time it is the citizen that 
will have to make a decision upon the policy to be set and “offered” to the autocrat. However, 
in this case the citizen knows the autocrat’s ideal point. Once the policy has been set, the 
autocrat will choose whether to try and stage a coup (see Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.4 – Extended form representation of the democracy subgame 
 
Note: the figure only represents outcomes. Payoffs are described in the main text. 
 
 
 
Following are the two players’ utility functions. For the autocrat: 
𝑢𝑎
𝐷(𝑥) = {
𝐷𝑎 − (𝑥 − 𝑎)
2,                                                                 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
−𝑘𝑎 + 𝛾𝑅 − (1 − 𝛾)(−𝑗𝑎 − (𝑥 − 𝑎)
2),                          𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
 
 
For the citizen: 
𝑢𝑐
𝐷(𝑐, 𝑥) = {
𝐷𝑐 − (𝑐 − 𝑥)
2,                                                               𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
−𝑘𝑐 − (𝑐 − 𝑥)
2 + 𝛾(−𝑘𝑐) + (1 − 𝛾)𝐷𝑐,                      𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
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Statement 2. In the D subgame there is a single, unique equilibrium. 
Let m =√
𝐷𝑎+𝑘𝑎+𝛼𝑅−(1−𝛼)𝑘𝑎
1−𝛾
 . 
 
1. The citizen chooses the policy x = 𝑥∗, so that: 
 
𝑥∗ = {𝑎 + 𝑚               𝑖𝑓  𝑎 + 𝑚 < 𝑐 < 𝑎 +𝑚 +√𝑘𝑐 + 𝛾(𝐷𝑐 + 𝑗𝑐)
𝑐                                                                                     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
2. There is a coup attempt by the autocrat if and only if: 
 
|𝑥 − 𝑎| > 𝑚 
 
Proof of Statement 2. 
Again, I use backward induction, and rely upon the same logic as before, but with the autocrat 
and the citizen switching sides. What changes, apart from both roles, is that the citizen knows 
the policy preference of the ex-autocrat, and can select x with this information at hand. 
The autocrat will try to subvert democracy and return to autocracy if |𝑥 − 𝑎| > 𝑚 . What is 
the citizen’s choice in light of this common knowledge? Whenever 𝑐 ≤ 𝑎 + 𝑚, the citizen 
can set 𝑥 = 𝑐 and fear no coup, because the autocrat will prefer the citizen’s choice to facing 
the uncertainty of a coup attempt. However, as 𝑐 grows, the citizen can no longer set the 
policy to his ideal point without risking a subversion attempt. Also, given that 𝑐 moves further 
away from 𝑎, the citizen is discouraged from risking facing a coup, which would make him 
incur both the costs of violence and, if the coup ends up being effective, would set the policy 
choice away from him. However, as 𝑐 moves even further away from 𝑎, the benefits of 
avoiding a coup attempt start to rapidly decrease as this would cost the citizen increasingly 
more in terms of policy compromise.  Therefore, the citizen will again tend to choose 𝑥 = 𝑐 
and risk a coup attempt. This will only happen when: 
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−𝑘𝑐 − 𝛾𝑗𝑐 + (1 − 𝛾)𝐷𝑐 − 0 ≥ 𝐷𝑐 − (𝑐 − 𝑎 −𝑚)
2   → 
𝑐 ≥ 𝑎 +𝑚 +√𝑘𝑐 + 𝛾(𝐷𝑐 + 𝑗𝑐) 
 
Interpretation. 
Figure 2.5 is a graphic representation of the equilibrium of this subgame in terms of policy 
choices. Ceteris paribus, when c is low enough, the citizen can set x at his own ideal point 
and the autocrat will never attempt a coup. For middle values, when c is within a certain 
threshold, the policy offer x needs to be kept fixed at a value lower than c in order to guarantee 
no attempt by the autocrat to overthrow the democratic government, and this policy 
compromise is still attractive to the democratic government compared to the expected loss in 
case a coup occurs and succeeds. Finally, after c rises above a second threshold, the citizen 
will always prefer a coup to compromising its policy position, and therefore it will set x at c 
again, and wait to see whether the coup will be successful or fail. 
 
 
The labels above the figure allow us to make a quite tempting interpretation of this game’s 
possible outcomes, conditional on c, a, and other ancillary parameters. When the policy 
preferences of the citizen and the autocrat are close enough, both the citizen and the autocrat 
will prefer a compromise. First, in the space that we termed as “consolidated democracy”, 
the policy preferences are near enough that the citizen can set the outcome at its own policy 
ideal point and fear no moves to overthrow him, so that the outcome is the “best of all 
worlds”. 
In a second case, when policy preferences are still close enough, but the distance between 
them widens, the citizen will choose to compromise on a policy position that is still closer to 
its ideal point but gets incrementally further as differences between the citizen and the 
autocrat widen. Here, the outcome is a policy that does not coincide with the median citizen’s 
own ideal point, and is therefore not optimal for the whole polity, but is considered a 
sufficiently good compromise and is preferred to the expected costs of a return to autocracy. 
Finally, as positions between the citizen and the autocratic elite get too far, no possibilities 
of mediation between the two exist, and the polity will certainly face a coup attempt. The 
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outcome is therefore dependent on violence, and we label this condition “unstable 
democracy”. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 – The citizens’ policy choices in the democracy subgame 
 
The graph may also be read from right to left: in this case, it may be regarded as describing 
a path of progressive democratization and democratic consolidation, as differences between 
the elite and the median citizen narrow. Clearly, given that this is a static game, there is no 
possibility that policy preferences change over time. But a dynamic extension of this 
“democratic game” might shed some interesting insights on factors enhancing the chances 
that a polity democratizes, and others lowering the chances that democratization occurs or 
that the political system consolidates around democracy. 
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While a number of studies have investigated the relationship between income inequality and 
political regime type, they generally assume that the political regime type determines the 
inequality level. This can be attributed to a number of reason. Some relate it to the size of the 
selectorate, which tends to be larger in democracies and smaller in autocracies, therefore 
bringing about a bias towards higher inequality in autocracies (Kemp-Benedict 2011). Others 
argue that “ideological” autocrats bring about higher levels of inequality by relying upon 
other sources of legitimacy or repression to prop up their regime (Galbraith 2012). 
Our model, consistently with most other political economy models that take off from a 
distributive conflict between two actors in a polity, posits that it is the distance between the 
median citizen and the autocratic elite that does the heavy lifting. Inequality determines the 
structure of political incentives (Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). In particular, 
Boix 2003 argues that inequality tends to prevent both democratization and consolidation, 
while Acemoglu and Robinson 2006 draws from the theoretical model the conclusion that 
inequality is expected to harm consolidation, but expects inequality to be linked to 
democratization through an inverted U-shaped curve. 
Arguments in favor of this hypothesis date back to Aristotle, and can for example be found 
in de Tocqueville, who stated that “[a]lmost all of the revolutions which have changed the 
aspect of nations have been made to consolidate or destroy social inequality” (de Tocqueville 
1951). Within the democratization literature, the implications of my democratic subgame 
model appear to agree with recent empirical findings that high inequality levels can harm 
democratic consolidation attempts, albeit some also find that this does not affect the 
likelihood of democratization (Houle 2009).  
 
 
2.4.3.  Open authoritarian subgame 
 
In an open authoritarian regime, the citizen has to choose whether to signal support to the 
autocrat, getting a “reward” but accepting a policy that is further from him, or signal 
opposition, receiving some concessions in terms of policy (the chosen policy will be nearer 
to his ideal point) but no reward. I therefore assume that, by construction, 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 ≥ 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝. 
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Irrespective of his previous signaling choice, the citizen can then choose whether to attempt 
to depose the autocrat or not, succeeding with probability β (see Figure 2.6). 
Therefore, utility functions are the following. For the autocrat: 
 
𝑢𝑎
𝑂𝐴(𝑥) =
=
{
 
 
 
 𝑅 − (𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
,                                                    𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑡. 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑢𝑡 𝑛𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
−𝑘𝑎 + 𝛽𝑅 − (𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
+ (1 − 𝛽)(−𝑗𝑎),          𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑡. 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
𝑅 − 𝑟 − (𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
,                                        𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑡. 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
−𝑘𝑎 + 𝛽𝑅 − 𝑟 − (𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
+ (1 − 𝛽)(−𝑗𝑎), 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑡. 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑏𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
 
 
For the citizen: 
 
𝑢𝑐
𝑂𝐴(𝑥) =
=
{
 
 
 
 −(𝑐 − 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝)
2
,                                                          𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑡. 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑢𝑡 𝑛𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
−𝑘𝑐 + 𝛽[−𝑗𝑐 − (𝑐 − 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝)
2
] + (1 − 𝛽)𝐷𝑐,           𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑡. 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
𝑟 − (𝑐 − 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝)
2
,                                                  𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑡. 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
−𝑘𝑐 + 𝛽 [−𝑗𝑐 + 𝑟 − (𝑐 − 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝)
2
] + (1 − 𝛽)𝐷𝑐, 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑡. 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑏𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡
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Figure 2.6 – Extended form representation of the open autocracy subgame 
 
Note: the figure only represents outcomes. Payoffs are described in the main text. 
 
Statement 3. In the OA subgame there is a single, unique equilibrium. 
Let n =√
𝑘𝑐+𝛽𝑗𝑐−(1−𝛽)𝐷𝑐
1−𝛽
 . Let  𝜌 = 𝑘𝑎 + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑅 + 𝑗𝑎) . 
1. If the citizen chooses to support the regime, the autocrat will set x = xsupp and offer r, 
while if the citizen signals opposition the autocrat will set x = xopp somewhat nearer to the 
citizen. In order to set the amount of r, the autocrat will follow this formula:  𝑟 =
−𝑎(𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝): 
 
 If 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ 𝑎 + 𝑛 , the autocrat will set 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 = 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 = 𝑎 ; 
 If   
𝑎
2
+ 𝑛 < 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 < −
𝜌
𝑎
  , the autocrat will set 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
∗  and 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
∗  such that: 
𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
∗ = min (𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑛,
𝑎
2
+ 3𝑛) 
𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
∗ =
𝑎 + 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
∗
3
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 If 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 > −
𝜌
𝑎
 , the autocrat will set 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
∗  and 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
∗  such that: 
𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
∗ = 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
∗ = min (𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑛, 𝑎 +
𝜌
2𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
) 
 
2. When 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 = 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝, the citizen will only choose to signal opposition if 𝑟 = 0. When 
𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 > 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝, the citizen will only choose to signal opposition and ask for policy 
concessions if: 
 
𝑐 >
𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 + 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
2
+
𝑟
2(𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝)
 
 
3. There is a removal attempt by the citizen if and only if: 
 
|𝑐 − 𝑥| > 𝑛 
 
Proof of Statement 3. 
By backward induction, as in RA, the citizen will only choose to attempt to remove the 
autocrat when: 
 
|𝑐 − 𝑥| > 𝑛 
 
Clearly, here x depends on the choice of whether to signal opposition and get a policy 
concession, or to signal support and get no policy concession but a “reward”. How will the 
citizen choose? Trivially, whenever 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 = 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝, and 𝑟 > 0, the citizen will always signal 
support and reap a better reward (overall). When this is not the case, the citizen will prefer to 
signal opposition when: 
 
−(𝑐 − 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝)
2
≥ 𝑟 − (𝑐 − 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝)
2 
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Rearranging, the citizen will prefer to signal opposition when: 
 
𝑐 >
𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 + 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
2
+
𝑟
2(𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝)
 
 
Call this 𝑐1. For values 𝑐 < 𝑐1, the citizen will always choose to signal support to the autocrat 
and reap the reward r,while leaving the autocrat’s policy offer unchanged. Also, by 
construction, if the citizen accepts the reward he will not attempt to remove the autocrat. For 
values of c above this threshold, the citizen will choose to signal opposition. Also, suppose 
there is a threshold for c below which the citizen will not attempt to remove the autocrat, 
while above it the citizen will always attempt to remove it. Call this second threshold 𝑐2. 
Therefore, three spaces open up: one in which the citizen will choose to support the regime 
and not revolt; another in which the citizen will signal opposition but regard the policy 
compromise as sufficient not to revolt; and a third one in which the citizen will signal 
opposition, look at the autocrat’s offer and always judge it too small not to attempt to remove 
him. 
The autocrat’s decision function will thus depend on three free parameters (𝑟, 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 and 
𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝) which he must set in order to maximize his own utility – that is: 
 
𝑢𝑎
𝑂𝐴(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑐 ≤ 𝑐1) {𝑅 − 𝑟 − (𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
} + 𝑃(𝑐1 < 𝑐 < 𝑐2) {𝑅 − (𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
}
+ 𝑃(𝑐 > 𝑐2) {−𝑘𝑎 − (𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
+ 𝛽𝑅 + (1 − 𝛽)(−𝑗𝑎)} 
 
Whenever the autocrat sets 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 = 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 and 𝑟 = 0, he is simply falling back to a repressive 
authoritarian setting in which he ignores potential signals. Again, a trivial solution in which 
the autocrat always sets the policy offer to his own ideal point (𝑥 = 𝑎) happens when 𝑎 ≥
𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑛, namely when the citizens’ benefit net of expected costs are always too small for 
him to prefer anything than an autocrat perfectly doing his own will. Thus I assume that 𝑎 is 
strictly below that critical value. Assumption 2 also allows me to do away with the times in 
which the preferences of the citizen and the autocrat are too far apart to allow for any 
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meaningful negotiation or strategic behavior, so that the autocrat would always set the policy 
to his own ideal point and face a removal attempt. 
Having removed trivial cases, I am left to calculate first-order conditions as the autocrat 
attempts to maximize his utility. I start by maximizing utility as 𝑟 changes, while holding 
𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 and 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 constant: 
 
𝜕𝑢𝑎
𝑂𝐴
𝜕𝑟
= 0         →        𝑃(𝑐 ≤ 𝑐1)(−1) +
𝑅 − 𝑟 − (𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
2(𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝)𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
−
𝑅 + (𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
2(𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝)𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
→ 𝑃(𝑐 ≤ 𝑐1) =
𝑐1
𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
=
−𝑟 − (𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
− (𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
2(𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝)𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
→ 𝑐1 = −𝑎 +
𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 + 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
2
−
𝑟
2(𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 − 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝)
 
 
Replacing 𝑐1with this result in the equation on the second line, I get: 
 
𝑟 = −𝑎(𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝) 
 
And finally, substituting 𝑟 in the third-line equation, I get: 
 
𝑐1 =
𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 + 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎
2
 
 
Now I need to maximize the autocrat’s utility as 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 changes, and knowing their 
determining equations can let 𝑟 and 𝑐1 vary with it: 
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𝜕𝑢𝑎
𝑂𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
= 0         
→        𝑃(𝑐 ≤ 𝑐1)[−𝑎 − 2(𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)] +
𝑅 − 𝑟 − (𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
2𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
−
𝑅 − (𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
2𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
=  
(𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 + 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)(𝑎 − 2𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝)
2𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
+
−(𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
+ (𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
− 𝑎(𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 − 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝)
2𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
= (𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 + 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎) (
𝑎
2
− 2𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝) +
𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
2 − 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
2 + 𝑎(𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 − 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝)
2
 
= (𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 + 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎) [
𝑎
2
− 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 −
𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 − 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
2
] 
= (𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 + 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
𝑎 − 3𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 + 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
2
= 0 
 
In order to get a zero solution, then, either the first or the second part of the equation must go 
to zero. However, the first part would be equivalent to 𝑐1 = 0 (see above for the 𝑐1 equation). 
This is trivial, given that both policy offers and the reward would go to 0 as well, and the 
equilibrium would fall back to a particular corner solution of the RA subgame. So I assume 
that 𝑐1 > 0, and therefore I will have to bring the second part of the equation to 0. The first-
order condition for 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝, then, brings me to a single non-trivial solution. 
Also, after calculating how 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 varies given the last equation, I can then substitute in the 
above equations for 𝑟 and 𝑐1 in order to straightforwardly determine how they vary with 
𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝. I therefore get: 
 
𝑐1 =
2𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎
3
 
𝑟 = −
𝑎(2𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
3
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Finally, I need to maximize the autocrat’s utility function as 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 changes. I can now allow 
𝑐1, 𝑟, and 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 vary with 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝. 
𝜕𝑢𝑎
𝑂𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
= 0   →        𝑃(𝑐 ≤ 𝑐1) [
2𝑎
3
+
2
3
(
2𝑎 − 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
3
)]
+ [𝑅 −
−𝑎(2𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
3
− (
2𝑎 − 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
3
)
2
]
2
𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
+ 𝑃(𝑐 > 𝑐1)2(𝑎 − 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝)
+
2
𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2 +
𝑅
𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
−
−𝑘𝑎 + 𝛽𝑅 − (1 − 𝛽)𝑗𝑎
𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
= 
2𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎
27
(10𝑎 − 2𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝) −
2𝑎
9
(𝑎 − 2𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝) −
2
27
(𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 2𝑎)
2
+
2
3
(𝑎 − 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝)(3𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 2𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 + 𝑎) +
2
3
(𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 − 𝑎)
2
+ 𝑘𝑎 + (1
− 𝛽)(𝑅 + 𝑗𝑎) 
= 
16
9
𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
2 + (−2𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 −
16𝑎
9
) 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 +
4
9
𝑎2 + 2𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑅 + 𝑗𝑎) = 0 
 
In order to solve this for 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝, I need to apply the classic quadratic formula, getting the 
value(s) of 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 for which the first-order condition is satisfied: 
 
𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 =
9
16
𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 +
𝑎
2
±
9
16
√𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥2 −
16
9
[𝑎𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑘𝑎 + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑅 + 𝑗𝑎)] 
 
The second-order condition, needed to verify that this is a real maximum of the function, 
allows me to remove the higher solution, leaving me with just one possible solution. Now we 
have all the elements to see what the autocrat’s choice would be – although some more effort 
is needed. When 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 < 𝑎 + 𝑛, the quadratic has no real-valued solution, so that the autocrat 
will not be able to maximize his utility function unless it chooses 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 = 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 = 𝑎. 
The functions requiring the choice between minima are reached by considering that if 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 ≥
𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 + 2𝑛, or 𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 ≥ 𝑛, this constrains 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 ≤ min (𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑛,
𝑎
2
+ 3𝑛). As 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 tends to 
−
𝜌
𝑎
 , my solution for 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 must dominate this condition (because in the interval between 
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𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 as solved to maximize the utility and 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑛, we have 
𝜕𝑢𝑎
𝑂𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝
< 0  ), the only solution 
is for the autocrat to set 𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝 to the minimum of those two functions, and not to any value 
below that. 
This equilibrium can only be valid until 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 >
𝑎
2
+ 𝑛, because I am requiring 𝑐1 =
𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑝+𝑥𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
2
> 𝑎 (it is not possible to expect the autocrat to set a policy further from his ideal 
point but also from the citizens, as this would be logically inconsistent). This requirement 
also does not hold whenever 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≥ −
𝜌
𝑎
. 
 
 
Interpretation. 
Substantively, this implies that larger policy concessions are awarded for “middle” values of 
𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 , i.e. of both the real divergence between the autocrat and the citizen, and the uncertainty 
around the real value of the citizen’s ideal preference as held by the autocrat. 
For very small and very large values of uncertainty, the autocrat will tend to ignore the signal: 
very small values push the autocrat to value the signal as useless; large values push the 
autocrat to incorporate a far larger potential tradeoff between policy compromise and its own 
ideal value, therefore convincing him to ignore the signal and risk being toppled. Therefore, 
in these cases the autocrat will behave as if one were observing a RA regime (and, as will be 
shown later, he will probably choose one given that the likelihood of being toppled in a RA 
as compared to an OA would be lower by construction). 
At middle values of 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 the autocrat can be sufficiently sure that, by compromising by a 
fairly small amount in policies or by rewarding supporting citizens, he would be able to 
guarantee that no revolt occurs at a small cost. As stated above, the probability to guarantee 
no revolts starts to decline the more 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 increases. 
The citizen, in turn, will choose to support the regime and not revolt for fairly small values 
of 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥. He will then move to signal opposition and gain a little superior policy concession 
for intermediate values, but without revolting, and he will finally signal opposition and try to 
topple the autocrat the further away he potentially is from the autocrat’s policy preference. 
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2.4.4.  Natural resources as a parameter 
 
In my model, natural resources do not have a special place compared to other kinds of 
economic rents or incomes. They also lack an explicit place in the model’s payoff parameters. 
However, this does not mean that natural resources – or any other rents for that matter – do 
not enter the game.  Rents may be one of many intervening parameters affecting actors’ utility 
functions (or, at least, that part of the utility functions that we are formalizing into our model).  
The lack of a special place for natural resources in the model is intentional: whether or not 
natural resources deserve a special place in comparative politics should not be derived 
directly from formal assumptions. Formal models should only serve as a guide as to the place 
where natural resources might come into play, while at the same time underlying assumptions 
should be made as explicit as possible in order to understand the complex interactions that 
may determine both benefits and costs of rentierism. That said, the argument begs the 
question: what could be the role of natural resources in my model of autocratic survival and 
regime choice? Following is a set of hypotheses that could not be explicitly modelled, but 
will serve as a guide when we will attempt at testing the influence that rentierism has on the 
probability that an autocratic regime lasts over time, ceteris paribus. 
Firs, natural resources may directly affect the expected level of the benefit R the autocrat 
extracts from staying in power, and the benefit Dc that the citizens can expect if they succeed 
in deposing the autocrat. This is consistent with the “greed” hypothesis (Collier and Hoeffler 
2002) as applied to political regimes instead of civil wars: given that some resources tend to 
be non-lootable, the parties in any conflict must aspire to take control of the legitimate 
government (and administrative and financial system) of a country before being able to take 
advantage of a significant portion of such natural resource rents. However, given that both 
the governing regime and power contenders may benefit from this situation, the utility 
functions of all actors may be augmented by a similar amount, and it could be difficult to 
disentangle differences in perceived utility from these natural resources. This is especially 
true when a governing regime draws a significant amount of public revenues from the 
administration or direct sale of natural resources, so that it would not be that different from 
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a rebel group, or an opponent elite faction (be it civilian or military) aspiring to take control 
of the state institutions as well. 
A second way in which natural resource rents enter my model is within the reward, r, that 
the autocrat dishes out to the citizens once they have signaled their support to the regime. 
The natural resource curse literature extensively elaborates on the hypothesis that autocratic 
rentier states may secure legitimacy (or at least passive benevolence) from their citizens by 
distributing the proceeds from the sale of natural resources. It seems natural that such 
proceeds are distributed only once the citizens have signaled their support to the regime – as 
it occurs in our model. 
Although at the start of the discussion I set out that policy offers in my model include a 
broader set of socio-economic conditions rather than a mere economic policy, in this case a 
distributional conflict reemerges from the model, and is pretty much economic: the autocrat 
needs the citizens’ support, and if the policy offer x is too low, it will anyway need to ‘bribe’ 
the median citizen sufficiently in order to lower the risk of facing violent opposition. 
This can easily happen when a country relies primarily on natural resources, and most 
certainly so when they are highly-valued in the international markets, because the autocrat 
can intervene to increase his citizens’ income, either through direct transfers or indirectly, 
through subsidies or investing in the provision of public goods. This behavior can for 
example be found in most hydrocarbon-dependent autocracies, which tend to intervene to 
increase their citizens’ income, either through direct transfers or removing some or most of 
the taxes, or indirectly, for example through subsidies or by investing on the development of 
a national welfare system (see Vandewalle 1998 for the Libyan case). In fact, among the ten 
countries that had no income taxes in 2015, 70% (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the 
United Arab Emirates, Oman, Brunei) were oil-dependent countries. 
One important and complex interaction that could be accounted for, is that the reward 
distributed to the population should be directly related to the benefit R that the autocrat can 
extract by remaining in office. Indeed, we can expect that the more the expected r increases, 
the smaller R should become. 
Finally, natural resources can also enter into the model through the cost parameter, because 
violence can temporarily stop their production/extraction or even stifle medium-term 
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production prospects (together with other economic activities – Venezuela during the last 
decade being an especially relevant case in point; see International Crisis Group 2015). 
However, especially for resources that are on the ground and that need to be extracted, the 
ground acts as a natural safe, so that the total expected cost should be very low compared 
with the benefit of selling them the more reserves are thought to be in the ground and be 
economically recoverable. 
What the model cannot do is recover the dynamics of the changing value of these resources. 
In times of low natural resource prices, the rent that the autocrat may distribute to the 
population gets smaller, or it must be secured by renouncing some of the direct benefits from 
staying in power itself. At the same time, the expectations of the economic benefits from 
ousting the autocrat may get smaller for opposition groups as well – especially for elites that 
see the winning coalition in power struggling to keep up with austerity measures. When 
prices reverse, instead, and the commodity becomes highly valuable, both the distributable 
rents and the benefits of seizing power increase. The way in which these two main channels 
interact, and especially whether the autocrat’s utility function increases faster or slower than 
the citizens’, remains to be seen and is highly likely to be context-dependent. 
 
 
2.5. Comparative statics: some representations of the general equilibrium 
 
Formal models are imperfect representations of reality. Also because of this, I refrain from 
deriving precise closed-form conditions for general equilibria – a process that can be tedious 
and prone to errors –, instead choosing to rely upon simulations. Using R, I code the 
mathematic relationships between variables included in key utility equations, and then 
simulate thousands of game outcomes. In order to give a graphical representation of our 
model’s outcomes, in the following I will fix most parameters but two, and record the 
outcome of the game over a bi-dimensional space.1 
                                                 
1 In order to fix parameters, I choose the following values: 𝑎 = −2; 𝑘𝑐 = 𝑘𝑎 = 6; 𝑗𝑐 = 𝑗𝑎 = 8; 𝐷𝑐 = 6; 𝑅 =
2;  𝛼 = 0.92;  𝛽 = 0.95;  𝛾 = 0.92. Non-probabilistic parameters are set at arbitrary values, but the author has 
checked that results are consistent throughout a wide spectrum of possibilities. Probabilistic parameters, i.e. 
regime strength, are set at the historic average “stability” of closed autocracies, open autocracies and 
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Figure 2.7 – The autocrat’s regime choice: autocratic uncertainty and incentives for 
democracy 
 
 
In particular, in this section I focus on the level of uncertainty of the citizens’ preferences 
(𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥), the strength of the different political regimes (α, β, and γ), and on how far the 
autocrat’s ideal point is from the zero midpoint. In the lower half, Figure 2.7 shows that the 
game tends to end in repressive autocracy for very small and very high values of uncertainty. 
This is because for very small values of uncertainty, the autocrat can be confident that the 
citizen is near his own ideal point, and at the same time the signal that may be provided by 
the citizen in an open autocratic regime (whether to signal opposition or support to the 
regime) has a relatively low value. 
As uncertainty increases but remains at relatively low levels, the autocrat only needs to make 
small concessions in order to increase greatly the chances to avoid revolt and the risk of being 
ousted. The signal from the citizens becomes so important to the autocrat that he accepts to 
                                                 
democracies, as coded by our variable regime2 (see section 3.2.2), and recovering the yearly probability of 
regime change between 1946 and 2008. 
Chapter 2. Modelling the Survival of Autocratic Regimes 
75 
 
see his chances of survival reduced (slightly) in case of revolt, in exchange for being able to 
discover the citizens’ ideal policy preferences and set a more precise policy offer. 
Finally, as uncertainty increases even more, the autocrat can expect that the citizens’ ideal 
preference lies further from him and that therefore the median citizen will tend to revolt more, 
irrespective of the policy offer as it will be too far away from its ideal preference anyway. 
Therefore, the autocrat chooses to increase his chances of survival by going for repressive 
over open autocracy (remember that here the assumption is that 𝛼 > 𝛽)2. 
On the upper side of the figure, one can notice that democracy would be the final outcome 
only for sufficiently high benefits of a democratic transition driven by the autocrat. In fact, 
as the autocrat and the citizen grow further apart (as signaled by the increase in 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥), the 
autocrat will hardly ever choose to directly lead a transition towards democracy but always 
choose a repressive autocracy and maximize his chances of survival instead of giving up the 
implementation of his policy preference in favor of the citizens’. 
This does not mean that the final outcome of the game cannot be democracy for very high 
values of “inequality” between the citizen and the autocratic elite: it simply means that the 
autocrat will prefer to risk being toppled rather than renounce its policy position. 
Here, it is important to note that Figure 2.7 implies that for middle values of uncertainty, the 
only two outcomes are either open autocracy or democracy, depending on the level of 
incentives to democratize directly experienced by the autocrat. This is an important outcome 
that will serve to substantiate some of the hypotheses that I draw in section 2.6. 
From Figure 2.8 we can also check that the autocrat’s regime choice conditional on his own 
ideal point almost mirrors the effects of 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 above. The autocrat will choose OA only for 
intermediate values of his ideal point, but democracy here is even more difficult to achieve 
(although it becomes more and more likely as the autocrat’s ideal point approaches the 
citizens’, to the right). 
The counterintuitive result here is that there is still a space on the lower right for repressive 
autocracy: this means that, even for lower values of latent conflict between the autocrat and 
                                                 
2 This assumption is not liable to empirical testing because we only observe actual regime failures, and not the 
resilience of each regime to the occurrence and intensity of protests. 
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the citizen, the structure of incentives of the game is such that, at certain conditions, the 
autocrat might prefer a repressive autocracy to a democracy. 
 
Figure 2.8 – The autocrat’s regime choice: autocratic ideal point and incentives for 
democracy 
 
 
 
This equilibrium however becomes less and less stable the more the benefits of a guided 
democratization of the country increase. The more we move to the right, the lower such 
benefits need to be for the repressive autocracy choice to become residual and disappear. 
Finally, in Figure 2.9 we can see that the stronger the autocrat, the more it will prefer a 
repressive autocracy, because it can expect to survive revolt with more and more confidence. 
However, again for intermediate values of uncertainty and intermediate values of regime 
strength, OA becomes a viable solution and is the outcome of the game, as the autocrat will 
prefer to receive an informational signal that would allow him to set a more precise policy 
offer and lower, through this channel, his chances to be ousted, rather than do so via the 
regime type channel. 
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Figure 2.9 – The autocrat’s regime choice: autocratic strength under different political 
regime conditions and uncertainty 
 
Finally, the weaker the autocrat, the more he will prefer to directly lead a transition towards 
democracy. The outcome is skewed towards democracy here because I assume the 
probability of remaining in power to be common knowledge, so that the median citizen will 
be more and more tempted to try to oust the autocrat and set its own ideal policy preference, 
rather than letting the autocrat do so himself, as the known probability of ousting the autocrat 
increases. 
Note that here the outcome may appear to be biased by the fact that we are letting 𝛾 (the 
strength of a democratic regime where the autocrat may still choose to try to stage a coup and 
regain power) vary with 𝛼 and 𝛽. This way, it could be argued, the autocrat may choose to 
lead a democratic transition opportunistically, wait for the citizen to choose his own policy 
offer, and then stage a coup. However, keeping 𝛾 fixed does not significantly change the 
situation, simply reducing the space for democracy in favor of open autocracy and not much 
for a repressive autocracy. 
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Finally, again, at very high levels of 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 the autocrat will fall back to a repressive autocracy, 
set his own ideal point, and gamble for his own survival no matter how small its chances of 
survival are. This is because as uncertainty over the citizen’s ideal preference position 
increases, it also becomes apparent to the autocrat that this position may be very far from his, 
and that he would never manage to assuage him with any policy offer. 
 
 
2.6. Model implications and other hypotheses 
 
Having described the autocrat’s choice as conditional of a host of other factors, I ultimately 
try to draw some implications from my theoretical model, compare them with some extant 
literature on the theory of political regime choice and regime survival, and derive new 
hypotheses from this literature as well. 
The first hypothesis that I draw is very general, but nonetheless interesting and liable to 
testing. As shown in the graphs above, in most cases political regime types tend to be the 
result of strong, structural and slow-moving forces. Such forces are a result of structural 
factors affecting a polity, and tend to vary very slowly with time. The distance between an 
autocrat and its citizens, for example, may remain pretty much a fixed feature of the regime 
throughout the whole life of an autocrat, and ceteris paribus will determine the elite-citizens 
interactions. 
This is a general conclusion of politico-economic models: conditions are structural, tend to 
change slowly with time, and even so there is a strong inertia to them. Also, even when 
structural conditions are ripe for change, while political uprising or revolt might become 
almost certain, the probability that such protest movements succeed tends to be limited. This 
inertia is strongly reflected in the results of my model, and elicits the first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Because of a large inertia in political regime, it is highly likely that next year’s 
political regime type will be the same as this year’s political regime type. 
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But there is also a set of very specific hypotheses that I can draw from my model. One 
possibility is that the distance between the citizens’ and the autocrat’s policy preferences, 
and the structural uncertainty of the autocrat towards the median citizen’s ideal point, can be 
framed into reality by some socio-economic conditions. One straightforward consideration, 
already suggested in Figures 2.7 and 2.9, is that this distance may be apt to represent 
inequality in the overall population, i.e. how each percentile of national wealth is distributed 
to the population, ordered from the richest to the poorest member of the country. The more 
wealth is equally distributed among the nation’s citizens, the more the citizens and the 
autocrat will be likely to be nearer in the policy space, while as inequalities get larger, the 
two will tend to get further apart. This suggests that “middle” values of 𝑎 and 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 may be 
comparable to average values of inequality, and therefore that its implications in terms of 
regime type may be found even in reality. 
Note that, given the constraint 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 < 𝑐, 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 is a function of 𝑐, so that the distance between 
the autocrat and the median citizen is implicitly embedded within 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 itself. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Liberalization movements (from repressive/closed autocracy to open 
autocracy, and from open autocracy to democracy) should be correlated with average levels 
of inequality, while liberalization should be discouraged by both low and high levels of 
inequality. 
 
This implication is controversial, but finds an important precedent in a by-now classic formal 
model of democratization. Indeed, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006 formulate a formal model 
of democratic transition, concluding that a choice in favor of a democratic polity should only 
be realized for average values of inequality. Low values of inequality would stifle 
democratization efforts by rendering potential social conflict a moot point, as the median 
citizen would have far less incentives to rebel to an autocrat setting a policy a little further 
from his ideal point. At the other end of the spectrum, an autocrat would never democratize 
and always face the chance of being ousted, because the cost of setting a policy offer that 
would prevent the median citizen from revolting would be too high. 
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A similar dynamic occurs in my model. However, a crucial difference is that I find that this 
conclusion is consistent for any “liberalization choice”: inequality should not just be related 
to the choice between dictatorship or democracy, but also determine the choice between 
repressive or open autocracy. 
A second hypothesis can be drawn from the fact that, looking at 𝐷𝑎, one can see that the 
probability of an autocrat choosing to lead a democratization process increases as the benefits 
from an autocrat-led democratization process increase. Namely, these benefits may be 
derived from the expectations of the autocrat not to be ousted, or to even be the leader of the 
democratic transition and play a determinant role even in the post-transition period. 
I therefore expect that, as international pressures in favor of democratization increase, both 
the domestic and the international environment become more conducive to enhancing the 
expectations that a “benevolent autocrat” will find his role preserved if he led a 
democratization effort, instead of being ousted by his citizens. The literature on democracy 
promotion bloomed during the Nineties, which were also a period of incredibly enhanced 
efforts in favor of democratic transitions, by national governments and NGOs alike (Chand 
1997, Linz and Stepan 1996). The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about the emergence 
of the United States as the sole superpower: for a possibly brief interlude, this in turn elicited 
what some scholars have come to define as the “unipolar moment” (Krauthammer 1990). 
The end of the Cold war and the self-promotion of American power – also through the spread 
of the liberal values, which, despite many limitations especially with allied middle powers 
(such as Saudi Arabia), was increasingly seen as coinciding with fostering the US national 
interest – spurred an effort at democracy promotion which was incomparably superior to any 
other after the Second World War, not even to the focus on human rights by US President 
Jimmy Carter. 
After about a decade, or even less than that according to others, the external support for 
democratization induced a backlash against it (Carothers 2006, Gravingholt et al. 2009, 
Burnell 2011, Wolff et al. 2014), both within some of the main “democracy promoters” such 
as the US, and in target countries. For one, regimes targeted with conditional aid tended to at 
best adopt cosmetic changes, while antiterrorism and regime change climbed at the top of the 
US foreign policy agenda after the 9/11/2001 attacks. 
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At the same time, the experience of failed democratic transitions, or the failure by autocratic 
leaders to properly lead the transition while preserving power during a period of turmoil, 
generated mistrust. Finally, the rise of new non-democratic powers as “prosperous, mighty, 
and assertive” actors served both as an example of illiberal economic development and called 
for an even more prudent approach by the US (Chen and Kinzellbach 2015). Finally, the 
growing narrative around  “illiberal democracies” in Central and Eastern European countries 
appears to be just the last nail in the coffin of a democratization push that by the 2000s already 
appeared to have fizzled out, with less and less countries democratizing and even a reverse 
trend appearing (Freedom House 2014). 
Despite all that, taking the whole post-Cold War period as a baseline against which to 
evaluate Cold War praxis in democratization trends and international support allows the test 
to be more stringent: it does not limit the possibility of international democratic support to 
the 1990s but extends it to the whole 18 years after the end of the Cold War in our sample 
(see Chapter 5 for more details). 
Meanwhile, international reactions to the Arab Spring, coupled with recent efforts from the 
international community to push Myanmar towards a slow but steady democratization effort, 
might offer a counterargument that Western countries have not abandoned their attempts at 
supporting democratization processes whenever conditions seem ripe. 
 
Hypothesis 3. By increasing the incentives for autocratic leaders to lead political 
liberalization, the post-Cold War period should be correlated with a higher likelihood of 
liberalization. 
 
Then, as extensively discussed in section 2.4, the model envisages a complex role for the 
administration of private rewards or public punishments for expressions of loyalty and 
dissent by the median citizen in general, and for the management of natural resource rents in 
particular. While I may assume that an autocrat commanding control over a vast array of 
high-valued natural resources may be facilitated in staving off his rivals (by buying them off 
through cooptation, or by buying enough means to repress them), it is nonetheless apparent 
from my model that under particular conditions even potential rivals might be more inclined 
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to ousting the autocrat and holding power directly themselves, than letting themselves be 
“bought off”. 
 
Hypothesis 4a. The relationship between regime stability and natural resource rents, 
particularly hydrocarbon rents, is indeterminate.  
Hypothesis 4b. The relationship between the choice of regime type and natural resource 
rents, particularly hydrocarbon rents, is indeterminate. 
 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b are somewhat non-hypothesis. They stand to signal that my model 
appears to be agnostic as to the political direction towards which natural resource rents may 
“tip” a polity, ceteris paribus, and on whether these natural resource rents may render a 
particular polity more or less prone to political instability. 
The natural resource curse literature appears to have a well-consolidated tendency to regard 
rents as stabilizers for autocracies and, therefore, stifling democratization. At the same time, 
recent studies tend to disprove the “political resource curse” hypothesis (Haber and Menaldo 
2011). 
My model warns from oversimplifications: the relationship between regime type, regime 
stability, and natural resource rents is something that needs to be tested in practice, and the 
model cannot suggest the most likely political outcome as natural resource rents become 
increasingly available to either democratic or autocratic countries. 
Moving away from my theoretical model, I also derive a set hypotheses from the general 
literature on comparative politics and regime stability, which are both liable to empirical 
testing and will serve to enrich our empirical multivariate models in Chapter 5. First of all, a 
classic strand of the literature finds consistent and considerable support for the modernization 
theory, which holds that economic development should foster social developments that are 
conducive to increasingly more liberal politics (Lipset 1959). Up to today, a large majority 
of studies has confirmed the correlation between economic development and the tendency of 
countries to democratize, even as “non-liberal” countries such as China, Singapore, or 
resource-rich Gulf Arab countries have growth considerably and remained largely autocratic 
in recent decades (Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009). Although there is considerable debate 
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about the mechanisms of this relationship, and the causes for this consistent finding are 
certainly not settled (see Przeworski et al. 2000), it is nonetheless evident that there is a broad 
consensus about the existence and robustness of this mutual relationship between economic 
development and increased likelihood of democratization. 
At the same time, I want to test whether this relationship continues to hold true for 
liberalization within autocratic countries. Is modernization theory only pushing countries to 
be “more democratic” over time by transitioning from autocracy towards democracy, or are 
we missing a lot of variability and change (and, possibly, new mechanisms to be uncovered) 
by ignoring the difference between repressive and open autocracies? Therefore, I draw the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5. Higher economic development should be correlated with higher levels of 
political liberalization. 
 
Another important factor that I want to include in my models is the tendency of political 
regime types to cluster in space. The regime diffusion (or “contagion”) theory posits that 
nearby or similar countries tend to influence each other in terms of the choice of regime type. 
This means that we should expect that countries with similar regime types tend to cluster in 
space. This is indeed the case throughout our whole sample period, as evidenced by a cross-
sectional analysis of spatial dependence that I undertook in the preliminary stages of my 
research (see the appendix to Chapter 6). 
The issue with spatial models is that they tend to easily degenerate towards complexity and 
are difficult to manage in panel data settings. Therefore, the preliminary analysis stuck to a 
series of cross-sections over time, but could not model time dynamics or intra-country 
variability in any meaningful way. Also, theoretical mechanisms cannot do away with the 
classic Galton’s problem, which can be reduced to an identification problem, whereby we 
can never be sure whether the spatial dependence that we find in empirical analysis is a result 
of a specific correlation between regime types, or is instead the result of spatial correlation 
in some observed or even omitted regressors (for example a result of the fact that levels of 
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economic development tends to cluster in space as well). Despite these limitations, it is still 
crucial to include some measure of spatial dependence in the following multivariate models. 
 
Hypothesis 6. Regime types tend to cluster in space. Some regions will tend to be more or 
less liberal than the world baseline. 
 
Finally, another classic strand of the literature posits that democratization comes in “waves”. 
Like a theory of contagion or domino effects, such theories argue that contagion effects do 
not just tend to cluster in space, but also happen simultaneously in time (Huntington 1991, 
Strand et al. 2011). Waves of democratization may be followed, or even occur together with, 
waves of autocratic retrenchment (McFaul 2002). Also, similar “waves” may be present in 
times of increased or decreased political stability overall, irrespective of the regime type 
outcome of such instability. Again, a peculiarity of our hypotheses is that we do not stick to 
democratization trends anymore, but inspect whether such “waves” occur also in tandem with 
liberalizing movements within autocracies. 
 
Hypothesis 7a. Some years or periods should be more or less conducive to political 
liberalization than others.  
Hypothesis 7b. Some years or periods should be more conducive to regime stability than 
others.  
 
 
2.7. Conclusions and avenues for further research 
 
In this section, I highlight some of the features that are missing from my theoretical model, 
and that may be avenues for further refinements and research. 
First, by choosing to conceptualize policy offers as general political-economic conditions, I 
cannot study the impact over regime outcomes of the level of a country’s gross domestic 
product or other economic determinants, such as taxes and transfers. This only allows me to 
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draw the modernization hypothesis from the extant literature, but not to logically tie it to my 
model. 
In terms of levels, however, it is worth noting that even the most advanced political economy 
models normalize the size of an economy to 1, so that this is something that, to our 
knowledge, all formal models lack at the moment. As to my model, ì it would be tempting to 
assume that the size of the economy may enter the game through the rent parameter, R (i.e. 
the benefit that the autocrat receives from staying in power), and that transfers enter both in 
the policy offer x and the direct transfer, r. I refrain from doing so in order not to stretch too 
much the implications that can be drawn from my model, and postpone  
Second, my model does not allow us to account for economic growth and its potential effects 
over political outcomes. This is again a shortcoming of any formal model in comparative 
politics, as they tend to treat the economy as perfectly static, for example considering the 
redistributive effects of taxes over the incomes of different actors but not their effects over 
economic growth. This is an obvious shortcoming in current comparative political models, 
especially considering that narrative accounts often offer mechanisms through which 
economic growth might affect actors’ utility functions and strategic calculations, and that the 
occurrence of violence during political regime change might feed back into economic growth 
itself. 
Finally, a potential deficiency of this model is the fact that it is missing recursivity. To 
completely model the behavior of rational actors, it can be argued that we would need an 
infinite-horizon game with time-discounting agents (Acemoglu et al. 2010). Comparative 
statics of a “static” model can only give us a general idea of how the “complete”/dynamic 
model would behave, and which equilibria it would converge to depending on parameter 
values: critics may argue that the complete long-run equilibrium still needs to be found. 
This is a valid criticism, and it is one of the reasons why we should be careful not to infer too 
much from our model. At the same time, it may also be argued that infinite-horizon games 
place mathematical elegance before plausibility. Infinite-horizon games require the actors of 
the game to have a perfect, though fading, sense of future scenarios, and perfect forecasting 
skills. As behavioral economics proved to us time and again, this is already unlikely to be the 
case already for economic actors following sufficiently reliable economic cues depending on 
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sufficiently strict economic laws (Samson 2014); it is even less likely in the case of actors 
moving in a socio-political context, in which innovations tend to be the norm. 
Finally, the problem of bringing to solution a game with many parameters has been plaguing 
game-theoretic models for a long time, as it requires to add first- or second-order conditions 
that devoid those parameters of meaning by invoking them into the game but then keeping 
them fixed (Camerer 2003). Adding dynamic modeling to a game with uncertainty would 
have required a considerable leap into the unknown that we have decided to leave for another 
time.
Chapter 3. Measuring Democracy 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
What is democracy, can we measure it, and if yes, how so? These questions have been around 
for decades – to some extent, even centuries (Rousseau 1762) – and have evolved with the 
very political systems and national cultures that have originated them. The problem of 
describing what is democracy was born the moment the word was invented, and is here to 
stay: democracy is what Gallie (1952) called a “contested concept”. 
The difficulty arises from the fact that “democracy” is an unobservable property of national 
political systems – a latent variable. We can observe, or at least hope to observe, tangible 
political institutions (such as legislatures and elections) and establish whether they are 
present or not in a political system at a given point in time, but democracy itself “is nowhere 
to be found” (Kaplan 1964). Moreover, even when we observe ‘facts of the world’, in order 
to assess whether a country is democratic and to what extent we can speak of democracy, it 
is highly likely that we will be forced to express a judgment over such facts (Wittgenstein 
1921): for example, when we need to evaluate whether an election has been free and fair. 
The fact that democracy is not directly observable leaves the concept in good company with 
many other fundamental concepts in the social sciences and, particularly, political science. 
For example, we cannot observe political power, both in the national and international arenas, 
and even consensus around the mere existence of a “power potential” outside the behavior 
of political actors and their strategic interactions seems to be feeble at best (Stoppino 2001). 
Still, political theory could not exist without relying on the concept of power. 
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During the last few decades, attempts at capturing the concept of democracy have proceeded 
in tandem with the progressive ‘quantification’ of political science in general and 
comparative politics in particular – i.e. progresses in the use of statistical methods and 
techniques in the methodology of social sciences. Gradually, political scientists have made 
good on their ambition to try to develop concepts that could be able to describe the political 
systems of all or most of the existing national polities in the world. The final aim was to make 
such concepts sufficiently general that they could be used to describe most national political 
systems, but at the same time not too vague that they become mere hollow shells of the 
original concept that they are trying to capture. This tension between universalization and the 
conservation of meaning is always apparent in contemporary social sciences. 
Notwithstanding their limits (for example, substantive concepts of democracy today tend to 
fade out, while formal concepts step in and replace them), such efforts in categorization are 
of primary importance to my work. Indeed, in order to subject the formal theory I described 
in Chapter 2 to empirical testing, I will first need to choose the appropriate way to capture 
underlying political, economic, and social concepts (and forces). 
This chapter will briefly summarize attempts at defining democracy, focusing on those that 
tried to apply the concept to the greatest number of national polities. I will focus on 7 
measures of democracy and briefly describe how the authors chose to capture the concept. I 
do this in order to choose the best measures of democracy – those that I can regard as both 
valid (i.e., measuring “what it is supposed to measure”; Bollen 1989) and reliable (i.e., 
multiple measurements done by different persons at different times should produce similar 
results). Pragmatically, I will also aim for measures that are sufficiently exogenous to my 
covariates (i.e., do not rely, or rely only slightly, on potential independent variables for the 
operationalization of the concept of democracy). 
In the next Chapter, I will show that even the best attempts at capturing the presence or 
absence of democracy, and of quantifying some “degrees” of it, fall short to a good 
operationalisation of political regime types – at least for my main research question. 
Nonetheless, they remain as important as ever to gauge the robustness of findings achieved 
via other methods, and deserve the specific attention I devote to them in the following pages. 
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3.2. Measures of democracy 
 
Although measuring democracy should be an important aspect of comparative political 
studies in the first place, systematic cross-country assessments of democracy over time are 
not as many as one might think. In fact, three such measurements (Polity IV, Freedom House, 
or Przeworski-like dichotomous measures) overwhelmingly dominate the contemporary 
literature on democracy. This should not be regardeds as an indication of a lack of 
measurement attempts, nor as a gap that necessarily needs to be bridged. In fact, there are 
reasons why this might not be the case. 
Firstly, the relative scarcity of measures of democracy could simply indicate that scholars 
regard existing measures as well-suited to capture the main dimensions of democracy, thus 
doing away with the need to come up with new operationalisations and embark in the 
recoding of democracy levels in every country in the world across time. After all, as Adcock 
and Collier claim, “in any field of enquiry, scholars commonly associate a matrix of potential 
meanings with the background concept[, and this] limits the range of plausible options” 
(Adcock and Collier 2001). 
Secondly, as we will soon see, such measures seem to offer a plethora of possibilities and to 
cover a lot of the conceptual space, leaving little room to further innovation after the 
important systematic efforts accomplished in the Nineties and early 2000s: it might well be 
that we have entered a period of ‘consolidation’ after one of ‘innovation’. Indeed, reviewing 
measures of democracy more than a decade ago, Munck and Verkuilen (2002) already listed 
almost every large-N measurement scholars can choose from today.  
However, there could also be reasons that might have left us with potential grey areas that 
still need to be filled. One such reason is that new codification projects tend to be big, 
requiring significant initial investment and, once the first huge efforts have come to an end, 
constant polishing and updating. Costs may sometimes be disincentive enough for scholars 
not to embark in such a project, even when they find current measures at fault. 
Nevertheless, we can find comfort in the fact that, as soon as a ‘standard’ of democratic 
measures has emerged in the literature, such measures have undergone extensive criticism, 
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and many of them have been refined over time by authors that have acknowledged fair and 
legitimate criticism. 
What is significant about measures of democracy is that almost all of them rely on definitions 
of democracy that are similar to Schumpeter’s procedural definition (Schumpeter 1947) and 
that stick to political/institutional characteristics rather than deviating towards more 
“substantive” (and all-encompassing) conceptualisations, which could also account for the 
socio-economic aspects of democratic political regimes. This is fortunate, because to be 
suitable for the use in empirical analysis it is of the utmost importance that the democracy 
measure one chooses does not include other variables, such as economic development or 
social pressures, which might as well be determinants of democracy rather than constitutive 
parts of the concept. In other words, I want my measures of democracy to be as exogenous 
as possible to potential correlates of democracy. 
In Table 3.1, I show seven large-N measures of democracy, along with a synthesis of the 
concept’s components declared to be important by each author in the definition and 
operationalization of the concept. Here, I proceed to briefly review the four most famous and 
authoritative measures, in order to adjudicate between them. 
I start from Alvarez et al.’s (1996; also see Przeworski et al. 2000) dichotomous 
conceptualization of democracy, also in light of the fact that it appears to be the most 
conservative in categorizing countries as democracies. The measure has been updated and 
expanded by Cheibub et al. (2010; CGV henceforth). 
Here, democracy is a political regime that satisfies two conditions: 
 
1. the government is accountable to an elected institution, usually a legislature; 
2. elections to the representative institution are contested, i.e. there exists an opposition 
which has an actual chance to be elected into office as a consequence of winning 
elections. 
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Source Measure Components 
Freedom House 2013 Discr. / Cont. Political rights, civil liberties 
Hadenius 1992 Continuous Elections, political freedoms 
PACL (Przeworski et 
al. 2000; CGV 2010) 
Dichotomous Executive elections, legislative elections, party 
competition 
Polity 4 (Marshall, 
Jaggers and Gurr 
2006) 
Continuous Participation: competitive and regulated; 
Executive recruitment: competitive and open; 
Constraints on the executive 
Polyarchy (Coppedge 
and Reinicke 1991) 
Continuous Free and fair elections, freedom of 
organization, freedom of expression, pluralism 
in the media 
PRC (Gasiorowski 
1996, Reich 2002) 
Discrete Competitiveness, inclusiveness, political 
liberties 
Vanhanen (Vanhanen 
1979, 1990, 2003) 
Continuous Competition, participation 
Table 3.1. Large-N measures of democracy 
 
For contestation to actually occur, three conditions must be met: 
 
1. the outcome of the election must not be certain before it takes place (ex ante 
uncertainty); 
2. whoever wins the election must actually take office (ex post irreversibility); 
3. elections meeting criteria 1 and 2 should occur at regular and expected intervals 
(Przeworski 1991). 
 
While this appears to be a great way to operationalise democracy, leaving out unnecessary 
socio-economic considerations, a problem arises when one needs a rule in order to 
operationalize the contestation criterion: how subjectively are we allowed to measure 
contestation, and how conservative do we want to be when we categorize a political regime 
as a democracy rather than as non-democratic? 
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Alvarez, Przeworski and all other scholars following in their lead choose a conservative rule: 
assuming that more than one party competes in the election, a regime can be considered 
democratic only if at least one alternation in power takes place under electoral rules identical 
(or very similar) to the ones that brought the incumbent to power. 
An illustration of the “reticence” of this dichotomous measure to categorize regimes as 
democracies can be easily found by looking at Mexico. PACL and CGV categorize Mexico 
as a non-democracy until 2000, when the first alternation in power happened after more than 
half a century of Institutional Revolutionary Party (IRP) rule. In reality, the defeat of IRP 
came after more than two decades of progressive political liberalization. The Polity IV index, 
for example, codes the first (small) liberalization of the political space in 1977, and then two 
major liberalizations occurring in 1988 and 1994. PACL and CGV appear therefore to be not 
very sensitive to sensible regime changes before “full democracy” occurs. 
Freedom House (FH) also carries out its own exercise for measuring how democratic political 
regimes are. The “Freedom in the World” report, released annually, has recently attracted 
huge media crowds, while researchers in comparative politics have been relying on the index 
for years. 
FH index’s appeal has appeared to wane in recent years, as scholars have come to consider 
it as less methodologically sound as it appeared to be in the second half of the Nineties and 
early 2000s (Brinks and Coppedge 2006). FH uses a 1-7 scoring system, where 7 means least 
democratic, combined with a “status” assigned to a country chosen among Free, Partly Free, 
and Not Free; the latter is not a different measure, but comes straight down form the overall 
score (a country is considered “free” if it scored between 1.0 and 2.5; “partly free” when it 
scores 3.0 to 5.0; and “not free” otherwise). 
The overall FH score is actually the average between a “political rights” score and a “civil 
liberties” score, which also vary from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). In practice, FH rates each 
country over 25 indicators, 10 of which are meant to describe the enjoyment of political rights 
(questions range from the electoral process to political pluralism and participation) and 
contribute towards that part of the index, while 15 are designed to capture the level protection 
of civil liberties (from freedom of expression and belief to associational and organizational 
rights). 
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Today, the comparative politics literature recognizes that the FH index has some drawbacks. 
First, it is not clear how or whether one should combine political rights and civil liberties in 
order to assess the level of democracy in any particular country. On the one hand, it is 
certainly true that the problem of aggregating many measurements into one single number is 
a charge that no index can be immune from, so this particular criticism is something that is 
not a unique liability (or, to remain neutral, a feature) of the FH index. On the other hand, 
aside from the aggregation method, in order to be useful to quantitative analysis an index 
should either stick to a formal/procedural definition of democracy, devoid of any other 
correlates, or clearly declare what enters the equation. 
With the FH index, one can never be sure of whether it includes ‘too much’ information and 
is therefore endogenous to other social manifestations of political events (such as uprisings, 
riots, and the consequent use of repressive measures) which may be contingent upon the 
country-year instead of being a characteristic feature of the political system. This tension 
between procedural definitions of democracy, in which majority rule makes up the most part 
of the requisite for a country to be declared a democracy (together with some sort of open 
procedure to enforce the periodic “updating” of the country’s majority through elections), 
and more substantive definitions that would favour the inclusion of some threshold for the 
level of protection of minority rights, resurfaces here in full force. 
Moreover, the FH index also has some practical drawbacks. For starters, the FH undergoes 
several slight tweaks in its methodology every year, but the index is never revised backwards 
– and could not be without considerable time, effort and resources, given that it relies upon 
such a long expert questionnaire. It is therefore difficult to establish whether the index always 
captures the same underlying concept, year after year, or whether the definition itself has 
significantly changed, risking to bias statistical results. 
At the same time, the index only ranks countries from 1972 onwards, even skipping one year 
(1981). Also, during the Eighties and early Nineties, it is not clear which year the report is 
referring to as it tends not to be synched with the calendar year, so that most of the times 
rankings do not refer to countries at 31 December of the previous year or 1 January for the 
current year. This way, consistency within the index and comparability with other indexes 
both risk to be undermined. Finally, FH raters unambiguously declare that the aim of the 
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index is to measure political freedom and civil rights scores as enjoyed by individuals within 
a country’s borders, irrespective of the fact that the curtailments on freedoms and rights come 
from state or non-state actors. This highly complicates the assessment of a country’s level of 
democracy whenever there is violence within its borders, or in cases when the government is 
not able to assert its control over a significant portion of its territory. 
Vanhanen (1979, 1990, 2003) approaches the problem of measuring a country’s level of 
democracy from a different angle. His dataset, now maintained by the International Peace 
Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), was called “Poliarchy” when it was first made public in 
electronic form because the index takes Dahl’s (1971) famous conceptualization of 
democracy as its starting point. Vanhanen thus attempts to measure democracy by relying on 
two variables, competition and participation, spanning a period that goes from 1810 to 2000. 
Vanhanen’s measure is interesting, and I believe that he is correct in trying to define 
democracy as a political regime possessing both of two dimensions: “participation”, which 
captures inclusiveness (the right to participate in elections), and “competition”, which refers 
to the level of political contestation (the fact that elections can be lost). 
However, Poliarchy has at least one important liability. In order to assess the level of 
competition of a political system, one needs to evaluate in some way the level of contestation 
of elections. The latter, in turn, depends not only on the level of contestation allowed by the 
political regime itself, but also by the structure of the party system: majoritarian systems will 
be expected, by construction, to be less ‘tolerant’ of lesser parties. Therefore, when Vanhanen 
includes the percentage of votes won by parties other than the largest one in his measure of 
the level of contestation within a political system, one can see that he is conflating the 
political regime with the party system, and his operationalization blurs the line between the 
two realms of comparative politics (regime type, and the structure and characteristics of 
electoral systems), instead of producing a clear result. 
I finally come to the Polity index approach (Marshall et al. 2006). This is by far the most 
widely used measure of democracy, and probably the most consistently updated (together 
with Freedom House’s Freedom in the World) and revised. It is also one of the most 
extensive, currently covering the period 1800-2013 for all ‘major independent states’ (i.e., 
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states with a total population of 500,000 or more in the most recent year – today it covers 
167 countries). 
The Polity index started out in a polity-case format (one observation for each political regime 
spell a country experienced; Gurr 1974). However, during the last two decades it has been 
modified to account for the growing scholarly use of time-series cross-section (TSCS) 
datasets, as computational power made it increasingly feasible to accommodate for the 
dynamic properties of TSCS data in statistical models – along with other desirable properties 
of TSCS data, such as the possibility to use lags and mitigate the problem of reverse 
causation. 
The Polity index measures democracy by relying on a series of indicators (for which see the 
Polity codebook, Marshall et al. 2014) that are ultimately aggregated in a 0-10 measure of 
“autocracy” and a 0-10 measure of “democracy”. By subtracting the autocracy score to the 
democracy score, one can therefore construct an index ranging from +10 to -10: that’s exactly 
what the Polity project has done since 2002, incorporating a practice going on for some years 
before then, and producing a new variable, “polity2”, that is amenable to use in TSCS 
analysis. However, it is important to recognize – as the Polity Codebook extensively does – 
that: “The simple combination of the original DEMOC and AUTOC index values in a unitary 
POLITY scale, in many ways, runs contrary to the original theory stated by Eckstein and 
Gurr in Patterns of Authority (1975) and, so, should be treated and interpreted with due 
caution. (…) The original theory posits that autocratic and democratic authority are distinct 
patterns of authority [emphasis added], elements of which may co-exist in any particular 
regime context” (Marshall et al. 2014). 
I believe that the Polity index offers many advantages compared to its ‘competitors’. First of 
all, it has been consistently scrutinized for errors by hundreds of scholars, and researchers 
maintaining the index have accepted some of these critiques by modifying the dataset 
(correcting errors, generating new variables, documenting discrepancies, etc.) throughout the 
whole period. It is also one of the most updated measures: together with the Freedom House 
index, every year the team maintaining the index produces new data for the full dataset of 
countries for the previous year. Evidence of such a continual updating effort can be seen 
today in the fact that Polity, which is currently at its fourth “incarnation” (Polity IV), is being 
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reviewed in order to switch to a next generation / version (Polity 5). Development of version 
5 of Polity kicked off in 2008 and, due to the tremendous amount of work that it entails 
(reviewing 167 countries’ regime types over more than two centuries), as of early 2016 it 
was about two thirds to completion (Center for Systemic Peace 2016). Moreover, Polity IV 
relies on a political definition of democracy that is not endogenous to socio-economic 
variables, and also tends exogenous to many other political phenomena of interest (such as 
the occurrence of protests, violence, civil wars, etc.).  
Therefore, for my empirical analysis, when I test for effects upon levels of democracy, I will 
mainly rely on the Polity IV index, and chiefly on the aggregated polity2 variable: the unified 
+10 / -10 score (but “corrected”: see next paragraph). However, given the tremendous amount 
of information that the availability of so many democracy indexes entails, it would be unwise 
to assume that I can select a single preferred index and do away with the full complexity of 
measuring a latent and multidimensional concept. This is why, together with my preferred 
measure, I will also rely upon the latent variable approach, for which see paragraph 3.3. 
 
 
3.3. Correcting ‘polity2’ 
 
Having selected the polity2 variable from the Polity IV Index, I want to account for its 
limitations and, whenever possible, amend the index in such a way as to remove some 
possible sources of bias. As stated in the previous paragraph, many such limitations have 
been dealt with over the years since the launch of the current version (2002), by current and 
previous teams maintaining the dataset. However, to my knowledge at least one serious issue 
still plagues the polity2 variable as can be found in the Polity IV dataset, and this still awaits 
to be tackled by the developing team. Given that this is the case, I decide to directly amend 
the dataset before proceeding, in order to fix the data to the best of my means. 
As explained in the previous section, the polity2 variable has been extensively used in panel 
(TSCS) data studies, and indeed it has been devised exactly for such a purpose. It captures 
the latent concept of democracy ranging from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy) 
through 21 discrete steps. What is more, compared to the original polity variable, which also 
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ranged from +10 to -10, the polity2 variable provides a democracy score for periods of so-
called “interruption”, “interregnum” and “transition”, while polity coded them with special 
numbers as -66, -77, and -88 respectively (and, therefore, as ultimately missing). This 
artificial substitution for a proper democracy score in periods where even the very concept 
of “polity” of a country is doubtfully applicable served the purpose to not lose too many 
observations, especially in cases of listwise deletion whenever some country-years were 
missing, and the more so when lags of the democracy index were thought to play a part in 
the true/best model (as this would at least double the missingness level). 
According to the Polity IV User Manual (Marshall et al. 2014), “interruption periods” occur 
“if a country is occupied by foreign powers during war, terminating the old polity, then re-
establishes a polity after foreign occupation ends”, Polity codes the intervening years as an 
interruption until an independent polity is re-established. Periods of interruption “are also 
coded for participants involved in short-lived attempts at the creation of ethnic, religious, or 
regional federations”: in the 1945-2007 period this applies to Singapore in 1963 and 1964, 
when following a heated referendum in 1962 with no option of independence it entered a 
short-lived union with Malaysia, before finally gaining independence in 1965. It also applies 
to Syria for the period 1958-1960, when the country entered into a political union with Egypt 
(joining the so-called United Arab Republic), until conflicts between Syria’s Ba’ath party 
and Nasser’s Egypt led to a military coup that restored Syria’s independence. 
Country-years are coded as an “interregnum period” (-77) when “there is a complete collapse 
of central political authority. This most likely occurs during periods of internal war” 
(Marshall et al. 2014). Notable cases of interregnum periods in the dataset include Somalia 
1991-2010 (encompassing the Somali civil war and concurrent state collapse), Lebanon 
1975-1989 (spanning the Lebanese civil war), Democratic Republic of the Congo 1992-2002 
(the two Congolese civil wars and, before 1996, a situation of quasi-state collapse with 
Mobutu and Mulumba creating two parallel state authorities within DRC), and Laos 1961-
1972 (the full-scale outbreak of the Laotian civil war, which had been ongoing since 1953). 
Finally, a period is coded as a “transition” when a transition between two polities exceeds a 
one-year length, for example when the building of the new polity takes time as in Angola 
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between 1993 and 1996, Burundi 2001-2004, Cambodia 1988-92, El Salvador 1979-83, or 
Iran 1979-81. Most transition periods however last just a single year. 
Out of the 9,201 country-years between 1945 and 2013, such periods represent a meagre 
minority of the grand total: 108 cases (1.2%) are coded as interruptions, 127 (1.4%) as 
interregnums, and 173 (1.9%) as transitions. Altogether, however, they make up 4.4% of the 
dataset, meaning that out of the average 55 years that a country is present (in my post-World 
War II initial dataset) special cases appear on average 2.42 times per country. Obviously, 
special cases are also skewed to occur more frequently in unstable countries experiencing a 
higher level of regime transitions (rare events themselves) and political instability. Such 
countries can expect special cases to happen almost double the time they take place in 
“advanced” countries and regions of the world, while at the same time these countries’ “life 
span” since they first gained independence can be considerably shorter. 
The occurrence of such special cases raises a twofold problem for TSCS studies: 
 
1. it causes a break in the series, so that the dynamic components of TSCS models lose 
out in estimation efficiency, and the more so the lengthier time lags are included in 
the models; 
2. it precludes the study of the causes of such missing data cases: listwise deletion 
forbids the researcher to explore the root causes of missingness. When such 
occurrences are non-random events, the ensuing regression analyses are not just 
inefficient but outright biased. 
 
The solution offered by Polity IV authors was to produce a new variable, called Revised 
Combined Polity Score, or simply polity2, which converts some of these special cases into 
conventional polity scores (between -10 and +10). In order to produce polity2, the values 
were converted according to the following rule set: 
 
 Cases of foreign interruption (-66) were treated as system missing. Therefore, no 
substantial change occurred, given that a special code would anyway be treated as a 
missing value by any scholar employing TSCS model; 
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 Cases of interregnum (-77) were converted to “neutral” Polity scores of 0; 
 Cases of transition (-88) were prorated across the span of the transition. So, authors 
employed a simple interpolation between the score for the year before the transition 
occurred and the score for the year in which the transition ended (Marshall et al. 
2014). 
 
Such treatment of special cases, although certainly useful to fill out most of the missingness, 
appears however to produce numbers that “lack face validity” (Plumper and Neumayer 
2010). Although it is apparent that Polity authors made a positive attempt to take a neutral 
stance towards coding without inserting their own biases, such a neutral stance in the 
evaluation of political regime scores ends up complicating things instead of offering feasible 
solutions. 
For example, assigning a score of 0 to interregnum periods can be conceived as “neutral” 
only insofar as it puts countries exactly at the middle of the spectrum between -10 and +10 
scores. Given that “interregnum” codes are reserved for countries experiencing enough 
political turmoil that central authority has all but collapsed, the assignment of a 0 score 
clusters all “failed state” experiences at the middle of the spectrum, making state capacity 
endogenous to Polity score and inducing the “humped shaped” relationship between regime 
type and state capacity that many authors have observed since the end of the Nineties and 
early-2000s (not noticing it was oftentimes an artefact of their own making). 
Moreover, assigning 0 scores is hardly “neutral”, because countries will most often have a 
democracy score that is non-zero (either positive or negative) before collapsing. Therefore, 
with a change from the non-zero score to zero it appears as if the regime type had abruptly 
changed, especially for countries with scores at the far ends of the spectrum, when something 
entirely different has actually happened (i.e., the state collapsed). For example, Afghanistan 
between 1992 and 1995 is considered a collapsed state, and the same holds for Cyprus 
between 1963 and 1967. However, given that Afghanistan’s democracy score is -8 before the 
interregnum period, it appears as if an important democratic transition happened in 1992, 
followed again by an autocratic transition between 1995 and 1996, when the country’s score 
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collapsed again from 0 to -7. For Cyprus, at the same time, a score of 8 in 1962 becomes a 0 
score in 1963, and reverts back to 7 in 1967. 
The problem is further amplified when the interregnum coding rule is applied before the 
transition coding rule, which implies that transition years can be substituted by interpolating 
the score from the year before the transition with the score when the transition has ended. 
This adds “fake” transitions towards or away from democracy. Consider for example Chad 
between 1990 and 1997: it is coded as an interregnum in 1992, while 1991 and the 1993-96 
period are coded as transition. The result is that, as 1992 is coded as 0, this generates a rapid 
transition towards democracy lasting two years (from -7 to 0), and then a slow transition 
towards autocracy lasting 5 years (from 0 in 1992 to -3 in 1997). 
This shows that a rule-based approach grounded in theory should be preferred to an approach 
that declares itself neutral but ends up conflating state capacity and regime type. The 
approach is based on the recognition that “some a priori knowledge, or at least some logic, 
always exists to make selection better than an a-theoretical computer algorithm” (King 1986). 
Finally, the problem gets even worse if one is interested in studying within-country 
variability, employing a fixed effects model that removes between-country variability, or 
models that try to separate within- and between-country variation. 
Though a unique, feasible solution is impossible to find, I prefer to operate a correction to 
the polity2 variable. My choice falls with what Plumper and Neumayer (2010) call the 
“minimum level” rule. I therefore set the interregnum years to the lower of the two polity 
scores bordering the interregnum period, then use linear interpolation to add the affected 
transition years. This choice has many advantages: 
 
1. Contrary to the “classic” polity2 coding, it makes use of country-specific information 
preceding or following the interregnum period. It is therefore country-specific; 
2. Therefore, the rule does not treat all countries as equal by assigning a 0 score: it will 
assign scores depending on the country’s historical regime trajectories, which we can 
expect to be much more consistent with each polity’s most probable democracy score 
than a one-size-fits-all rule; 
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3. The rule constrains the democracy score to values within those before and after the 
interregnum. Again, this seems much more plausible than coding abrupt changes 
towards or away from democracy by assigning a 0 score to such cases. 
 
Once I have corrected the polity2 variable, I am left with a democracy index that appears 
much more reliable even in “fringe”, controversial cases, so that at least a priori my trust in 
regression analysis employing this measure can increase much more. The new variable 
correlates 99.2% with the previous polity2 coding. Despite such a high correlation, the 
correction is especially important in cases of fixed-effects models, where the between-
country variability is ignored and within-country movements become the only source of 
variation in the sample. This tends to compound the effects of measurement errors, especially 
since transitions are very rare compared to the persistence of political regimes (see Chapter 
6), and “fake” transitions can therefore bias estimates in unforeseeable ways. 
It is also important to underline that while a small number of comparative politics studies 
now corrects for this coding error, no analysis in the resource curse literature has ever 
employed such a correction. Therefore, previous analyses can be misleading, especially those 
studying regime transitions. The outcomes of such analyses should be considered imperfect 
until a replication with the improved measure of democracy confirms their findings. 
 
 
3.4. Unified Democracy Scores: the latent variable approach 
 
As anticipated in section 3.1, it seems wasteful to simply choose one among many measures 
of democracy. Although I came to the conclusion that the Polity index, and specifically an 
improved version of its polity2 variable, is potentially the best measure out there, it is 
however possible that other measures are valid as well – at least partially so. 
Moreover, a less stubborn, more flexible approach may account for the fact that, in 
comparative politics, there exist rival strategies for evaluating and validating measures of 
democracy (Seawright and Collier 2014). These certainly comprise levels-of-measurement 
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approaches such as those described in section 3.1, but also include structural-equation 
modelling with latent variables such as those expounded in this section. 
In fact, insofar as one assumes that every democracy index is an attempt to capture a unique, 
but complex and latent, underlying concept, one may want to assess the possibility of 
constructing a democracy index that accounts for this possibility. 
Pemstein et al. (2010) attempt to do just that. They collect 10 different measures of 
democracy, including the seven measures that I reviewed in section 3.1 and three democracy 
indexes that maintain a regional focus. Evidence for the fact that the 10 measures are trying 
to capture the same underlying concept is the fact that they correlate highly with each other. 
This, however, does not imply that they are all equally valid (Adcock and Collier 2001). 
Moreover, scholars that choose only one democracy score among many, as valid as they 
consider it to be, will make all the ‘mistakes’ that their measure of choice makes. It could be 
useful, then, to try to gauge just how much my index of choice is idiosyncratic compared 
with all other 9 measures, at least as a robustness check. For example, Polity considers 
Vladimir Putin’s ascent to power in 1999 to increase the country’s democracy from 3 to 6, 
and leaves it at that value until 2007, when it lowers it to 4. On the opposite, Freedom House 
considers democracy to be decreasing since 1998, and constantly from there on, until Putin’s 
Russia takes on a starkly authoritarian face. 
Who is right and who is wrong? Under Pemstein et al.’s (2010) methodology, I profess 
myself agnostic to the question and try to capture how reliable each coder tends to be 
compared to others, and how reliable the specific measure of democracy for that specific 
country could be whenever one observes discrepancies between different indexes. 
Therefore, Pemstein et al. (2010) construct a Unified Democracy Score. The authors model 
each indicator as an approximation to a latent, continuous unidimensional variable. 
Specifically, they assume that each index is produced by an observer (a judge) that, in trying 
to observe and measure the latent variable in each country-year, makes judgmental mistakes. 
Another assumption is that all the attempts are equally capable, ex ante, to observe the same 
concept were it not for mistakes. Given the true level of democracy zi, in country-year i, the 
rater j generates a perception tij of democracy in that country-year, such that: 
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 𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝑧𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑗
2) (1) 
 
Note that this model assumes that the rater makes only stochastic mistakes: systematic 
mistakes are forbidden. This could be problematic, and even the high correlation among 
measures can mask systematic errors. However, one can safely assume that differences in 
conceptualization, measurement and simple coder mistakes take the lion’s share of the error 
as raters construct indexes. 
We can summarize Pemstein et al. (2010)’s reasoning as follows. Suppose we can directly 
observe the raters’ perceptions, 𝑡𝑖𝑗, and their error variances, 𝜎𝑗
2. In reality we observe raters’ 
coded democracy scores, which, depending on the scale (be it continuous, ordinal, or 
bivariate), will be chosen as the closest to their perceived level of democracy. Moreover, 
suppose we have no a priori information about the true level of democracy, 𝑧𝑖. In such a case, 
we only assume: 
 
 𝑧𝑖~𝑁(𝑧0, 𝜎0
2) (2) 
 
If we take together (1) and (2), we can calculate the posterior distribution of 𝑧𝑖, i.e. its 
distribution conditional on  𝑡𝑖𝑗 and 𝜎𝑗
2, which is: 
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(3) 
 
So the posterior mean is simply a weighted average of the individual raters’ perceptions, with 
weights that are proportional to each rater’s precision. Moreover, by looking at the variance, 
we can see that uncertainty is decreasing in the number of raters, 𝑚. 
While it is true that we do not observe raters’ perceptions but their actual democracy scores, 
Pemstein et al. (2010) find a solution to this problem by employing a technique called 
multirater ordinal probit (Johnson and Albert 1999). To summarize, the technique allows for 
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potential variation due to the fact that: (1) rankings in democracy scores are based on some 
unknown function of each rater’s underlying perceptions; (2) the potential observable space 
is not continuous (no mind could categorize things into an infinitely continuous space), so 
that it can be subdivided into a number of ordinal categories (and not interval-level ones); (3) 
the rater can make mistakes, so that raters’ assignment of each country-year to a particular 
value of democracy depends on an underlying probability distribution. 
Estimating the model with a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm allows the 
authors to recover an estimate for the latent continuous level of democracy for each country-
year, as well as quantify the error committed by relying on the point estimate (its standard 
deviation). 
For the analysis in Chapter 6, I will only preserve the point estimates recovered from the 
procedure that produced the Unified Democracy Scores (UDS). I do this because I believe 
that the value of the UDS lies more in its role as a robustness check whenever most coders 
find themselves at odds with my preferred democracy score (the improved version of 
polity2). While uncertainty around each point estimate could certainly be useful, a huge 
problem in using it is that is soaks up almost all variability in within-country democracy 
scores, rendering any meaningful analysis particularly problematic. 
Doing so, I must be particularly aware of errors of commission: especially in fixed-effects 
regression analysis, the UDS point estimates might capture within-country democracy 
movements that are not actually happening but originate from the error around the point 
estimate. However, we should be confident that small-enough movements will not be 
significantly different from zero-movements to bias our analysis. 
Ultimately, I am left with an original measure of democracy that I prefer to the others – the 
improved polity2 score – and a weighted combination of 10 measures of democracy as an 
important variable that I can use to test the robustness of my findings. 
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3.5. Comparing UDS and polity2 democracy scores 
 
Now that I have selected two measures of democracy, I can compare them and see how they 
tap into the same underlying concept. 
First of all, the two measures are highly correlated in the sample I will use for later analysis 
(ρ=.923 for 5,282 country-years between 1970 and 2007). Clearly, a high correlation between 
the UDS and the polity2 score is to be expected because the UDS is actually constructed 
using 10 measures of democracy among which polity2 figures prominently. However, such 
a high correlation also proves that polity2 is a good benchmark, meaning that either the 
algorithms used to calculate the UDS – including Bayesian calibration – tend to give it 
enough weight when other measures disagree with it, or that the various measures of 
democracy seldom disagree between each other. 
Nevertheless, the more one scratches below the surface, the more some differences between 
the two indexes start to appear. In order to compare the extent to which the two scores agree 
or disagree, I must transform one scale in a way that it can be compared with the other. I 
therefore standardize polity2 to the yearly limits (maxima and minima) of the Unified 
Democracy Scores. I can now plot the two, but I can also do more than that: I can take 
advantage of the fact that UDS scores come not only with point estimates, but also with their 
own standard deviations. I can therefore add to the graphs the 95% confidence intervals for 
the UDS, and check whether polity2 and the UDS are significantly different from one 
another, or whether polity2 falls within the UDS’s C.I. 
I do this for 1970 and 2007, the first and last year in my sample, for all countries. Figures 3.1 
and 3.2 show, interestingly, that both measures tend to have similar shapes. In 1970, both 
UDS and polity2 appear to describe a complete logistic curve, although polity2’s seems to be 
much sharper and UDS’s is smoother and gentler. In 2007, instead, the curve seems to 
transform from a logistic seems into a logarithmic curve, driven by a large number of more 
democratic countries that form an upper plateau, while declining faster at the autocratic end 
of the spectrum. 
Though their ‘functional form’ across countries for a given point in time might appear to be 
similar, if we compare the two measures with each other, we can see that they tend to agree 
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more at the far ends of the spectrum, for full authoritarian or full democratic countries, and 
much less for middle values. This happens even though we corrected the polity2 measure by 
modifying the values that, beforehand, tended to cluster at 0 because of interregnum periods. 
Moreover, compared to UDS scores, the polity2 measure shows a remarkable “democratic 
bias” in 2007. This brings us back to a handful of recognized and distinctive features of Polity 
IV scores: 
 
a. they tend to categorize regime types at the ends of the 21-point scale much more 
often than at the middle. While this in turn might be simply the way things are with 
regime types, it in turns begs the question of whether we should prefer a 
dichotomous, or ordinal, scale to an interval-level variable such as polity2; 
b. especially for the period after the Cold War, they tend to categorize most democratic 
regimes as “fully democratic”, while other democratic indexes, and single-country 
experts, appear to be more conservative (Iskahan and Slaughter 2014; Marshall et 
al. 2014). 
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Figure 3.1 – Comparing polity and UDS with 95% C.I. (country scores for 1970)
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Figure 3.2 – Comparing polity and UDS with 95% C.I. (country scores for 2007)
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In order to compare the two measures, while still sticking to 1970 and 2007, one can also 
subdivide the two continuous scores by assigning each score to one of four categories, then 
map the world and have a look at the differences. The tricky part consists in finding 
substantive, meaningful ways to assign each score to one particular category. 
As regards polity2, I rely upon a partitioning that has been proposed directly by the authors, 
by creating 4 categories called democracy (polity2 scores between 6 and 10, included), open 
anocracy (1 to 5), closed anocracy (0 to -5), and autocracy (-6 to -10). This partition has been 
used in several studies (Benson and Kugler 1998, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Davenport and 
Armstrong 2004, Regan and Bell 2010), although it has also been subject to important – and 
founded – criticism (Vreeland 2008). 
As for the UDS, instead, the very fact that the score aggregates so many measures of 
democracy, “auto-anchoring” itself, wipes away any immediate possibility of substantive 
interpretation. To overcome this problem, one must be quite careful. Assuming that the UDS 
is tapping into the same latent concept of democracy as polity2 and all other democracy 
scores do, the safest way to split the continuum of UDS scores into four categories is by first 
relying upon some algorithmic optimization method, and then check for the factual validity 
of its outcome. In my case, after having tried various optimization methods, I chose the Jenks’ 
natural breaks classification method (Jenks 1967). 
Jenks’ natural breaks method determines the best arrangement of values into different classes 
using the following optimization rules: 
 
a. minimize variance within each class (i.e., minimizing average deviation of each 
value within one class from the class average);  
b. maximize variance between each class (i.e., maximize average deviation of each 
class from every other group mean). 
 
Given that I aim at creating four categories, I create three natural breaks to divide each 
category from the next one (the fourth one will be left to the right of the last break).
  
Figure 3.3 – Democracy in the world in 1970, UDS 
 
  
  
Figure 3.4 – Democracy in the world in 1970, Polity IV 
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At the end of the optimization, I am left with four classes that can be roughly compared with 
the substantive four categories in which polity2 was subdivided. I map results over a world 
map for UDS and polity2 scores, both for 1970 and 2007. The “democracy bias” of polity2 
is already evident in 1970, as the prevalence of light and (especially) dark green on the map 
shows. Differences are most evident for North America, Southern Africa, the Indian 
subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. At the same time, polity2 considers some countries to be 
more autocratic than UDS does: among them one can find Mexico, Nicaragua, and Laos. 
Leaping about 35 years forward, the situation is similar. 
Again, polity2 has a democracy bias with respect to UDS. However, the regions of the world 
in which this bias is most evident have shifted to Southern America, Western Africa, Eastern 
Europe, while all previous regions remain persistently more democratic than the UDS 
reports. At the same time, exceptions are also evident in Central Asia, Iran, Belarus and 
Bangladesh, where polity2 scores are ‘harsher’ than UDS and end up placing these regions 
and countries in more autocratic categories than UDS does.
  
 
Figure 3.5 – Democracy in the world in 2007, UDS 
 
  
  
 
Figure 3.6 – Democracy in the world in 2007, Polity IV 
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3.6. Conclusion 
 
In order to measure levels of democracy or autocracy, I choose to rely on two indexes: the 
polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset, but corrected as indicated in section 3.2, and the 
Unified Democracy Scores.  
The two indexes agree most of the time, and almost all of the time with regards to the “region” 
where any country appears to reside with regards its levels of democracy or autocracy. 
However, when the two indexes tend to disagree, they do so more for countries at the middle 
and middle-to-higher end of the political regime spectrum, which is also a place where many 
open autocracies would appear to reside (see Chapter 4). 
Employing the two indexes in some of my empirical models in Chapter 6 will therefore be 
an important test for robustness, allowing me to see whether results change in any meaningful 
way when I employ alternatively one index or the other.
Chapter 4. Measuring Autocracy and Regime Openness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In this Chapter, I shift my focus from levels of democracy from levels of liberalization in 
general, and then try to tease out the differences between “autocratic regime types”. I make 
a relevant contribution to the study of autocracies by devising a novel way to conceptualise 
differences in “liberalisation levels” (what I term “regime openness”) that go beyond the 
presence or absence of particular institutional features (such as legislatures, elections, etc.) 
in autocratic regimes. 
This new operationalisation will also be central in Chapter 6, which will focus on empirically 
testing the hypothesis I derived from the formal model and the relevant literature on 
democratisation at the end of Chapter 2. While my model clearly posits the existence of three 
distinct “political regime types” (closed/repressive autocracy, open autocracy and 
democracy), many of the hypotheses present in the democratisation literature could be 
naturally extended and generalised to levels of regime openness, and it would be interesting 
to see whether longstanding theories withstand a test set in this new scene. 
My attempt to arrive at an operationalisation of different autocratic regime types fits neatly 
within a growing body of literature that traces its origins back to the dissatisfaction in current 
measures of democracy, and tries to “unpack” autocratic regimes. I believe that this new way 
of differentiating between more and less liberal regime types, in order to test whether they 
correlate differently with many potential covariates, can potentially shed a new light upon 
some of the most interesting findings in the current democratisation literature and the 
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fledgling new studies of autocratic regime types, and may produce evidence that corroborates 
previous findings, while showing that others may be less robust than we previously believed. 
 
 
4.2. The limits of extant autocratic typologies 
 
Continuous measures that try to capture some sort of “level” of democracy or autocracy and 
map them onto a unidimensional scale spectrum come with various benefits. For one, they 
are easy to use in a regression as they can be treated as interval-level variables. Differences 
of scale, not just type, are enticing as they allow for a much more fine-grained analysis. 
It is therefore unsurprising that, as statistical methods and computational power increased in 
the last few decades, the literature progressively turned from categorizations that were 
perceived as too simple, or even coarse, towards something that was considered as the next 
generation of political measurement, liable to fine-grained statistical analysis. 
However, democracy indexes come with a number of strings attached. One of the most 
important liabilities is that they can be treated as interval-level variables, but they are such 
only by construction. Who is to say that the difference between a country that scored -6 and 
one that scored 2 on the Polity scale is the same as the difference between a country that 
scored 2 and one that scored 10 – especially given that the same Polity score can be reached 
through different scores along different dimensions of authority patterns? 
A second major problem, which follows from the first, is that countries at similar levels of a 
univariate democracy scale might be different in some crucial respects, and that while the 
scale is suggesting researchers to conflate two countries into a single category, some 
fundamentally different characteristics between these countries may be lost in the analysis 
and could not be recovered. 
The urgency to rethink the way in which we approach the quantitative analysis of 
comparative politics built up strongly during the last decade or so, with the renaissance of 
authoritarian studies. This new wave of literature, which focuses on authoritarian regimes 
and investigates the correlates of their durability, felt the urge to “unpack” countries that 
scored similarly towards the autocratic end of the Polity score spectrum. The problem was 
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compounded by the fact that the Polity index tends to score countries towards both ends of 
the spectrum (see Figure 4.1), while countries that are in an intermediate position are both 
rare and may be confused with countries experiencing some other kind of polity failure 
(Plümper and Neumayer 2010). 
Moreover, the Polity score would only allow the study of transitions from autocracy to 
democracy, or democratic breakdown, but it could not provide researchers with a tool to 
study transitions between different types of autocratic regimes. It would also not allow 
researchers to study times in which the political regime remained at a similar “level”, but 
some other kind of transition occurred – such as from a military autocracy to the next after a 
coup d’etat. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Kernel density estimate of the Polity score (fixed), 1970-2012 
 
 
Possibly the largest and most consistent attempt to date that tried to reassess the literature on 
regime change and democratization by focusing on different types of transitions within and 
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between autocratic regimes was published in 2014, as the ultimate product of a 5-year project 
financed by the US National Science Foundation (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014). The 
authors produced what they named as the Autocratic Regime Data Set, taking off from the 
premise that some transitions in authoritarian states may not be captured by traditional 
democracy scores. This may happen in two ways: either regime survival under new 
leadership, or an autocratic regime being replaced by a different type of autocratic regime. 
In the first case, this kind of “transition” is similar to any democratic change of power after 
free, open and contested elections: clearly, and contrary to typical democratic elections, in 
autocracies these events may not be foreseen in advance, and their outcome in terms of 
regime survival might be much more uncertain. But when the outcome is regime survival 
under a new leadership, GWF consider that the transition has been successful in preserving 
the previous regime. Take, for example, the autocratic regime of Anwar al-Sadat, who was 
President of Egypt from 1970 until October 1981. Due to his efforts to reconcile his country 
and the whole of the Arab world with Israel (the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in 
Washington in 1979), he was assassinated by Islamic extremists. After his death, however, it 
took the Egyptian civilian and military elite just eight days to select a new President, Hosni 
Mubarak, and swear him into office. 
While the survival of the Egyptian autocratic regime was facilitated by Mubarak having been 
Vice President for six years before Sadat’s assassination, the outcome was a pretty smooth 
transition within the same authoritarian regime, and Mubarak would go on to be President of 
the country for the next 30 years, until the Arab Spring protests convinced the military to 
depose him. At the time of his demise, he was the third-longest serving leader of a Middle 
East and North Africa country, after Muammar Gaddafi (Libya’s leader, 40 years) and Ali 
Khamenei (34 years at the time of writing, still serving as Iranian Supreme Leader). 
At the same time, transitions can also occur between different types of authoritarian regimes. 
Consider the 1979 Iranian Revolution, in which more than one year of protests culminated 
in the Shah Reza Pahlavi being ousted from power and forced to leave the country (he 
actually ended up being granted asylum in Egypt by Anwar al-Sadat himself). As the Shah 
fled, a completely different type of autocratic regime took hold in Iran, led by a different elite 
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(Muslim clerics) and in a style which was very different from the Shah’s self-styled 
monarchic reign. 
For their purposes, GWF define a regime as a set of formal and informal rules that “determine 
what interests are represented in the authoritarian leadership group and whether these 
interests can constrain the dictator”. A transition, here, is defined as one in which the basic 
rules that denote the identity of the regime leadership group change. 
In their classification, an autocratic regime can be considered to fall within one of seven 
types, of which four are the most frequent: 
 
1) a dominant-party regime, in which a single party and its leadership hold power and 
the security apparatus is also under their control; 
2) a military regime, in which the control over policy and leadership selection is held by 
the military institutions; 
3) a personalist regime, in which power is confined to a very narrow group of people 
centred around a single person; or  
4) (d) a monarchy, in which political rule is invested upon a royal family and succession 
is institutionalised. 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of such political regime types over time, starting after the 
Second World War, according to the GWF coding. 
Apart from the merits of explicitly trying to devise a way to distinguish between different 
autocratic types, GWF’s attempt has at least another important value: by comparing the 
coding with the Polity score, one finds that a small percentage (but not an insignificant one) 
of regimes that are coded as autocratic by GWF actually score between -3 and +5 onto the 
polity scale. 
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Figure 4.2 – Regime types over time: GWF categorisation, 1945-2010 
 
Source: Geddes et al. 2014 
 
At the same time, most autocracies falling into the four main GWF types score highly similar 
Polity scores. In fact, the median military, personalist and party type all score -7, while 
monarchies tend to score just a bit lower (-9 or -10). This goes to show that a single, 
unidimensional scale is sometimes unable to capture the ambiguities and complexity of the 
autocratic regime spectrum, and that at the same time it can struggle to paint a precise picture 
of variations in autocratic rule even for those countries that the expert consensus would 
confidently place at the end of the autocratic spectrum.  
Before GWF published their index, others had gone down the path of classifying different 
regime types. I review some of these attempts here in order to highlight differences and 
similarities between them, but we do so only briefly because, as will become apparent soon, 
these important efforts all try to distinguish between different types of regimes, but do not 
try to measure in some way the degree of “openness” or “closeness” of political regimes. 
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A widely used data set on autocratic regime types is the so-called Democracy and 
Dictatorship Data Set (also known as DD Index, or CGV as per the initials of the last names 
of its three authors: Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010). The authors offer their own take 
at how to tell democratic and autocratic polities (which they refer to as “dictatorships”) apart. 
They choose a minimalist definition of democracy, but they add the requisite of at least one 
alternation in power. This way, countries that have a dominant party that has won all elections 
since they have been established fall under the “dictatorship” category, even if the elections 
happen to be free and fair. This is not ideal, but CGV decide to go down this road in order to 
minimize Type I error (false positives when identifying democracies) while ignoring Type II 
error (false negatives). At the same time, CGV acknowledge that other scholars might be 
more concerned with the inverse error and offer the opportunity to reverse the dataset by 
coding a dummy for dubious cases. 
They then go on to distinguish between democratic types, resorting to the classical tripartite 
classification of parliamentary, semipresidential and presidential democracies. Finally, they 
classify “dictatorships” into three types: monarchies, military, and civilian dictatorships. 
Recognizing that “there is no clear agreement on the dimension along which dictatorships 
should be distinguished”, they go on to argue that what is important is not, as it is for GWF, 
the way in which different autocratic regimes retain control over access to power and 
influence, but it is the way in which leaders are removed from power. 
For CGV, “members of the ruling elite constitute the first major threat to dictators”. 
Authoritarian countries can be told apart according to the characteristics of the elites that 
prop up each leader or group of people that rules within each country. Monarchies rely on 
family and kin networks to come to power and preserve it; consequently, according to CGV, 
around 70 percent of monarchs are replaced by family members. Military dictatorships 
almost always come to power following coups d’état, and tend to rule through small juntas. 
In around half of the cases, they are deposed by other members of the military. Finally, 
civilian dictators cannot directly appeal to the armed forces and need to co-opt high-rank 
figures from the military in order to secure their tenure and remain in power. They tend to 
rule through parties, in an effort to institutionalise their rule and give important roles to their 
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allies. Their demise generally follows no clear pattern, because they may both turn more 
democratic, turn more repressive, or be deposed by different civilian or military rulers. 
In practice, the CGV dataset is not only focused on the way in which autocrats lose power. 
The characterisation of each regime is much more fine-grained, and it may crucially serve 
important, different purposes. Their dataset is a treasure trove for comparative politics 
scholars, and that is exactly where I will turn to in order to create my “regime openness” 
variable in section 4.2. 
Finally, a third important dataset is the Authoritarian Regimes Dataset, first proposed by 
Hadenius and Teorell (2007) and refined by Wahman, Hadenius and Teorell (2013). Their 
typology classifies any regime based upon the modes to access and conservation of political 
power: “(1) hereditary succession, or lineage, (2) the actual or threatened use of military force 
and (3) popular elections”. This allows the authors to distinguish between a first set of 
political regimes: monarchies, military regimes, and electoral regimes. The latter category 
can be further specified, based on how competition within these regimes takes place. 
Therefore, the authors classify regimes that allow multi-party competition (multiparty 
regimes), those that only allow the government party to compete (one-party regimes), and 
those that ban all parties (no-party regimes). Here, then, the authors focus on the institutional 
features that distinguish each regime, irrespective of the characteristics of their leaders, or 
ideology. 
The datasets produced by GWF, CGV and WHT tend to agree for a large part. In particular, 
if we compare which regime they consider to be autocratic, and take the two categories that 
can be said to appear in all the datasets, the level of agreement is above 99% for all three 
pairs of indicators in the case of authoritarian monarchies, while they agree between 83% 
and 90% of the times when categorising military autocracies (Wahman et al. 2013). 
When the datasets do not agree, the reason mainly rests in the fact that they are built upon 
different premises. On the one hand, GWF and CGV tend to be somewhat more similar in 
their approach to categorising autocratic regimes due to the fact that they both retrace the 
crucial difference between different types of autocracies in the “identity of the group from 
which leaders can be selected” (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014), or the “inner sanctums 
where real decisions are made and potential rivals are kept under close scrutiny” (Cheibub, 
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Gandhi and Vreeland 2009). On the other hand, WHT prefer to start from the type of 
institutions that each autocratic leader and the elites supporting them decide to rely upon to 
regulate the use and the specific powers of public authority (with the ultimate aim to increase 
their chances to survive in power). 
CGV and GWF are at odds over the threshold that needs to be overcome befrore any country 
can be considered democratic, as GWF requires that no large party is forbidden to take part 
to an election, while for CGV it is enough that more than one party participates in elections. 
However, CGV becomes far stricter when, as stated above, it requires countries to undergo 
at least one alternation in power before they can be considered democratic. At the same time, 
both datasets either do not impose a threshold (CGV) or set it at just 10% of total population 
(GWF) for the “participation” side of their democracies, so that a country may be labelled a 
democracy even when no universal suffrage is granted. 
In turn, WHT relies on an empirically-calculated “threshold” of democracy scores, which 
combines Polity and Freedom House scores into a single 0-10 index, and then chooses a cut-
off point based on the average of other datasets that already categorise democracies and 
autocracies in a binary way, before possibly typifying both into sub typologies. While 
interesting, this approach is highly ambiguous in practice, and tries to solve empirically the 
very important problem of where to precisely set the democratic threshold, at a time when 
many other scholars are trying to do away with empirical anchors and systematise the world 
through the refinement of concepts/requirements for types of democracies and types of 
autocracies. 
There are other differences to these categorisations. For example, CGV code any regime 
where a former member of the armed forces is head of state as being military, while for GWF 
and WHT what is relevant are the institutions supporting the leader, not the leader himself. 
On the other hand, GWF uses a “personalist regime” category, while WHT does not. This is 
due to the fact that WHT only tries to rely on institutions for its categorisation, and therefore 
considers that the personalisation of a political regime cannot become an intrinsic 
institutional feature of such a regime, and should be regarded as separate and not relevant 
when it comes to distinguishing between autocratic regime types. Finally, WHT allows for 
hybrid regimes that cross more than one of their category: while this grants more latitude to 
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researchers who are unsure over in which category exactly to place a specific polity within 
the classification, it also removes some precision and makes the dataset’s use in quantitative 
analysis more complex. 
Taking a step back from these attempts at categorising regime types, it is crucial now to make 
some more general considerations that stem from common features of most similar attempts 
to be found in the literature. For as useful as they may be, a key problem with these datasets 
is that they do not allow to assess whether a specific type of regime is more or less “close” 
or “open” than another in terms of political participation and voice of regime rivals (whether 
excluded elites or citizens). Therefore, these categorisations – though possibly making a 
conceptual step forward from interval-level democracy scores – are still some way off from 
what it would be needed in order to link the theoretical model described in Chapter 2 with 
empirical observations. 
More important still, all these categorisations tend to be fixed and static once the institutions 
of the regime, or of their leader, have been set out. However, who is to say that within every 
single regime type, conditions do not change and leaders do not slowly open up the way in 
which they organise political relationships within the polity, or on the other hand crack down 
on opponents? A model that only distinguishes between autocratic regime types might miss 
relevant intra-regime dynamics, and therefore take us back to where we started in terms of 
the possibility to link our theoretical model on regime choice and regime stability with reality 
– in order to test its implications. 
 
 
4.3. Conceptualizing and measuring regime openness 
 
What exactly is “regime openness”? Can we get a sense of it for each country at each point 
in time? Is it possible to measure it, and if so, how? When reflecting upon this question, one 
has to decide what makes a regime more open or closed than others, and whether such 
selected features of a political regime are liable to measurement. 
From a survey of the literature, it is hard to come by to even something similar to the concept 
of openness of a regime. Almost certainly, it has to be a multidimensional concept; but it is 
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hard to get a sense of where to look for, and such an elusive concept risks being associated 
to everything and, in the end, nothing. 
The risk – that I will decide to run – is that I am trying to capture something which does not 
represent the regime per se, but its manifestation at particular points in time. A regime’s 
public order policies, for example, or its tendency to repress protests or to let them vent 
naturally, may be a function of different elements, some or most of which may be exogenous 
to the regime itself but just a reaction to some socioeconomic features of the polity, or to one-
time shocks. 
For example, the violence of a protest might be relevant for a political elite and leaders in 
order to decide whether to resort to repressive measures, and with what intensity; but the 
intensity of such violence might be the result of a number of factors that escape the specific 
control of the regime, and so it would not be wise to treat such intensity as a proxy for “regime 
closeness”. At the same time, the frequency of protests, or of challenges to the regime in the 
past will likely affect the choice of which tools to use in order to appease demonstrating 
citizens. Another political occurrence which is liable to the same criticism as protests is, for 
example, the level of intra-elite infighting. At the same time, intra-elite discord or outright 
clashes would be even more difficult to capture, given that such feuds might brood for years 
without exiting the “inner sanctum” of the ruling elite, and thus be impossible to actually 
observe and measure – sometimes not even ex post. 
Also, the level of closeness of a regime might be linked to the level and intensity of intra-
elite infighting in complex ways: it may be a consequence of it, as the more a regime closes 
down, the more it may tend to exclude relevant/powerful elites; or it might be a cause for it, 
as more infighting pushes the regime to tighten up its policies in order to silence dissenters. 
Take China: is the current anti-corruption campaign by its President, Xi Jinping, a result of 
increasing dissent (possibly caused by the country’s economic slowdown and the 
increasingly unsustainable debt burden), or is it a cause for the increasing number of persons 
within the Chinese Communist Party who appear to be more defiant, if not towards the 
President then towards the Prime Minister, Li Keqiang? 
All these problems notwithstanding, I need a measure that is flexible enough without being 
too pliable. This way, if I make mistakes in conceptualising and operationalising my measure 
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of regime openness, I will always be in time to tweak its main components, or the weight I 
give to each one of them, in order to test the robustness of my final results to 
validity/reliability problems. Ultimately, I need an index that is able to capture a range of 
policies and institutional settings that can be changed by the political leaders of each regime 
and that, if changed, would either weaken the autocrats’ hold on power while allowing him 
to extract more information from citizens and non-ruling elites, or strengthen his hold on the 
regime while sacrificing some knowledge about his subjects. 
For my attempt at capturing such an ever-fleeting concept as regime openness, I choose to 
rely upon existing datasets, searching for those that best approximated my idea of openness 
and that offered enough flexibility and sub-dimensions to choose from. At first, the NELDA 
dataset appeared to be fit for purpose. NELDA is the acronym for National Elections Across 
Democracy and Autocracy. The dataset, created and maintained by Susan Hyde and Nikolay 
Marinov (2012), provides detailed information on all election events from 1960 onwards. For 
each election, the authors captured 58 relevant features by relying upon a set of questions. 
Some of them are more traditional, like: “Was opposition allowed?”, “Was more than one 
party legal?”, “Before elections, are there significant concerns that elections will not be free 
and fair?”. But some other offer much more latitude in order to grasp the degree of regime 
openness, such as: “Had the incumbent extended his or her term in office or eligibility to run 
in elections at any point in the past?”. 
Although a very interesting experiment, I ultimately judged the NELDA dataset to be not fit 
for my purposes because it only gives information for countries that allow for some kind of 
electoral competition to take place. While I consider this to be an important sign of regime 
openness, elections are not everything that there is to it. 
For instance, an autocratic regime might choose not to hold elections but show to be open to 
its citizens/elites by letting them express more freely through other formalised means such 
as government meetings, assembly speeches, public discourses by opposition leaders, or 
through other direct or indirect, institutional or informal types of signalling. 
Ultimately, NELDA was discarded, but it will be useful as a way to check for the validity of 
our preferred measure of regime openness, whenever a country does hold elections. For the 
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same reasons, I also decided not to rely upon another data set of political regimes measuring 
electoral contestation (Boix, Miller and Rosato 2013). 
I therefore turned to the CGV dataset, that has been introduced in section 4.1. There are many 
reasons for this choice, but the first and most important one is that the CGV dataset essentially 
captures institutional features of a given polity. However conservative the authors may be as 
to the number of actions that an autocrat or the ruling elite may undertake in order to “open 
up” or “close down” an autocratic regime, many of its dimensions might be useful in order 
to capture some of the features of a polity that are liable to change over time, even within a 
given regime, and that may affect the level of perceived openness of the regime. 
At the same time, by relying upon institutional features of the regime (even when they are de 
facto, not legal features; see below), I can be more confident that my proposed measure is 
exogenous to potential correlates of regime type and regime change such as the frequency of 
repression, violent protests, or purge events. 
Once I decide to go for the CGV dataset, I first use the GWF dataset to tell democracies and 
non-democracies apart – I prefer it to the CGV dataset because, as explained in section 4.1, 
the CGV tends to be too strict when deciding when a political regime can in fact be 
considered to be a democracy. This will be my first bipartite division, between democracies 
and autocracies. But I still have to generate (at least) two autocratic regime types, and tell 
them apart by some measure of regime openness. 
In order to do so, from the CGV dataset I select 7 subcategories: 
 
a) exselec: Mode of effective selection of the chief executive of the polity. It is coded 1 
when the leader is directly elected (directly by popular vote, or by voting for 
committed delegates that are only selected for the purpose of nominating the chief 
executive); 2 when there is an indirect election (so that the selection of the effective 
chief executive happens through an elected assembly or an elected but uncommitted 
electoral college); 3, when it is nonelective; 
b) legselec: Mode of legislative election. It is coded 0 when no legislature exists (it 
includes cases in which there is a constituent assembly without ordinary legislative 
powers); 1 when there is a non-elective legislature (e.g. because legislators are 
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selected by the effective chief executive, or on the basis of hereditary rules, or 
ascription); 2 when there is an elective legislature (at least the members of the lower 
house of a bicameral legislature must be elected, either directly or indirectly); 
c) closed: it describes the status of the legislature. It is coded 0 when the legislature is 
closed; 1 when it is appointed; and 2 when it is elected; 
d) dejure: it describes the legal status of parties. It is coded 0 when all parties are legally 
banned; 1 when the polity only allows a single, state party; and 2 when multiple 
parties are legally allowed; 
e) defacto: it describes the de facto existence of parties, irrespective of their legality. It 
is coded as 0 when there are no parties; 1 if there is one party; 2 if there are multiple 
parties; 
f) defacto2: it describes whether there exist parties that do not support the regime front. 
It is coded 0 when there are none; 1 when there are one party or multiple parties, but 
they belong to the regime front; and 2 when there are multiple parties, and not all of 
them belong to the regime front; 
g) lparty: it describes how parties are actually represented within the legislature. It is 
coded 0 when there is either no legislature, or all members of the legislature are 
nonpartisan; 1 when the legislature is only composed of members from the regime 
party; and 2 when the legislature has multiple parties. 
 
In choosing a method of aggregation, I wanted to rely on something that would create some 
kind of balance between the institutional and the de facto features of a polity, and that would 
be unbiased between degree of openness in the selection of the leader, and openness in the 
selection of a legislative assembly that might at least pose an indirect threat to the leader, for 
example by collecting his allies in a public body but also presenting them to the public and 
allowing for factions to form, or even directly challenge the leader himself (in case of 
legislatures that are vested with some actual powers). 
I choose to do this by aggregating the seven variables through the use of the following 
equation: 
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(4 − 𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐) +
1
2
∗ (𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐 + 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 + 𝑑𝑒𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜 + 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜2 + 𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 
 
This way, exselec has been recoded in order to capture concepts that go in the same direction 
as the other variables (from least to most open), and it can vary on a 1-3 range, while legal 
characteristics of the legislature and the party system can vary 0-3 (it would have been 0-6 
otherwise). The other variables, representing de facto situations, all vary 0-2, so that at most 
they can also reach a maximum value of 6. 
I therefore obtain an index that varies in the range 1-12. As a preliminary consistency check 
I verify that, on this “regime openness” index, democracies (as categorised according to the 
CGV dataset) score between 10 and 12 in all country-years, with 99.3% of democracies 
scoring 11 (59%) or 12 (40%). 
Conversely, for autocratic regimes, I am presented with the following distribution of scores 
in the period 1970-2007 as shown in Figure 4.3. 
One of the interesting features of the way in which I tried to capture levels of “regime 
openness” is that I avoid the huge valley of very few observations between purely autocratic 
and democratic types that result from the polity2 score. On the contrary, I generate a measure 
that appears to be sufficiently well-dispersed. 
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Figure 4.3 – Kernel density estimate of “regime openness” for non-democracies,  
1970-2007 
 
On the one hand, democracies still cluster to the far right of my measure, confirming either 
that democracies tend to share very similar elements to one another or the inability of 
“openness” scores to properly capture differences between democracy levels within 
democracies. On the other, the figure shows that the “autocratic spectrum” appears to be 
much more spread out over values ranging from 0 to around 8, so that even prima facie a 
distinction between open and closed regimes appears feasible and encouraged by data. 
Thus, I establish thresholds in order to subdivide autocracies into possible “regimes types” 
that are linked to their measured level of openness. According to the theoretical model 
described in Chapter 2, there should be two ideal types of autocratic regime: an open and a 
closed regime. 
The problem, then, is to identify some thresholds in the regime openness continuum that I 
may employ in order to set a clear and reasonable distinction between regime types. 
Naturally, I cannot expect to make such a choice without repercussions: especially for those 
countries that may shift in one of two categories depending on the thresholds I set, I may be 
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committing Type I or Type II errors by including or excluding them from the “closed 
autocratic regime” category. Even worse, I have very few ways (close to none) to ascertain 
whether I am acting correctly by including a particular authoritarian regime in a particular 
year in either of the two categories, apart for when this regime held periodic elections, and I 
have evidence that the political elites attempted or succeeded at manipulating them according 
to the NELDA dataset. 
Given this far-from-ideal situation, I decide to tackle conceptual uncertainty by increasing 
my robustness checks. I do so by using a set of different thresholds in order to distinguish 
between closed and open autocracies. In the remaining part of this section, I describe four 
different ways to divide regimes into categories according to their measured openness. In 
Chapter 6, I will use all of them as dependent variables in my models and check whether 
shifting from one to the other yields different empirical results. 
When selecting these thresholds, two “natural”, atheoretical measures come to mind in order 
to distinguish between closed and open autocratic regimes: using the median (8.5) or the 
average (7.92) scores of a subsample of my dataset, including all those countries that are 
classified as autocratic in the GWF dataset. I therefore create the regime1 variable by using 
the median (coding it 1 for closed autocratic regimes when a country scores 8.5 or less in a 
particular year, 2 for open autocracies, and 3 for democracies); and the regime2 variable by 
distinguishing autocracies through their average score. 
Two other atheoretical ways to set thresholds may be devised by visually inspecting the 
specific distribution of regime openness scores in the sample shown in Figure 4.3. From the 
figure, a first threshold seems to appear at a score of 5. Therefore, I create a regime3 variable 
that differentiates between open or closed autocratic regimes by relying on this threshold. 
Finally, a fourth threshold, although less clear, is suggested by the end of the hump-shaped 
part of the curve at a value of 8.5 (which is also equivalent to the median score of non-
democratic regimes). This is why, in order to increase robustness, I use this threshold and 
divide the regime-openness space into not just three but four “types” (coding 1 for years in 
which an autocratic country scored 5 or less, 2 when it scored between 5.5 and 8.5, 3 if it 
scored above 8.5 and is autocratic, and 4 if it is a democracy), creating the regime4 variable. 
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Clearly, by categorizing countries in such a way, I assume that there is a change in kind 
whenever a particular country scores less or more than a particular threshold. At the same 
time, I remain agnostic as to whether a change in kind from a closed autocracy to an open 
autocracy can be considered “of the same size” than a change from a closed or open autocracy 
to a democracy. 
 
 
4.4. Regime openness over time and space 
 
Depending on the thresholds I choose to categorise open and closed autocracies, I may obtain 
different results, particularly for countries that stay near or at threshold levels most of the 
time. For example, while the first three indexes (those that map autocratic countries onto a 
binary open/closed regime space) tend to agree most of the time, Table 4.1 shows that there 
can be significant differences, especially between the typology that employs the highest 
threshold (regime1) and the one that uses the lowest one (regime3). While there clearly is no 
problem for that part of the sample that is considered to be a “democracy” as per the GWF 
definition (around 43% of the sample), on the autocratic side of the sample, regime1 and 
regime3 tend to disagree in over 1 case out of 4 (this decreases to 16% if we take the whole 
sample into account – which is still a significant figure). 
 
 Agree Do not agree 
regime1 v. regime2 90.1% 9.9% 
regime2 v. regime3 82.6% 17.4% 
regime1 v. regime3 72.7% 27.3% 
Total sample = 3,115 autocratic country-years (2,320 democratic-years excluded as all indexes agree 
by construction). 
Table 4.1. Comparison of the first three typologies of open/closed regime. 
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Figure 4.4 – Number of autocracies (by type) and democracies over time, 1970-2008 
 
 
If one looks at the general development of “regime openness” over time through the 1970-
2008 period, the three measures give a clear and unequivocal trend. For illustration purposes, 
I choose to rely upon our regime1 coding. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show, first, the clear “wave” 
of democratisation, which starts in the second half of the Eighties and ends in the early 
Nineties, both in absolute and relative number of existing countries in our sample (which 
increases from 117 to 153). Interestingly, the democratization wave coincides with many 
regimes shifting from a closed autocratic to an open autocratic setting. 
After this period, the “liberalization” trend then bottoms out and remains pretty stable for 
some years, while a small positive trend appears at the end of the sample (contemporary 
studies show that this trend might have plateaued over the last few years). 
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Figure 4.5 – Relative number of autocratic types and democracies over time, 1970-
2008 
 
What is even more significant for my purposes, however, is to focus on the increasing number 
of countries that do not complete their transition towards democracy and stay or turn into 
“open autocracies”. While closed autocracies peak in 1975 at 50% of the sample and then 
decrease, reaching 10% in the 1999-2008 decade, the opposite is true for open autocracies, 
which experience a decreasing trend between 1970 and 1989, then shoot upwards during the 
1990-1998 decade (doubling from 18% to 37% of the sample), and finally settle on a slowly 
decreasing trend during the last decade, but remain around a third of the sample (from 37% 
to 31%). 
While the overall trend is clear, and appears to justify my approach in the study of the 
correlates of different types of autocracies at different liberalisation levels, I now focus on a 
few countries in order to point out cases in which the choice of a threshold makes a crucial 
difference, might skew my results, and therefore justifies robustness tests based on multiple 
operationalisations of the underlying regime openness concept. 
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Figure 4.6 – Regime openness and regime “thresholds” for Niger 
 
 
Let’s take Niger. Having gained independence in 1960, the country enters my sample right 
away. Figure 4.6 shows that Niger is considered an open autocracy between 1970 and 1973 
by two out of three of my categorisations, but slightly fails the “open autocracy” test when 
using the regime1 threshold. It then slips into closed autocracy for all three of my thresholds 
in the period 1974-1988 (with the 1988 score, at 4.5, coming just short of my lowest 
threshold). 1989 is again a case in which my highest threshold is a little too high to consider 
the autocratic regime as open, while the 1990 value (11) clearly allows all my regime 
typologies to classify it as an open autocracy. Finally, 1991 and 1992 are again a case in 
which Niger is considered an open autocracy by two of my thresholds (but just so for 
regime2, which at 7.92 relies upon the sample average), and only after 1993 all 
operationalizations allow me to unanimously categorize the country either as a democracy or 
an open autocracy. 
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Figure 4.7 – Regime openness and regime “thresholds” for Cambodia 
 
 
The case of Cambodia is even more telling as to the relevance of different thresholds to 
describe open and closed autocratic regimes. As Figure 4.7 clearly shows, Cambodia spends 
a relevant part of its sample years (roughly until 1990, with just a brief interval of clear “open 
autocracy” status between 1972 and 1974) in an intermediate score that does not allow to 
consistently classify it across measures. Indeed, between 1976 and 1990 the country 
constantly scores between a minimum of 5.5 and a maximum of 7.5, thus being categorized 
as an open autocracy by my regime3 variable, and a closed autocracy for both regime1 and 
regime2. However, for a significant portion of this period (1981-1989) the country continues 
to score 7.5, which is barely short of my regime2 threshold of 7.92. 
To conclude: given how sensitive is regime type to different operationalizations, and 
sometimes even to very slight changes of the underlying threshold, empirical models might 
be especially sensitive to potential miscategorizations. However, given the fact that it would 
be very hard (and possibly improper) for me to select one out of the four different thresholds 
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based upon theory or previous literature, I will have to rely upon all four of them as robustness 
checks in the empirical analysis that I carry out in Chapter 6. 
 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter I surveyed the current state of the art in the literature that tries to subdivide 
the autocratic space along different typologies. I then went on to propose a novel way to look 
at typologies across autocratic political regimes, and developed a new measure of “regime 
openness” that could be best suited to gauge levels of liberalization along the autocratic 
spectrum. 
Having done that, I produce four original typologies of autocratic regimes: three of such 
measure are dichotomous along autocracies, dividing the space between “closed” and “open” 
autocracies. The fourth measure adds a measure of complexity by subdividing the autocratic 
space into three different autocratic types. 
Along with democracies, which do not change across my measures, I find these typologies 
highly suitable to my analysis of the correlates of liberalization trends. Such analysis is 
different, and to many extent original, as compared to the classic democratization literature, 
but in many ways it runs parallel to it. 
In Chapter 2, along with deriving my own set of hypotheses, I found some hypotheses within 
the democratization literature to be generalizable to a liberalization context and, therefore, 
amenable to testing, which will span the bulk of Chapter 6. 
For now, I regard this as a first, important attempt at going beyond current measures of 
political regimes, with the potential of shedding new and important insights on the causes 
and correlates of political regime choice, stability, and change. 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
In this Chapter, I make a novel contribution to the literature on the resource curse, by 
attempting to devise a measure that can gauge the potential “political leverage” of rents 
derived from the extraction and sale of hydrocarbons (crude oil and natural gas, in all their 
forms). 
I review current measures, pointing out benefits and costs of employing each one. I then 
proceed to create my new proposed measure. My contribution to the operationalization of the 
leverage allowed to political leaders by the proceeds accrued to the state from hydrocarbon 
rents is twofold. 
First, I attempt at measuring absolute rents by combining multiple source and then relying 
on multiple imputation methods (see Chapter 6.2). Having done this, I then use my new 
estimate in new, straightforward measures of fuel rents that, being relative to a country’s per 
capita income, can more precisely gauge the latitude bestowed upon political leaders by these 
resources. 
I will then take some time in showing the consequences of my choice in terms of how fuel 
rents vary over time and space, and focus on a few interesting features of fuel rents over my 
sample period (1970-2008 – although here I extend it a little forward, to 2012, this has no 
substantial effects on my findings). 
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5.2. The limits of extant measures of political leverage of rents 
 
The literature on the resource curse postulates that countries dependent on some specific 
types of natural resources are not just blessed with them, but also suffer from various negative 
effects. The political interpretation of the resource curse theorises that the rents that political 
leaders derive from natural resources increase the overall wealth of the regime. Political 
leaders may then use such rents in order to buy legitimation from their subjects, buy out 
competing elites, or to pay for the loyalty and employment of their country’s holders of 
repressive means. 
These three mechanisms postulate that we should expect a stabilizing effect for autocracies, 
and possibly a reluctance of autocratic leaders to embrace the full spectrum of “legitimizing” 
means for an autocracy – including elections, or tolerance towards displays of dissent. 
One could expect this effect to be even stronger for a very specific kind of natural resource, 
i.e. hydrocarbon (oil and natural gas) resources, and this for different reasons. First, 
hydrocarbon’s high value compared to the overall gross domestic product of “rentier” 
countries, and their high-value content in terms of volume (differently, for example, from 
agricultural resources or timber). 
Second, hydrocarbon resources require substantial capital investments at the identification, 
exploration, and development stages, but – at least for conventional oil and gas fields –  after 
these early stages these investments allow production to flow for years, or even decades, at 
very low operational costs. 
And third, these resources are “non lootable”, meaning that in order to be extracted they need 
infrastructure, and they cannot be stolen or moved around as easily as other high-value 
resources such as gold or diamonds. 
In order to measure the “leverage” that each political leader (especially autocrats) may gain 
from relying on hydrocarbon rents, I need to find a way to measure such rents in a 
meaningful, consistent, and reliable way. The literature on resource dependence offers an 
incredibly high amount of methods that may be employed in order to operationalize such 
dependence. 
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Table 5.1 reports ten such different measures: each of them has been proposed at various 
points in time over the last two decades. Digging deeper in the resource curse literature, along 
these measures one may find an an almost infinite amount of small variations. 
At closer inspection, however, most of these measures suffer from a series of weaknesses 
that risk , biasing the results of any quantitative analysis. Some of them, such as a dummy 
that fires up in case of OPEC membership, are just a rough approximation of reality and leave 
many hydrocarbon-dependent countries out (such as Russia or Norway, for example). In fact, 
there is an even higher amount of oil-producing countries than there are OPEC members 
today, and most of these non-OPEC countries export some of their oil. 
Clearly, other dummy variables that set some threshold to be passed before a country can be 
considered hydrocarbon dependent face significant risks of selection bias: why should a 
country that relies on 30.001% of its exports or GDP on oil and natural gas be considered 
dependent, while a country that relies on it for 29.999% of its exports should not? Moreover, 
dummies in general appear outdated, as sufficiently reliable data becomes increasingly 
available to researchers. 
Continuous measures can suffer from problems as well; yet, most of them are simple to 
address. For example, measures of hydrocarbon dependence that rely upon the share of 
hydrocarbon exports over total exports cannot account for the varying relevance of overall 
exports themselves for different countries in the world. Bigger countries, even countries that 
are considered very open to global trade such as the United States, tend to export goods for 
a much smaller share of their GDP than smaller countries (according to the World Bank, in 
2014 the US exported goods for a value equivalent to 14% of its GDP, while Estonia exported 
goods valued at 84% of its GDP). For this reason, this is a measure that cannot account for 
the actual economic leverage political leaders may gain from relying on hydrocarbon 
resources. 
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Measure Main studies using it 
OPEC membership (dummy) Fish 2002, Fish 2005 
Oil exports over 50% of total exports 
(dummy) 
Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2007 
Oil revenues over thresholds of national 
income (dummy) 
Davis 1995 
Energy resource depletion over GNI Abdih et al. 2008, Arezki et al. 2011 
Oil exports over total exports Jensen and Wantchekon 2004 
Oil export revenues over GDP Ross 2001, Smith 2004, Smith 2007, 
Morrison 2009 
Oil deposits per capita Alexeev and Conrad 2009 
Oil discoveries per capita Tsui 2011, Cotet and Tsui 2013 
Oil value per capita Aslaksen 2010 
Oil and gas income per capita Ross 2012 
Table 5.1 – Measures of hydrocarbon dependence 
 
 
Even measures that do away with this problem and directly measure oil revenues derived 
from exports over total GDP have some liabilities. One of these is the fact that they cannot 
account for the actual leverage over citizens that such oil rents bestow upon each country’s 
political leaders. 
Hydrocarbon rents should be compared to the share of citizens’ per capita income that 
accrues to citizens outside from the “oil rents cycle”, i.e. due to other economic activities. 
Moreover, such measures cannot account for the indirect income effect that the subsidised 
domestic consumption of fuels (products derived from crude oil, such as gasoline and diesel 
oil; fuel oil and natural gas used in power plants; gas used for heating, for those countries at 
sufficiently high/low latitudes, or hydrocarbons in general used in desalination plants) has on 
the citizens. 
Until after the 2014 oil crash, a number of Middle East hydrocarbon exporting countries had 
no or very low income taxes (something allowed by the export of hydrocarbons), but also 
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highly subsidised fuel prices. This is also true of countries that today consume a very large 
portion of what they produce at home, such as Russia, Indonesia (today a net oil importer, 
but still a large producer), or even the United States after the shale revolution. 
Even more original studies, employing oil exploration and discoveries/deposits per capita, 
have their limits. First, hydrocarbon discoveries can take place years, or even decades, before 
any oil or gas comes into production in the country. Think about Uganda, where significant 
recoverable oil reserves were discovered in 2006; by 2016, the country still had to produce 
any significantly marketable amount of oil. While it is true that some income may accrue to 
citizens during the exploration activities carried out by international oil companies, such 
amounts are so marginal that they generally do not account for any significant portion of per 
capita income. 
Second, the variability of reserves is undoubtedly endogenous to political conditions (like 
the decision to allow IOCs into the country, or the presence of international sanctions that 
target the hydrocarbons or overall commodity sectors), general business activity in the 
country, the region or the world, and technical estimates (the amount of hydrocarbons that is 
economically recoverable varies with the international and regional price of the resource). 
Given that proposed measures have so many liabilities, and at the risk of adding to this 
cacophony with a new off-key note, I will try to use an original method in order to build my 
preferred measure: one that aims at directly gauging the political leverage bestowed upon 
political leaders by hydrocarbon revenues, but still remain as simple as it may possibly be.   
 
 
5.3. Estimating absolute resource rents: primary and secondary sources 
 
How can we measure resource rents? way In 2011, Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo 
authored a new study on the relationship between authoritarianism and natural resource 
dependence (Haber and Menaldo 2011). The study’s results were fairly controversial, finding 
no general effect from natural resource dependence on authoritarian stability. 
The Haber and Menaldo (2011) study employed an empirical model which has been gaining 
traction in the recent comparative politics literature (to the best of our knowledge, Aslaksen 
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2010 was the first to propose a dynamic panel model to study the political variant of the 
resource curse literature), but which I will criticize in other parts of this work (see e.g. section 
6.3). Moreover, the Haber and Menaldo study had several serious drawback: it implies that 
natural resource dependence starts at a country’s time of independence, not of nationalization 
of the resource (so that rents flowing out of the country were in fact measured as if accruing 
to the country’s government); it adds together rents from hydrocarbons and minerals alike; it 
uses a “fiscal reliance” variable which is clearly endogenous to state capacity; and it goes 
back to 1800, so that the biggest part of the dataset is comprised of countries whose reliance 
on oil and natural gas was clearly nil for over a century – sometimes even a century and a 
half. Despite all these drawbacks, Haber and Menaldo’s study is relevant for the wealth of 
data that it produced, and for making that data swiftly and freely available to other 
researchers. 
Before Haber and Menaldo, the only reliable source for estimating natural resource rents 
(whether oil, natural gas, coal, or agricultural) in a sufficiently long and non-discontinued 
time series was the World Bank’s “natural resource depletion” data (Hamilton and Clemens 
1999, World Bank 2006, World Bank 2011). The World Bank estimates natural resource 
rents as a percentage of GDP of a country (it is therefore straightforward to calculate their 
value in nominal or real dollars). The rents are directly calculated as the difference between 
the value of the resource being exported and sold at (some average of) world prices, and total 
costs of production. 
Haber and Menaldo, meanwhile, go back to a long list of primary sources, and build upon 
them in order to rebuild an alternative dataset, taking great care in preserving consistency 
over time. Despite flaws in their analysis, their dataset appears to be a great alternative source 
to check for any discrepancies in the World Bank dataset.  
At the same time, in the next section I build my own preferred version of hydrocarbon rents 
through an entirely different source: the United States Energy Information Administration’s 
“International Energy Statistics”. The three of them will be combined in order to arrive at at 
the best compromise among different sources as to the exact extent of “fuel rents” of 150+ 
countries in the world, between 1970 to 2012. 
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5.4. Measuring the political leverage of hydrocarbon rents 
 
In order to build my measures of hydrocarbon rents and their “political leverage” I need to 
select a primary source, and then choose whether and how to modify it, with the aim to 
improving it to the best of my means. 
I start from the World Bank measures of rents for oil, natural gas, coal, mineral, and other 
natural resource rents. The World Bank’s rent measures are obtained by subtracting the 
estimated total costs of producing a unit of the natural resource, to the estimated total 
revenues acquired from it sale (assuming an average world price), multiplied for the quantity 
sold each year. However, this is just a rough approximation of each countries’ actual 
revenues, primarily for two reasons: 
 
(a) total revenues are calculated using international benchmarks, which are somewhat 
more accurate when commodities are indeed globally priced, such as oil or coal 
(although significant regional or country variation may be hidden there as well), but 
not when markets are regionalized, as in the case of natural gas. In both instances, 
moreover, each country’s price tends to fluctuate at a premium or at a discount from 
the benchmark, depending on the quality/blend of the natural resource sold; 
(b) total costs are always a best guess, and they tend to be endogenous to the price of 
the resource. For example, when oil prices are high, services companies or 
international oil companies investing in exploration and production activities in a 
given country can ask for more rents per barrel, on average. On the other hand, when 
the price crashes, the first to lose out tend to be the “middlemen”, as countries do their 
best to maximize the part of revenue that accrues to their coffers, while competition 
among upstream and midstream companies rises (Cabrales and Bautista 2014). 
 
Moreover, the World Bank estimates did not aim at being very precise, as they were 
extrapolated from studies whose aim was to measure the total wealth of each country in the 
world. These studies were more concerned with present asset values and these, in turn, in 
Chapter 5. Measuring Political Leverage of Fuel Rents 
 
146 
 
 
 
 
order to be calculated could be spread out in the (discounted) future: short-term price 
fluctuations are less of a concern to such studies. 
Noticing how hard it is to reach sufficiently reliable and precise estimates of resource rents, 
this only reinforces my belief that it would be very difficult to use rent variation over time in 
order to try to capture its effect on political outcomes: at the intra-country level, the noise in 
the apparent yearly deviations from a country’s average may well drown out the signal, 
giving rise to spurious and biased correlations (see Chapter 6.3). 
Also, the original World Bank dataset reports a huge number of missing values. Most of the 
time, these represent values for countries whose hydrocarbon and/or natural resource rents 
are equivalent to zero. However, this is not always the case. 
For instance, data for Saudi Arabia data starts in 1991, while Kuwait’s starts in 1995. In order 
to recover estimates for previous years, I first compare the World Bank data to Haber and 
Menaldo (2011) and to other sources (such as Smith 2004 and Ross 2012) to check which 
data point can be confidently set to zero. Whenever I expect, instead, that a missing data point 
is signalling a non-zero actual missing value, I leave the value as missing and prepare the 
dataset for multiple imputation (for a description of multiple imputation inference and 
analysis, see section 6.2). 
I include Haber and Menaldo estimates within my dataset, so that the technique can account 
for that data and its correlation with my estimates: this will allow me to greatly improve the 
efficiency of multiple imputation techniques and impute much more reliable data to replace 
missing values, all the while shrinking the estimated uncertainty around that data point. 
Multiple imputation includes time-series cross-section dependencies, and uses one time lag 
of significantly time-dependent variables (oil rents included) in order to estimate probable 
values of missing data. It also includes dozens of other variables that may correlate or affect 
oil rents, such as the recorded occurrence of major episodes of political violence within a 
country, or the oil price per barrel. The procedure generates 10 multiply-imputed datasets. 
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Figure 5.1 – Oil rents in Iran (1980-2009) 
 
Data: WB, modified and imputed 
 
In order to show the usefulness of the multiple imputation procedure in this specific case, 
below I report oil rents as a percentage of GDP for Iran and Iraq for the period 1980-2009. 
Black dots represent non-missing data, while red dots represent non-zero missing 
observations in the original dataset. Multiple imputation methods allow me to estimate the 
probable values of rents in cases of missing data, along with the estimated 95% confidence 
interval. 
In the case of Iran, Figure 5.1 shows that the series has an unexpected break for the years 
1991 and 1992, but nothing “strange” appeared to happen in the country in those two years, 
suggesting that data was missing due to unavailability or lack of reporting rather than a “real” 
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exogenous shock (despite the fact that the first half of 1991 was plagued by the 1990-1991 
Gulf War). 
Accordingly, multiple imputation analysis estimates that rents remained pretty much 
unchanged in 1991 and 1992. Given the uncertainty around the reason for missingness, the 
estimated uncertainty around the most plausible estimates is very high, ranging from the 
minimum value observed through the 1980-2009 period for Iran, to the 75% percentile of the 
Iran sample. What is interesting to note, then, is that uncertainty is incorporated within the 
dataset and is not at all lost through the imputation process: this allows me to avoid listwise 
deletion due to missingness, and also to simply impute a value as if no uncertainty was 
involved in the imputation process (potentially biasing the following analysis). 
Multiple imputations, and the hard process involved in estimated country-level data as shown 
here for fuel rents, suggest that it is quite fictitious to assume that our observed, non-missing 
values have a zero error around them. However, this error is conceivably much smaller than 
the one we make when imputing plausible estimates for missing data. Again, note that this 
uncertainty around yearly data can tend to bias fixed-effects models or models employing 
differenced data. 
Moving to Iraq, the country reports missing data for the period 1990-1996 and for 2003. It is 
common knowledge that Iraq’s history after 1990 was troubled. This knowledge is grounded 
on historical facts – which are unknown to a multiple imputation program, unless we feed it 
with sufficiently useful data! 
In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, ultimately leading to Operation Desert Storm being 
launched in January 1991 by a US-led coalition of 34 countries. While the operation was 
successful in liberating Kuwait, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was left standing in Baghdad. 
Also due to this, UN sanctions against Iraq – which had been imposed already in 1990 – 
remained in place throughout the Nineties, making Iraq a de facto international pariah. 
Interestingly enough, afer the 1990-1996 break in the data, information on hydrocarbon rents 
become available again from 1997, two years after the launch of the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme. Finally, the clear blip in the data for 2003 corresponds to the US invasion of 
Iraq that deposed Saddam Hussein. 
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Figure 5.2 – Oil rents in Iraq (1980-2009) 
 
Data: WB, modified and imputed 
 
Iraq offers a real test for my multiple imputation analysis: if I simply decided to impute data, 
I should have relied either on expert knowledge (which is scant when international statistics 
are unavailable), or to a seemingly “impartial” method to impute data, such as interpolating, 
by taking the values of the most recent past year with non-missing values, the most recent 
next year with actual observations, and divide it up for the years of missingness and 
attributing the same yearly change to every year reporting missing data. 
If I were to choose interpolation, then, I would assume that the 1990 value was higher than 
the 1989 one, that 1991 rents were higher than in 1990, and so forth until 1997. 
Instead, the software continues to impute very low levels of oil rents, which are highly 
plausible given international sanctions. In fact, bear in mind that this is a measure of rents as 
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a share of GDP. This means that as GDP varies, oil rents could shoot up not because of much 
higher rents from oil, but also because of an exogenous shock made GDP collapse. This is 
something that we can assume happened throughout the Nineties. However, GDP data is also 
missing for Iraq until 1997, so that the software will simultaneously estimate GDP and oil 
rents as a share of GDP. The resulting low level of oil rents over GDP is thus the result of 
the software not estimating a total collapse in GDP (although uncertainty in GDP figures, not 
shown, is estimated to be so high that it could surely include a collapse). 
Given that I will not use oil rents as a share of GDP directly in my analysis (see below), even 
if the software may be slightly underestimating oil rents as a share of GDP (compare the 1996 
to the 1997 value), if it also slightly overestimating GDP the final output will be a much 
better estimate of absolute rents. Most importantly, multiple imputation also allow me to 
recover an estimate of uncertainty around unknown values. 
Even more testing to the imputation procedure is the 2003 value: here. Figure 5.2 shows the 
huge benefits deriving from multiple imputation, aside from recovering uncertainty 
estimates, i.e. that even without “expert judgment”, the program is able to guess quite 
correctly thanks to the many correlations included within the original dataset. 
Specifically, despite 2002 and 2004 values being at levels near 100% of GDP, the 2003 value 
is estimated to crash to around 19%, with the 95% confidence interval estimating variation 
between 2% and 38%. This estimate is most probably a result of the fact that my dataset I fed 
to multiple imputation software also included war and civil war episodes variables, reporting 
both occurrence and intensity. It is therefore highly likely that the software picks up this and 
other instability signals, that in other parts of the dataset are correlated with an observed crash 
in economic activity and/or low values of fuel rents. Looking closely, even the 1990 point 
estimate for Iraq is much lower than 1989, possibly due to the dataset signalling the 
occurrence of the Gulf War. 
Multiple imputation allows me to recover a number of otherwise missing rents data, such as 
those for the whole Libya time series, for Syria after 2007, for Turkmenistan’s natural gas 
rents (which are spotty), UAE oil rents in the period 1971-1974, and some point estimates 
for Kuwait, Qatar, and Afghanistan (coal and natural gas rents). 
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Multiple-imputed methods thus allow me to recover plausible estimates for missing values 
and to continue to account for the uncertainty around estimates that replace missing data. 
After the imputation step (which, see section 6.2, also serves to recover all missing values 
for other important covariates in my dataset that suffer from a high degree of missingness), I 
am ready to calculate my preferred measures of the political leverage deriving from 
hydrocarbon rents. 
First of all, I calculate rents per capita by multiplying relative resource rents by that year’s 
GDP country estimate, and then dividing this value for country population data. This 
measure, though notably improved thanks to multiple imputation, is for most purposes 
analogous to the one used in Ross 2012. As explained in section 5.3, I consider this to be a 
step forwards if compared to just relying upon natural rents as a share of GDP, as this 
accounts for the number of citizens/subjects over which rents should be spread out in order 
to secure consensus. Although it can vary by country also as a function of the political regime, 
the level of rents per capita could be correlated to the potential political leverage from rents 
when the autocrat wants to target them not to the whole citizenship, but just to the selectorate 
(Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003). Lacking reliable measures of the selectorate of each 
country, however, I am left with a measure of rents over the population. 
All this notwithstanding, while this measure is importantly exogenous to GDP change, it can 
only go so far in estimating the actual and potential leverage accruing to political leaders over 
their citizens, because the same rents per capita would matter much more in, say, Angola or 
Mozambique than in, say, Norway. This is because in Norway the populations’ wellbeing is 
already high, so that it would take much more resources and revenues per capita for a political 
leader to be able to either “buy” consent from the population or pay the police and military 
apparatus to stifle dissent. 
I therefore calculate what I refer to as the political leverage from rents, by taking the gross 
rents per capita and dividing them by the population’s overall level of GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parity (PPP). This is the first of my preferred measures of the political 
leverage enjoyed by each country’s leader thanks to hydrocarbon rents. 
There is also another way I can tweak this measure, in other to account for other specificities 
of the “political leverage” proxy. This has to do with expectations and the tendency of rentier 
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states’ citizens to become slowly accustomed to the benefit they can enjoy. This may modify 
their perceptions of the benefit they may get from the regime, despite the actual level of 
benefits being higher. 
Although domestic consumption of abundant resources in natural-resource exporting 
countries is generally subsidized, in this case I consider subsidies to be simply “lost” 
autocratic rents, meaning that the existence of subsidies is actually a lost revenue for the 
country at the long-run equilibrium. This is because I expect that when political leaders 
approve a consumption subsidy, this is noticeable to the population in the first few years, but 
tends to act as a one-time shock that will soon be “embedded” within the expectations of the 
general population. As time goes by, citizens will tend to take this subsidy for granted. I 
therefore check for this “addiction” effect and test for both total hydrocarbon rents per capita 
as a percentage of total GDP per capita, and for rents per capita only accruing from exports 
(subtracting rents lost from the domestic consumption of hydrocarbon resources). 
In order to separate export rents from total rentss, I rely upon the United States’ Energy 
Information Administration production and consumption data for 1980-2012, which accounts 
for all the countries in my sample, for oil, natural gas and coal. I then proceed to calculate 
net exports of each resource, fixing them at 0 when they are negative (this means that 
countries are in fact net importers for that given year). Then, I calculate the share of exports 
over total production (a value ranging between 0 and 1) and multiply such share my my 
calculation of oil, natural gas and coal rents. 
I finally improve this absolute proxy by calculating the ratio of these rents per capita to GDP 
PPP per capita. I call this measure, which accounts for an “addiction” effect of rentier 
countries, my political leverage from export rents variable. 
It is important to bear in mind that all these calculations are still a rough approximation of 
actual yearly rents. In many cases, rents accruing one year may actually appear in the state’s 
coffers one year later (in the form of taxes, royalties, etc.), and part of them may simply 
disappear due to corruption or be outright stolen. Consider, for example, two recent cases in 
two very different countries: Nigeria and Brazil. In 2014, Nigeria’s central bank governor 
estimated that the state-owned Nigerial National Petroleum Corporation had failed to pay 
upwards of $16 billion to the state’s treasury (Onapajo et al. 2015, Hackett 2016). In the same 
Chapter 5. Measuring Political Leverage of Fuel Rents 
 
153 
 
 
 
 
year, the largest corruption scandal in Brazil’s history started to emerge, involving the semi-
public oil company Petrobras in the payment of owards of $3 billion in bribes, with some 
estimates of revenue lost due to corruption reaching $20 billion. 
Estimates of yearly rents become increasingly less precise with the development of sovereign 
wealth funds in many autocratic countries, starting in the last decade of the XX century. 
Sovereign wealth funds allow political leaders to: 
 
(a) smooth out the leverage of rents over a longer period, assuaging the effects of 
potential downturns while at the same time removing from political leaders and elites 
alike some potential “rent leverage” in boom times. The effect is stronger during 
downturns, given that in times of exceptionally low international prices or of any 
domestically-induced crash in hydrocarbon-related revenues, the accumulated 
financial resources can be called upon in order to avoid the excessive or too rapid 
enactment of fiscal austerity measures; 
(b) use financial economies of scale and invest the revenues in foreign assets or 
financial products, in order to extract a higher level of total rents from the same level 
of hydrocarbon rents over a longer period of time. This partially counteracts the fact 
that natural resources deplete over time, helping the country extract more revenue for 
each dollar of resource sold over the long run. 
 
Considering all that, it is important to highlight the fact that, even after my best efforts, the 
estimated amounts of yearly natural resource rents are still a rough approximation of actual 
rents. This is again one of the reasons why empirical models relying upon fixed effects, while 
potentially gaining in accuracy by excluding the effect of time-invariant omitted variables, 
suffer from a fundamental liability (see section 6.3). The fact that our numbers remain very 
rough estimates at the country-year level suggests that, for as much as we would prefer to 
have sufficiently reliable data available, this is still not the case in today’s comparative 
politics field. Using yearly changes from the overall country sample mean risks biasing our 
results because so much noise is embedded in our data when we decide to zoom in at the 
within-country level (Jerven 2013, Jerven 2015). 
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5.5. Political leverage of rents over time and space 
 
Hydrocarbon rents per capita as a share of GDP PPP per capita have fluctuated a lot over the 
last four decades. In order to show how they have evolved over time, I use my multiply-
imputed dataset and employ a special Stata command (mim) to recover descriptive statistics 
out of an imputed dataset. 
 
Figure 5.3 – Evolution of hydrocarbon rents over time 
 
Data: WB, EIA, modified and imputed; BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015 
 
As Figure 5.3 shows, the share of hydrocarbon rents has mainly varied according to changes 
in the real oil price (as natural gas contracts have remained overwhelmingly oil-indexed 
throughout my sample period). The figure shows that average hydrocarbon rents for all 154 
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countries in my sample rarely exceeded 10%. In fact, they made up at most 1% of the share 
of GDP PPP per capita in over 35% of my sample. At the same time, the upper tail of the 
distribution in hydrocarbon rents is long, and it is mostly represented by a small number of 
countries that display a high level of “rentierism”. 
As shown in the figure, these countries are mainly found in the Middle East and North Africa 
region. As expected, moreover, OPEC countries (whether within or outside the MENA 
region) reach the highest levels of hydrocarbon rentierism than any other country grouping 
in the sample. One interesting thing to note is that, even for OPEC countries as a group, the 
level of rentierism has tended to flatten out since the mid-Eighties, resulting in a plateau at 
around 30% for two decades between 1985 and 2004. It then rose with the oil price 
throughout the end of my sample years, but never reached the highest peaks of the Seventies 
and early Eighties. 
 
Figure 5.4 – Average OPEC hydrocarbon rents as share of GDP PPP 
 
Data: WB, EIA, modified and imputed 
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This may be due to two related evolutions. First, even OPEC countries have tended to grow 
somewhat more diversified over time. While these countries have remained dependent on the 
export of their high-value hydrocarbon resources on average for over 90% of their exports, 
the composition of their domestic economy has changed, mainly thanks to oil-driven 
industrialization, nontradables such as housing and, in the last decades, financial services 
(IMF 2015). 
Second, oil exporting countries have experienced both a rise in their country’s overall GDP 
per capita levels, and a rise in population, which means that the same absolute value of rent 
accruing to political leaders now must be spread over a larger population, and that each dollar 
is now worth less compared to their citizens’ living standards. 
A third pressure determined by a growing number of more affluent domestic citizens on oil 
exporting countries’ governments and upon the political leverage from hydrocarbon rents is 
best exemplified by Figure 5.4. 
As the figure shows, over time an increasingly larger share of rents in OPEC countries has 
been “consumed” domestically. The share of domestically-consumed hydrocarbon rents rose 
from about 5% in 1970 to over 10% from 2004 on, and the trend has gotten stronger during 
my sample’s final decade. 
Generally, this means that an increasingly larger share of rents does not directly accrue to 
political leaders, but is used for domestic energy consumption. Moreover, domestic 
consumption is mostly subsidised, so that the difference between export rents and total rents 
may not be totally recovered through domestic use, but may even constitute a net loss to the 
public finances. It is hard to quantify how much of the hydrocarbon revenues is actually lost 
to subsidies and how much is simply direct consumption. 
A second, indirect effect of subsidies is they incentivize domestic consumption even more 
than the normally “depressed” price of a domestically produced resource. Therefore, 
subsidies have the perverse effect of eroding public revenues over time, especially as 
demographic pressures increase, and tend to keep the system from reaching the optimal 
balancing point that would maximise both revenues (from the international sale of 
hydrocarbons) and the standard of living of the country’s citizens (Coady et al. 2015). 
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Moving on, Figure 5.5 shows the evolution of hydrocarbon rents for a sample of oil exporting 
countries over time. The figure shows both common trends and country-specific shocks. 
The 1973 and 1979 oil price spikes are very present, although they appear to have a different 
effect over different countries. Also, both the general decreasing trend in oil rents of the 
Eighties, the plateau of the Nineties and the growth of the 2000s are plainly visible. However, 
the decreasing trend affecting post-revolutionary Iran during the Eighties (the time of the 
Iran-Iraq war) shows the problems faced by the country during that decade; these in turn 
almost tunred Iran into a “non-dependent country” in 1986. By the early 1990s, though, 
Teheran’s oil rents were again picking up, bringing Iran in the middle of the represented 
bunch by the end of that decade. 
 
Figure 5.5 – Political leverage from export rents, high-leverage countries 
 
Data: WB, EIA, modified and imputed 
 
From the figure, Iraq also stands out, with the effects of the 1991 Gulf War and the sanctions 
period being plainly visible, as well as those of the 2003 US-led invasion. Finally, Chávez’s 
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Venezuela experiences a stronger shock than others in 2007, and a smaller recovery one year 
later, setting the country upon a decreasing trend (not visible because out of sample). 
 
Figure 5.6 – Political leverage from export rents, African countries 
 
Data: WB, EIA, modified and imputed 
 
One can also focus on specific patterns of “rentierism” over time, as the extraction and sale 
of hydrocarbon resources can affect different countries differently, especially if compared to 
Figure 5.5, which shows countries that remained rentier states throughout my sample period. 
Figure 5.6 shows how some countries experienced much shorter, boom-bust cycles. These 
bouts of “rentierism” appeared at different moments in time, with Egypt and Cameroon 
becoming temporarily dependent on hydrocarbon resources respectively by the late-
Seventies and early-Eighties, while others, like Equatorial Guinea, Chad, and even Sudan, 
experienced much more recent hydrocarbon booms. 
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Also, some of these countries have seen the hydrocarbon bubble deflate quite rapidly, despite 
maintaining a certain level of rentierism up to these days (2012 for Sudan was a one-off zero 
rents year due to South Sudan’s independence and the ensuing civil/international war 
compounding the oil crisis). Other countries, while possibly already having passed their 
initial hydrocarbon rents peak, remain heavility dependent on the resource up to this day. 
Extending the analysis to out-of-sample years, Chad appears to have experienced a very short 
boom period, but in 2014 was still as dependent to hydrocarbon exports as Egypt and 
Cameroon were at the peak of their boom years (my measure of political leverage from export 
rents records a figure a little over 20% for the country in 2014). Meanwhile, Equatorial 
Guinea is already past its peak, but can still count upon a level of political leverage from 
export rents which amount to over half her citizens’ GDP per capita PPP. 
Finally, Figure 5.7 shows a peculiar consequence of the way in which I measure the political 
leverage from hydrocarbon rents. Historically, the literature on the (economic) resource curse 
was based upon the observation of the experience of nationalizations across Gulf Arab 
Countries (Beblawi and Luciani 1987), but also on a peculiar case of an economically 
advanced country experiencing a natural gas boom: the Netherlands during the Seventies and 
Eighties. Thus, the popularization of the theory and empirics of the economic resource curse 
as “the Dutch disease” (Davis 1995). However, if one tries to measure the political leverage 
from hydrocarbon rents across this period, he cannot but acknowledge that, even at its peak, 
rents per capita accruing to the Dutch government via hydrocarbons never exceeded 3% of 
GDP per capita PPP. 
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Figure 5.7 – Political leverage from export rents, Norway and the Netherlands 
 
Data: WB, EIA, modified and imputed 
 
Even compared to Norway, a country whose rents still remained at the lower range of the 
political-leverage spectrum of hydrocarbon rents (compare Norway’s maximum oil rents to 
GDP per capita PPP of 20% to Figure 5.5, where the average country stays above the 40% 
mark for most of the sample period), the Netherlands appear as a rare bird. It is peculiar that 
such an extensive literature decided to focus on a case which, though being key in showing 
that resource dependence (as low as it could be) could crowd out industrial development in 
other sectors, import high levels of inflation, and cause recessions or lower potential 
economic growth in the longer run, is ultimately not an outstanding example of a country 
experiencing high levels of rent dependence. 
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5.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter shows that the picture of hydrocarbon dependence is complex, varying wildly 
both over time and within countries. This is also the reason why it is important to develop 
measures that can gauge, to the best of our means and knowledge, the political leverage that 
an elite/government may exert upon its citizens through rents accruing to the state’s coffers. 
Throughout the Chapter, I propose two novel ways that in my opinion can best capture the 
leverage bestowed by hydrocarbon rents to a country’s governing elite: the “political leverage 
from rents” variable and the “political leverage from export rents” variable. 
I find this measure to be highly correlated with the international price of energy. However, 
country-specific trends can set in and affect the overall trend levels both as one-time shocks 
and in the form of longer-term dynamics. 
I advise against inferring too much from year-on-year changes of my variables, especially 
given the fact that, as extensively discussed above, it is hard to pinpoint the exact extent of 
yearly rents, and there are many unobservable factors that may complicate the picture. A 
complex mix of business- and country-specific factors, such as the choice of contractual 
agreements with international oil companies or each country’s leeway in force better or worse 
conditions, and its ability to smooth rents over time through sovereign wealth funds and 
conservation policies (not to mention the level of corruption or outright theft), can affect the 
share of rents that remains withing the government of a country or is brought abroad. 
The precise figure of rents accruing to the political governing elite can hardly be estimated 
precisely, and therefore we should always take each data point as a best estimate of the true 
values, not as highly accurate data. 
At the same time, to the best of my knowledge, this attempt at estimating rents from multiple 
sources, multiply imputing missing data by employing a very large dataset with dozens of 
potential covariates, and the proposal of two new pretty simple measures to estimate the 
political leverage bestowed upon each country’s leader by hydrocarbon rents are original 
efforts that may make a significant contribution to the literature of the political resource 
curse.
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In this brief appendix, I present a number of graphs showing the extent of average political 
rents accruing to every country throughout the 1970-2008 sample period, together with intra-
country variability. The purpose is to show the extent to which rents tend to vary along the 
country and time dimension. 
Of note, for example, is the small political leverage that hydrocarbon rents bestow upon 
advanced countries, which here I grouped under the OECD label. Apart from Norway, which 
reaches an average 10% value throughout the period and a peak of 20% for one year, the 
second country (and big oil and natural gas exporter), Canada, does not reach even 5% of 
each citizen’s GDP per capita PPP at its peak, and overs at an average below 2% throughout 
the sample period. Even Mexico, a middle income country with a well-developed oil sector, 
earns less hydrocarbon revenues from exports that are equivalent to less than 10% of its GDP 
per capita PPP all the time between 1970 and 2008. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, MENA countries display very high potential political 
leverage from hydrocarbon exports, and some of them display considerable fluctuations over 
time, with years in which rents even surpass 100% of each citizen’s GDP PPP. Some African 
countries also display high potential political leverage, together with some Post-Soviet 
countries (Russia being at the lower end there), while only a few countries in South and 
Central America (Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago) display a relatively high level of 
political leverage from export rents. 
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Figure 5.8 – Political leverage from export rents, selected countries (1970-2008) 
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 Chapter 6. Testing Regime Choice and Change 
Democratization, Liberalization, and Their Correlates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I make a number of contributions to the literature that empirically tests the 
correlates of political regime choice and stability. My main aim is to test the hypotheses on 
the correlates of liberalization that I derived from my theoretical model in Chapter 2, by 
making full use of the operationalisations of my main variables of interest in Chapters 3-5. 
Most importantly, I am interested in testing whether the traditional correlates of 
democratization are robust, and whether these same correlates can be extended to broader 
liberalization trends. Meanwhile, I also aim at testing several other theories and hypotheses, 
in particular those related to the causes of regime “failure”. 
Throughout the analysis, I employ robustness checks to make sure that my findings are not 
dependent on a wide range of different operationalisations of my main variables, and to other 
estimation strategies. Different models and techniques also enhance the likelihood that I will 
be able to study how findings vary as research questions slightly change. In particular, I am 
interested in studying whether the correlates of political regime type (across different levels 
of liberalization) and the correlates of regime failure are the same or different, and how they 
may interact with one another. As will be shown in Section 6.3, my findings over the 
extended modernization hypothesis (for liberalization rather than democratization trends) are 
particularly crucial in that higher GDP per capita may increase the likelihood that actors 
within a polity choose more liberal regime levels, but is also correlated with higher regime 
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stability overall (possibly through repression and co-optation mechanisms), so that the 
outcome of per capita economic growth on political regime choice will be the result of a 
complex fight between two opposing forces generated by a similar underlying process of 
increasing well-being and increasing (but possibly perverse) state capacity. 
My empirical analysis wholly relies upon multiple imputation techniques. Multiple 
imputation strategies are not novel, but they are still used very rarely. This is unfortunate, 
because multiple imputation allows researchers to make the best use possible of the 
information contained within the collected data, even when some important variables are 
plighted by the problem of a relatively large share of missing data. Multiple imputation does 
away with some of the worst scenarios for estimation strategies (listwise deletion, especially 
in panel data settings, or dropping variables with a high share of missingness from the model) 
without resorting to possibly biased and massively cumbersome human-based imputation. 
This technique is explained in detail in section 6.2.2, along with the way in which I apply it 
to my original dataset. 
Moving to the proper empirical testing, I regard the models described in section 6.3.1 as 
especially relevant to the hypotheses I derived from the formal model. This is so because 
these models rely upon an ordinal, tripartite (or occasionally quadripartite, as in the case of 
the regime4 variable) categorization of political regimes, dividing the political regime space 
into democracies, on the one hand, and autocracies at different levels of “openness” on the 
other. The findings will confirm all of the hypotheses I advance in section 2.6. Possibly the 
most important finding is that political regime choice across the tripartite (or quadripartite) 
liberalization spectrum is even more strongly correlated with classical correlates of 
democratization than levels of democracy (see models in section 6.3.2). Moreover, by using 
the latest version of a measure of inequality that can be considered the state of the art in that 
literature (and multiple imputation that help filling some gaps), my empirical tests allow me 
to adjudicate between two competing theories’ implications over how inequality should 
correlate with more liberal regimes. Namely, I find support for theories that imply that 
regimes that are more liberal should be found at average levels of inequality, and therefore 
reject theories that postulate that more liberal regimes should be found at low inequality 
levels. 
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In section 6.4, I shift the research question and ask whether the same or different factors 
appear to be at work in determining political regimes’ failure/transitions, and how so. This is 
relevant because, as confirmed several times throughout my empirical analysis, once the 
political regime settles upon a particular political path (i.e. a liberalization level), its 
institutional setting tends to be highly persistent. Therefore, while particular autocrat-citizen 
dynamics and their relationship, as well as socio-economic correlates and other structural 
conditions, might be relevant in shaping a political regime’s current and future path, it might 
be that other forces are at work in determining specifically when or how often a certain 
political community may experience regime change. In the following analysis. 
Asking whether political regime change is correlated to a certain set of political, socio-
economic, historical or geographic factors allows me to expand my sample to a sufficient 
number of cases of regime change. At the same time, the mechanisms underlying the 
direction of regime change might vary according to whether one is interested in studying the 
causes of a polity to “liberalise” (from a closed autocracy to a democracy, or simply to a 
more open form of autocracy), or whether one chooses to investigate the reasons why a polity 
might run into new impediments and experience democratic retrenchment. This is why in the 
final sections of this Chapter I will try to shed important, while still preliminary, light upon 
this question. 
 
 
6.2. Working with multiple imputations 
 
6.2.1.  Why multiple imputations? 
 
Missing data is a diffuse problem in the social sciences. Many interesting or potential 
correlates to our dependent variables might be available only inconsistently, or be outright 
absent, for a number of reasons, ranging from research design to uncontrollable events to 
chance. When we deal with data at the country level, as I do here, data may not have been 
reported to the collection agency, and the problem might have arisen at multiple levels: from 
the absence of reliable statistical collection agencies upon a country’s territory, coupled with 
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the impossibility or unavailability of international organizations/groups that take up that role; 
to outright violence that might totally preclude data collection over a single or multiple years. 
Sometimes, generally with slow-moving variables like demographic ones (total population, 
fertility, life expectancy, etc.), these numbers may be estimated, or even simply interpolated. 
Think, however, about the evolution of Rwanda’s total population: having settled upon an 
increasing trend for 30 years, it went from 2.8 to 7.2 million people between 1960 and 1989. 
In 2001, Rwandan population had reached 8.8 million people. Yet, between 1990 and 1995 
the country’s population lost about 1.6 million people because of the Rwandan genocide and 
the conflict in general, as many died and others were displaced in other countries. Simple 
interpolation would be a disaster in cases like these: and it is just similar cases that increase 
the likelihood that data will be missing. 
The problem gets even more serious in a multivariate, panel-data setting. This is due to the 
fact, while simple interpolation can be unreliable and can hugely bias estimation results, 
scholars have often resorted to the standard response to missingness, which is listwise 
deletion. 
This implies that every time a variable that one believes should appear in the true model is 
missing an observation, the whole country-year row will be omitted during estimation. The 
more variables one adds to the model, the higher the risk of excluding a huge chunk of the 
dataset. As the number of covariates increases, the risk of biasing our analysis increases even 
when just a single variable contains a small amount of missingness, as the combination of 
small amounts of missingness may lead to a large fraction of the observations being omitted 
from subsequent analysis (or to having to drop some covariates, this way leading to omitted 
variable bias). 
Even worse, whenever one is interested in investigating time dynamics, or thinks that the 
model should include at least one lag of a regressor, the impact of missingness from that 
regressor increases by a factor equivalent to the number of lags that are added to the model.  
At the same time, whenever there is a reason for an observation to be missing, omitting it 
from the model or trying to impute it through any simple method like interpolation risk 
biasing our results. In the comparative politics field, some variables may be missing because 
of the occurrence of international wars, civil wars, or social disturbances of any kind: if 
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missingness is correlated to such social phenomena, and we do not take into account during 
the analysis, it is most likely that our results will be biased in some non-measurable way. 
Luckily, in the last decades statisticians have developed a number of methods to analyse 
datasets with missingness without resorting to traditional and problematic solutions. 
Specifically, multiple imputation was first proposed by Rubin (1976) to treat missingness in 
a public use survey data setting. 
 
 
6.2.2.  Methods of multiple imputations 
 
Here I introduce some notation to formalize the multiple imputation procedure, and go into 
some detail as to how this technique allows us to recover best estimates and levels of 
uncertainty around best estimates for our missing data. 
At its most basic, multiple imputation techniques consist in three-step procedures. In the first, 
the “imputation step”, the researcher creates plausible values for missing observations, which 
also incorporate the uncertainty around these plausible values. To do so, one has to employ 
regression models over the whole dataset and use a set of statistical techniques to estimate 
each missing value and the error around it, making full use of the whole information 
contained within the original dataset. In order to include uncertainty around plausible 
estimates, the procedure requires that the same estimation technique is used more than once 
over the original dataset, creating multiple “complete” datasets. For a general rule of thumb, 
users of multiple imputation techniques generate 5 ≤ 𝑀 ≤ 10 complete datasets, depending 
on the circumstances (as explained later, during the estimation step one can check whether 
the 𝑀-complete datasets are enough or more are needed. 
Once these complete datasets have been created, the “estimation” step is to analyse them 
using ordinary, complete-data methods such as regression models. Finally, the 
“combination” step consists in taking the results of each complete-data procedure and to 
combine them into a unique result that can account for the variability in the results, given the 
variability in the imputed data within each complete-dataset. 
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As stated, then, multiple imputations requires estimating a preliminary, “multiple imputation 
model” in order to assign plausible values to missing observations and to recover the 
uncertainty around these plausible values. Therefore, it is important that this initial model is 
well specified in order to avoid that the following analysis suffers from the bias introduced 
during this step. Note however that, as compared with other approaches such as interpolation 
or listwise deletion, multiple imputation techniques perform way better: even with a highly 
unspecified multiple imputation model, these techniques are almost always to be preferred to 
other methods for dealing with missing data (McIsaak and Cook 2014). 
Going back to notation, suppose for simplicity that we are operating in a cross-sectional 
setting, and we are interested in recovering the coefficients 𝜷 and other distributional 
parameters from a model that relates our response variable of interest to a set of covariates, 
𝑓(𝑌𝑖|𝑿𝑖, 𝜷), where letters in bold express a set of observations and coefficients in matrix 
form. Suppressing the 𝑖 indicator, suppose that our covariates have missing observations for 
some subjects 𝑖. For each subject, Denote 𝑿𝑜𝑏𝑠 that set of observations that are observed, and 
𝑿𝑚𝑖𝑠 those that are missing. Also call 𝑴 a set of dummy variables that, for each 𝑿, take the 
value 1 of the observation is observed, and 0 if it is missing, and suppose that the value of 𝑴 
is conditional on a set of parameters 𝝋. In plain words, this means that we are supposing that 
missing observations are missing for a reason, and that there exist some parameters that 
predict when to expect to find missing observations in our dataset. 
When missingness is due to a process of missing completely at random (MCAR), we have: 
 
𝑃(𝑴|𝑌, 𝑿) = 𝑃(𝑴|𝑌, 𝑿𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝑿𝑚𝑖𝑠) = 𝑃(𝑴|𝝋) 
 
where 𝝋 and 𝜷 are assumed to be different. This entails that this kind of missingness is not 
related in any way to our observed covariates, and also that it does not influence them in any 
way (i.e. that missingness is not related even to unobserved covariates, just to chance). 
Given the implausibility of such an assumption, multiple imputations are motivated by an 
assumption of missing at random (MAR), where we suppose that we can identify the cause(s) 
Chapter 6. Testing Regime Choice and Change 
 
172 
 
 
 
 
for missingness and that we can make an attempt at modelling them. The model thus 
becomes: 
 
𝑃(𝑴|𝑌, 𝑿) = 𝑃(𝑴|𝑌, 𝑿𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝝋) 
 
MAR assumes that missingness only depends on observed quantities (both outcomes and 
covariates) and that this completely determines the likelihood of observing a missing 
observation. Although the MAR assumption is certainly superior to MCAR, this does not 
mean that it is safe: the potential for omitted variable bias is reduced, but can never be 
completely eliminated. In fact, given that we cannot hope to capture every conceivable 
mechanism influencing our outcome variable and to model it properly, choosing the correct 
functional forms for each covariate, we need to commit to a portion of bias. In any case, 
studies show that by employing an “inclusive strategy” in which we include in the imputation 
model a much higher number of potential covariates and causes of missingness, instead of 
just our variables of interest and a few covariates, bias tends to be reduced by a great deal 
(Collins et al. 2001). Also, the inclusion of the information about our outcomes of interest 
(although, as will be shown, they will not be subject of imputation but only serve to impute 
missing data for covariates) can greatly improve the imputation step of our procedure (Moons 
et al. 2006). 
Going back to our imputation model with the MAR assumption, we can reduce notation 
further down to: 
 
𝑃(𝑀|𝐷) = 𝑝(𝑀|𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠) 
 
Where M is a missingness matrix, D is data (including both X and Y), and 𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠 are 
observations that are non-missing. As stated above, multiple imputation assumes that the 
complete data follows a multivariate normal distribution: ~𝒩𝑘(𝜇, 𝛴) , which is also why I 
will transform categorical, limited dependent and other data types in order to make this 
assumption plausible. In any case, there is evidence that assuming multivariate normal 
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distributions works well enough in most instances (Schafer 1997). As per Honaker and King 
2010, the estimation strategy to impute plausible values in place of missing data in my initial 
dataset is based on the following reasoning. First, the likelihood of my observed data, and 
assuming that missingness follows a MAR data generating process, we can write: 
 
𝑝(𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠, 𝑀|𝜃) = 𝑝(𝑀|𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠)𝑝(𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠|𝜃) 
 
After a series of manipulations, Honaker and King 2010 arrive at the identification of the 
posterior for the distribution of the parameters that we want to estimate, which are included 
in 𝜃 (assuming a flat prior): 
 
𝑝(𝜃|𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠) ∝ 𝑝(𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑠|𝜃)𝑑𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑠 
 
Once the posterior has been determined, they still need to find a way to take random draws 
of 𝜇 and Σ from these posterior densities so as to recover the estimation uncertainty around 
imputations. They solve the problem by devising an algorithm that further improves on the 
expectation maximization importance sampling (EMis; Dempster et al. 1977), relying on a 
bootstrapping technique that reduces computational burden by several orders of magnitude. 
The multiple imputation process applied to my dataset is described in the section below. 
Meanwhile, here I focus on the way to combine the analysis done on multiply-imputed 
datasets into a single estimate for the coefficients, and how to correct the recovered standard 
errors of the coefficients by accounting for the larger uncertainty contained within 
observations that have been imputed. 
Recovering the multiple-imputation coefficient estimates is straightforward: it is enough to 
average estimated parameters over all 𝑚-multiply imputed datasets, 𝛽𝑗(𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚): 
 
?̅? =
1
𝑚
∑𝛽𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
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The variance of the coefficient estimate is the sum of the within variance (the average of the 
𝑚 estimated variances) plus the sample variance in the point estimates across all datasets. 
The latter must be multiplied by a factor that corrects for the bias given that 𝑚 < ∞. So, the 
estimated standard error will be: 
 
𝑆𝐸(𝑞) = √
1
𝑚
∑𝑆𝐸(𝛽𝑗)
2
+ (1 +
1
𝑚
)∑
(𝑞𝑗 − ?̅?)2
𝑚− 1
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑚
𝑗=1
 
 
 
6.2.3.  Multiple imputations in practice: from a single dataset to multiply-imputed datasets 
 
For the imputation step I rely upon Amelia, an R package developed by James Honaker, Gary 
King and Matthew Blackwell. I build a dataset including all my variables of interest, plus a 
great number of variables that will not enter the final analysis but will help me decrease the 
likelihood that the data generating process around missingness is not MAR (see 6.2.2). 
Namely, this step includes 91 variables: together with all my outcome variables and all my 
covariates of interest, I add a number of variables accounting for demographic, economic, 
social or political factors such as: the occurrence of civil, international or ethnic violence or 
wars; the occurrence of coups d’état; many possible types of regime or government 
transitions and measures of levels of democracy; urbanization rate, population density, 
fertility rate, age dependency ratio, share of the working age population, migration rate; 
percent of population employed in agriculture, industry, and services; any possible measure 
of GDP and GDP per capita, GDP growth, poverty rate and unemployment rate; any possible 
measure of natural resource rents; imports or exports of goods; military expenditures; land 
area and the extent of rough terrain. 
Figure 6.1 shows the so-called missingness map, which is a graphical representation of the 
missingness within the dataset. Variables are ordered from left to right, from the one that 
misses most data to the least missing. Overall, missingness is not too relevant a factor apart 
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for some specific variables: at the same time, the map clearly shows that missingness can be 
spotty, meaning that missingness does not tend to be consistent throughout variables, but 
tends to vary, leading to at least some data missing in most of my country-year observations 
despite over 85% being present on average for every observation. 
One complication of the multiple imputation step in my case is that I am using panel data: 
my analysis relies on 154 countries in the period 1970-2007. This requires me to specify a 
multiple imputation model that can account for correlations along the time and country 
dimension. First, I add a series of time polynomials to my covariates in order to account for 
general patterns within variables across time. Amelia lets me also include country dummies 
to account for potential fixed effects, and interacts my time polynomials in order to account 
for important country-specific time dynamics that might escape the overall dataset. 
Finally, I also specify appropriate transformations for categorical, ordinal, and limited 
dependent variables before kick-starting the imputation process. Time polynomials and 
country fixed effects highly increase the accuracy of the imputation step, at the cost of a 
higher computational burden. In particular, the EMB algorithm – as fast and agile as it is – 
risks not converging, especially when some included variables contain a high degree of 
missingness, such as in my case. The time polynomials and country fixed effects add 3 ∗
154 − 1 = 461 parameters that require estimation.  
In such cases, Amelia’s codebook recommends adding a ridge prior, which shrinks 
covariances between variables towards zero without changing their means. In short, this 
choice adds a percentage of observations to the dataset that have the same means and 
variances as the existing (observed) data but with zero covariances. This imposes a little more 
structure upon the data, although it tends to drag imputed estimates a little towards the 
observed averages of each variable. 
 Figure 6.1 – Missingness map for the multiple imputation dataset 
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The Amelia codebook suggests adding between 0.5% and 1% of observations to stabilise 
the dataset and ensure convergence, while stating that even 10% would be an “acceptable 
upper bound”. In order to keep this value as low as possible, we choose a 0.1% ridge prior. 
This ultimately ensures convergence (in my case, the imputation process takes around 30 
hours to converge).  
 
Figure 6.2 – Testing for convergence of overdispersed starting values 
 
 
In order to make sure that the EMB algorithm properly converged (i.e. that the algorithm has 
managed to find a global maximum of the likelihood surface), and that starting values in the 
iterative process have had no effect upon the imputation results, I can use a visual diagnostic 
tool offered within Amelia. Namely, the program allows to run the EM chain from multiple 
starting values that are overdispersed from the estimated maximum, and then shows a 
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graphical representation of how the algorithm behaved. Given that the likelihood moves in a 
high-dimensional space, only the first and second principal component are displayed in order 
to give a good rule of thumb for convergence. As shown in Figure 6.2, the algorithm does 
indeed appear to converge towards a single global maximum, irrespective of the starting 
point. I can therefore be confident that the multiple imputation procedure was well-behaved. 
After this process, I am left with 10 multiply-imputed datasets. Each of them is a complete 
dataset with no missing data, and I can use all of them in order to proceed with the rest of my 
analysis, having avoided to lose any information due to missingness and, hopefully, having 
minimized bias. 
 
 
6.2.4.  Inferring from multiple-imputation data and its limits 
 
As a general introduction to the following sections, it is important to delve into how to read 
model output when using a multiply-imputed dataset, and to underline benefits and costs of 
a multiple imputation analysis at the estimation stage. 
As explained in section 6.2.1, multiply-imputing a dataset is useful in order to avoid any 
listwise deletion while at the same time making full use of the information contained within 
a dataset. After multiple imputations, in my case, we are left with a set of 10 multiply-imputed 
datasets containing the same number of country-year observations as the original dataset 
(6,045), but with no missing values apart from the few cases in which I decided that some 
variables were not to be imputed. For example, variables that have not been imputed include 
democracy scores, regime openness scores and political violence scores, which are not liable 
to be imputed being the result of expert judgment and direct observation. These values are 
also most likely to be missing for a very specific reason, and not being missing at random, 
thereby risking to invalidate our multiple imputation analysis. Recall that in section 3.1 I 
recoded the polity2 variable instead of letting multiple imputation do its “magic”. 
For a rough estimate of the benefits from multiple imputation analysis, bbeing able to do 
away with listwise deletion in the context of my models, just consider that the inclusion of 
all variables in Model 1 (see Table 6.2 and section 6.3.1) and the employment of listwise 
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deletion would have led to the use of just 2,339 country-years instead of the 5,101 I can rely 
upon via multiple imputation: a net loss of 54% of the observations included in the dataset. 
Also, some covariates would have automatically been dropped due to collinearity. Also, the 
disappearance of a lot of observations would almost forbid the modelling of time dynamics, 
rendering panel data modelling almost useless. 
In the face of such huge benefits, one should not underestimate the fact that multiple 
imputations come at some considerable cost. One liability concerns the estimation process 
itself, while other regard post-estimation and prediction. By increasing the complexity of the 
underlying data structures, multiple imputation models require considerably more 
computational power and time in order to converge towards final estimates. Also, while I 
took considerable care during the multiple imputation step in order to best preserve the initial 
relationships between data, imputed values are never true values, and the estimated 
uncertainty around them is only valid if we can be reasonably confident that we accounted 
for dependencies within the original data and for the data generating process that generated 
missing values in the first place. Recall that, in order to best approximate my model to the 
true underlying DGP I modelled time dynamics by adding time polynomials, and included 
country fixed effects to account for the panel nature of my data. 
In practice, as explained in section 6.2.2, given that the following estimated models come 
from multiply imputed data, I need to adjust coefficients and standard errors for the 
variability between imputations. This “between” component is a function of the variability 
in my dataset – from which the efficiency of multiple imputation depends upon. Thus, the 
precision of multiply-imputed estimates depends not only on sample size, but also on the 
number of imputations and on the structure inbuilt in the original dataset. 
This implies that, even with a large sample size, important factors to the precision of 
coefficient estimates are both the fraction of missing information (the larger it is, the less 
precise our estimates will be) and the number of multiple imputations the model can rely 
upon (the smaller it is, the less precise the recovered estimates). As the number of imputation 
increases, however, the efficiency of multiple imputations decreases exponentially, so that 
we must calibrate M (the number of imputations) in order to maximize precision while 
preserving efficiency. 
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Below each of the multiply-imputed models, I report the “Average RVI” and “Largest FMI” 
values. “Average RVI” refers to the average relative variance. It reports the relative increase 
in variance of the estimates which can be attributed to missingness, averaged over all 
coefficients. The closer this value is to zero, the less effect missing data will have on the 
estimate’s variance. 
Note however that the average RVI is zero when one estimates a model with just the non-
imputed dataset: in such a case we are not missing any information due to missingness, but 
we are also not using a potentially large chunk of the dataset due to missingness itself. Also, 
in multiple-imputation models the RVI value is not only a function of the quantity of missing 
data, but also of the effectiveness of the multiple imputation model (due to the pre-existing 
structure of the data) in recovering the underlying “true” values for each missing data point. 
The second value reported below the model is the largest fraction of missing information 
(FMI): it simply reports the largest fraction of missing information for all coefficient 
estimates due to nonresponse. This number can be used to get a sense about whether the 
number of imputations M is high enough for the analysis. A rule of thumb is that 𝑀 ≥ 100 ×
𝐹𝑀𝐼 provides an adequate level of reproducibility in the MI analysis. In the subsequent 
analysis, keep in mind that I am working with 10 multiply-imputed dataset; however, 
whenever the “Largest FMI” value exceeds 0.10, I estimate the model using 20 multiply-
imputed datasets, which can be considered enough even for the outlier Model 29 (see Table 
6.10), for which the largest FMI is 20.1%. 
Another feature of multiple imputation that is important to recall is that, unlike usual 
estimation techniques, the reported significance levels and confidence intervals of each 
coefficient are based on DFs that are specific to each coefficient, and vary with their 
missingness level. Therefore, it may happen that the model shows non-significant results not 
only because data is unsupportive of a correlation within our sample, but also because 
missing data is too frequent for that specific variable to let us recover a significant result. 
This may for example be true for inequality data, which is missing for 23.6% of our sample. 
Therefore, the measure for inequality needs to pass a much higher threshold than other more 
complete variables, due to its relative high level of missingness. That said, this is exactly 
what we aim for when employing multiple imputation techniques: we want to make the best 
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use of the information within our dataset, but we also want to obtain reliable estimates that 
do not overconfidently estimate standard errors around our main variables of interest due to 
some biased imputation procedure. 
To get a sense of how much the missingness in each variable influences standard errors a 
diagnostic option in stata (dftable) shows the percentage increase in the estimated standard 
error attributable to missingness. Sticking to inequality, which is the variable with most 
missing values in my models below, the increase in standard errors floats at around 3% in all 
models, which is a considerable feat given that around a quarter of the observation are 
missing. Sometimes, other variables suffer from a larger increase of standard errors due to 
missingness, but it is never exceeds 15%: overall, no coefficient in none of my models 
becomes insignificant due to missingness alone.  
Finally, also of importance in multiple imputation analysis is to note that postestimation and 
prediction calculations tend to be not directly applicable to models estimated through 
multiple imputation techniques. While estimation methods are well-defined within each 
individual completed-data analysis, they may not have a clear interpretation or consistent 
large-sample properties when the individual analyses are combined in the final MI step 
(Carlin et al. 2008; White et al. 2011). MI estimates may not even have a valid variance-
covariance matrix associated to them when the number of imputations is smaller than the 
number of estimated parameters. So, although I will show some post-estimation and 
prediction calculations, these should be taken with a grain of salt, as they come with very 
clear caveats that they can only serve as illustrative examples. That said, some standard 
postestimation commands have been proven to remain valid even under a multiple imputation 
framework, such as joint tests for significance (which I will employ below) and estimates of 
predicted values for the units of the original dataset (Carlin et al. 2008). 
 
 
6.3. Correlates of regime choice: political liberalization and democratization 
 
In this section, I employ my 10 (or 20, as explained in section 6.2.4) multiply-imputed 
datasets in order to test the Hypotheses I derived in section 2.6. The dataset I rely upon 
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contains a sample of 154 countries over the 1970-2007 period. For countries, I followed an 
inclusive strategy, deciding to leave out only states with too few or no observations. This is 
the case for dozens of small islands and micro-nations (like Liechtenstein, Andorra, St. Lucia, 
etc.), Taiwan, Cuba, North Korea, Myanmar and Somalia (for lack of data), and too recent 
states (like Montenegro and South Sudan). With regards to the time span, I choose to be 
somewhat conservative in order not to bias my analysis through unreliable data – whether 
too recent or too old. I choose to stop at 2007, before the Great Financial Crisis hits the global 
economy and years before the Arab Spring (attempted) transitions, because the full effects 
of both might not have come to full bear. An obvious avenue for future research is to extend 
the following empirical analysis to more recent years. 
I choose 1970 as the earliest cut point because before that date, data becomes highly spotty 
or unreliable – especially data that matters most for my analysis, such as inequality measures 
or fuel rents. Moreover, before the great wave of nationalizations of the rentier states’ oil 
industry, for the major part rents from the sale of oil and natural gas did not accrue to the 
governments of these countries, but were “expropriated” by international oil companies. 
Extending the analysis to earlier years, as others have done (Haber and Menaldo 2011, Ross 
2012) would therefore bias the analysis by greatly overestimating the political leverage of 
fuel rents accruing to most countries in my sample before the nationalization “waves” started. 
As for the variables I employ, my dependent variables are based upon my four 
operationalisations of political regime type, as explained in Chapter 4, on the CGV dataset 
for a binary measure of democracy (Cheibub et al. 2010), and on my recoding of polity2 and 
the UDS scores, as explained in Chapter 3. 
On the other hand the main independent variables that I will employ throughout the following 
analysis are: 
 
 Political leverage of fuel rents: by default, I use my favourite measure which is based 
on exports rents per capita as a share of GDP, as described in Chapter 5. In general, 
results do not change using total fuel rents per capita as a share of GDP, unless when 
specified; 
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 Inequality: I rely upon the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID; 
Solt 2009, Solt 2014), version 5.0 developed in 2014. Specifically, I employ the Gini 
market value before redistribution, and fill in some missing values by relying on the 
Global Peace Index database for later years. Missing observations in earlier decades 
(1970-1989) have been imputed at the imputation stage described in section 6.2; 
 Economic variables, such as GDP per capita PPP and GDP growth, are taken from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database; 
 Political violence is measured via the Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset, 
employing the actotal variable (which aggregates all conflicts on a 0-14 
occurrence/intensity scale; Marshall and Cole 2014). 
 
Table 6.1 reports descriptive statistics for the main non-binary, non-lag regressors that I chose 
to include in the following analysis (for brevity, I do not report descriptives for potential 
substitutes for each of them). A host of other variables has been included at various stages: 
given that they proved to be non-significant and do not change the substantial effect of 
significant variables, they have been dropped from the subsequent analyses.3 In non-linear 
models such as logit or ordered logit, all these variables have been standardised to facilitate 
interpretation of substantive effects. 
In the models below, all standard errors are always panel-data corrected. This is because the 
normal variance estimator would hugely underestimate the variance within panel data, 
treating all observations as independent, while we know that observations for each country 
tend to depend on observations of the same country in previous years, and are not to be treated 
as independent from each other. This implies that we expect standard errors to be correlated 
among country observations. 
  
                                                 
3 These controls include: total population (logged), population density, urbanization rate, fertility rate, share of 
young population, age dependency ratio, population growth, urban population growth, net migration rate, 
unemployment (total), youth unemployment, male unemployment, poverty rate, primary sector (% GDP), 
industry (% GDP), military expenditures (% GDP), gross capital formation (% GDP), coal rents (% GDP), 
mineral resource rents (% GDP), and forest rents (% GDP). 
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 Range Median Mean Std dev % missing 
Inequality 18.4 – 79.4 43.8 44.5 9.2 23.6% 
Fuel rents pc / GDP pc 0 – 76.8 0 4.21 10.98 45.2% 
GDP pc PPP (logged) 4.96 – 11.80 8.88 8.80 1.28 43.9% 
GDP growth -62 – 150 3.94 3.77 6.64 7.7% 
Life expectancy 19.5 – 85.2 66.6 63.7 11.2 0.4% 
Political violence 0 – 14 0 0.77 1.86 0.5% 
 
Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics for non-binary regressors in the original dataset 
 
Before delving deeper in the analysis, it seems best to introduce here a reasoning on fixed 
effects estimation in panel data. As will be clear from the following sections I will estimate 
some fixed-effects models, reporting and discussing results, but I will not employ them for 
the bulk of my analysis, for example to test my main hypotheses. 
Fixed effects models come with a great benefit: they allow researchers to account for the 
effect of any unobservable non-changing variable. This is a great opportunity that 
investigators should not miss, because time-invariant unobservables are legion in the social 
sciences. 
At the same time, fixed effects come with a number of liabilities, which are too often ignored 
or too easily dismissed in the recent comparative politics literature that has tested for the 
correlates of regime type and transitions (see for example Acemoglu et al. 2008, Boix 2011). 
First, fixed effects change the research question. Adding country dummies to the estimated 
equation is equivalent to demeaning each variable for the country’s average, which is in turn 
equivalent to asking how is a change in the output variable affected by changes in the values 
of the independent variable. Therefore, when we are interested in the effect of the values of 
our independent variables upon our dependent variable, fixed effects are unsuitable for 
answering this question. 
Recent methods to deal with omitted variable bias in a panel-data setting without doing away 
with between-country variation have been proposed in the literature (Fayad et al. 2012, 
Wright et al. 2013). However, the estimators employed in both models are still liable to 
criticism as to their large-sample properties, and cannot be incorporated yet in multiple 
imputation models. 
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Researchers are left with two options: either completely change their research questions, 
abandoning questions that have to do with levels and just investigate effects of changes; or 
leave fixed effects aside. 
A second liability of fixed effects models is that they assume that observations are highly 
reliable. Unless this is the case, changes from one year to the next might be the result of 
measurement error just as likely (or even more likely) than the result of true yearly changes. 
While every social scientist would prefer this not to be the case, most social science data 
tends to be unreliable at the yearly level, with even highly reliable economics data being 
consistently revised from one year to the next. In some developing countries, even numbers 
as reliable as GDP get revised by huge amounts (think about 2014, when a country as big as 
Nigeria revised its GDP upwards by 89%; that same year Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zambia all revised their GDP figures up by 25% or more). In fact, numbers often tend to be 
more unreliable where – at least for the testing of democratization and democratic transition 
– matter most, i.e. in autocratic developing countries (Jerven 2013, Jerven 2015). Lacking 
sufficient precision, yearly estimates are a best guess that is useful to make inference over 
their level and in large samples: their reliability greatly decreases when they serve as the 
basis to infer effects at the country level. 
Finally, especially when we are dealing with economic data, yearly variations are seldom 
interesting per se. A large swath of unobservable and non-measurable elements can affect 
data that appear to be similar on first sight. Think, for example, of the effect of an oil price 
slump on fuel rents, and compare Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. Being endowed with a very 
large sovereign wealth fund, Saudi Arabia can smooth out the effect of the slump over an 
estimated 5-7 years at the current rate, and can therefore afford to weather the storm, while 
Venezuela is already on the brinks of outright economic default. The same shock, and 
comparable initial levels of oil dependency, mean two very different things for two different 
countries according to their ability to withstand single-year shocks. Again, level equations 
are much more resistant to such smoothing out, while fixed effects would be unable to 
account for such differential ability to withstand the same shock unless much more 
information was supplied to the model via new independent variables. 
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Given all that, as said, our main models will rely upon regressions in levels. In order to avoid 
to introduce bias, we will try to account for many of the potential and measurable covariates 
of interest, and that theory suggests that should be included in the “true” model. 
 
 
6.3.1.  Testing the implications of my theoretical model 
 
In this section, I will test the implications of my theoretical model (see Chapter 2.2), namely 
the hypotheses that I drew from it and the literature (see Chapte 2.6). Overall the chapter, I 
will search for answers to the question: what makes a country choose more or less liberal 
political regimes than others? The research question is novel, given that previous studies 
focused only on democratization or autocratic stability/retrenchment, and answering is only 
feasible because I am relying upon my four operationalisations of political regime types, 
which define a typology of regimes ranked by liberalization level: closed autocracies, open 
autocracies, and democracies (the fourth operationalization subdivides the autocratic space 
into three liberalization levels, adding democracy, for robustness). 
My main test relies upon ordered logit models (Models 1-4, see Table 6.2). Ordered logit is 
a regression model for ordered dependent variables. Just like the logit, the ordered logit is a 
model that uses a latent / censored variable approach, in which the true data generating 
process for political regime openness is assumed to be continuous: 
 
𝑦∗ = 𝑥′𝛽 + 𝜀 
 
but in the data collection phase one can only observe its discrete outcomes: 
 
𝑦 =
{
 
 
 
 
0                  𝑖𝑓 𝑦∗ ≤ 𝜇1
 1       𝑖𝑓 𝜇1 < 𝑦
∗  ≤ 𝜇2
2      𝑖𝑓 𝜇2 < 𝑦
∗  ≤ 𝜇3
          …
𝑁                𝑖𝑓 𝜇𝑁 < 𝑦
∗
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The model assumes that the distance between different levels of regime openness may not be 
equal, meaning that the (conceptual) distance between a very closed autocratic regime and 
an open autocratic regime is not necessarily the same than the distance between an open 
autocracy and a democracy. Given that my outcome variables are not interval-level, but 
discrete ordinal variables, this assumption is the safest: an OLS regression would most 
probably be unfeasible apart from the highly unlikely case in which the measurable distance 
between the three (or four, in the case of the regime4 operationalisation) categories were the 
same. 
One important thing to keep in mind, however, is that ordered logit regressions assume 
proportional odds, i.e. that the relationship between each pair of outcome groups is the same. 
In short, it assumes that the same mechanism that increases the likelihood by a certain amount 
of ending up in the open autocracy or democracy category while being in closed autocracy is 
the same as the mechanism increasing the likelihood of that same amount of ending up in a 
democracy while being in an open autocracy. 
This assumption is also called the “parallel slopes” assumption, and it is only thanks to this 
that we only need to recover one set of coefficients. If this assumption did not hold, we would 
need to estimate a much greater set of coefficients in our model. 
In the estimation output for an ordered logit (see e.g. Table 6.2), the cut points, or intercepts, 
are estimates indicating where the latent variable was cut to make the three (or four) groups 
that we observe in our data. 
All tables reporting estimation outputs for ordered logits or logits all display odds ratios, for 
ease of interpretability. Odds ratios are simply the exponentiation of the recovered log odds 
(or ordered log odds) coefficients, and can straightforwardly be interpreted into an increase 
or decrease in probability of being in a higher (if they are above 1) or lower (otherswise) 
category, given a 1-unit increase of the regressor, holding all other regressors constant.
  
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 
DV: regime1 
Model 2 
DV: regime2 
Model 3 
DV: regime3 
Model 4 
DV: regime4 
Regimet-1 (lag of DV) 251 (65.0) *** 296 (75) *** 622 (165) *** 147 (37) *** 
Inequality (std) 1.07 (.06)  1.12 (.07) * 1.09 (.09)  1.08 (.06)  
Inequality squared (std) 0.95 (.03) . 0.93 (.03) * 0.93 (.04) . 0.93 (.03) ** 
Hydroc. exports rents per cap. (std) 0.88 (.04) ** 0.87 (.05) ** 0.83 (.05) ** 0.90 (.03) ** 
GDP pc PPP (logged, std) 1.19 (.09) * 1.25 (.09) ** 1.33 (.11) *** 1.21 (.09) ** 
Political violence (std) 1.00 (.04)  0.98 (.05)  1.00 (.07)  1.00 (.04)  
Post-Cold war 3.21 (.97) *** 3.26 (1.05) *** 2.94 (1.34) * 2.46 (.64) *** 
South & Central America 0.99 (.44)  0.85 (.38)  0.81 (.34)  0.81 (.32)  
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.41 (.17) * 0.40 (.16) * 0.28 (.11) *** 0.38 (0.14) * 
Middle East & North Africa 0.29 (.12) ** 0.26 (.12) ** 0.15 (.06) *** 0.24 (.09) *** 
Post-Soviet countries 0.40 (.17) * 0.40 (.18) * 0.30 (.13) ** 0.33 (.13) * 
South Asia 0.63 (.29)  0.54 (.26)  0.26 (.11) ** 0.48 (.21) . 
East Asia 0.68 (.37)  0.61 (.34)  0.50 (.29)  0.55 (.27)  
South-East Asia 0.46 (.21) . 0.40 (.19) . 0.38 (.17) * 0.41 (.17) * 
Europe 1.84 (.80)  1.63 (.74)  1.59 (0.67)  1.37 (.56)  
Year dummies YES  YES  YES  YES  
Latent var: 1st cut 6.87 (0.55) *** 6.83 (0.57) *** 6.91 (0.58) *** 5.76 (0.49) *** 
Latent var: 2nd cut 12.40 (0.76) *** 12.82 (0.76) *** 14.65 (0.76) *** 10.63 (0.66) *** 
Latent var: 3rd cut       16.07 (0.90) *** 
Average RVI 0.56%  0.61%  0.70%  0.68%  
Largest FMI 5.8%  10.7%  7.0%  6.5%  
Observations 5,101  5,101  5,101  5,101  
 
Notes. Results of ordered logit models. The table reports odds ratios. Standard errors adjusted for 153 clusters (countries) in parentheses. 
(std) variables have been standardized to facilitate interpretation. The initial dataset has been imputed 10 times. 
Significance levels: *** = .001 ** = .01 * = .05  . = .10 
Table 6.2. Determinants of political liberalization levels. 
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In an ordered logit, odds ratios are called proportional odds ratios, and we can interpret them 
much in the same way as we would interpret odds ratios for a binary logistic regression – 
with a simple tweak. So we will say that for a 1-unit increase in a covariate, the odds of the 
highest category (democracy) happening are [proportional odds ratios] greater, assuming all 
other variables in the model are held constant. Likewise, the odds of (democracy + open 
autocracy) compared to closed autocracy are again [proportional odds ratios] greater. 
Looking at the results for Models 1-4 allows me to check how my hypotheses fared against 
real-world occurrences. Here, I run over them one by one. Hypothesis 1 stipulated that regime 
types evolve slowly over time, and that “there is a huge inertia from one year to the next”. 
From the results, one can see that the lag of the political regime is highly significant, and that 
the estimated odds ratios tend to dominate the whole estimation process. This allows me not 
to reject Hypothesis 1.  
In general, each country has an overwhelmingly higher probability of being in the same 
regime type category as it was in the year before. Note that throughout model estimation I 
will be using a one-year lag; given the huge inertia of the political regime type process, this 
soaks up a lot of variability from the data: this can serve as a further robustness test for my 
remaining variables. Taking a five-year lag greatly decreases the lag’s explanatory power 
(while keeping it highly significant), and in general enhances the effect of all other regressors. 
I use the one-year lag as a further robustness test to my findings. 
Moving on, Hypothesis 2 suggested a higher likelihood to find more liberal political regimes 
at average levels of inequality. Looking at the models’ results, I find the quadratic coefficient 
for the measure of inequality to be broadly significant, while the linear term drifts in and out 
of significance. Recall that, given that I am using standardised values, the linear coefficient 
is estimating the effect of inequality over liberalization at the sample average level of 
inequality. Using non-standardized coefficients and shifting the inequality measurement so 
that it has a minimum at 0 rather than at 18.4 (this is important so that the quadratic 
relationship is always estimated in-sample) makes both terms return significant (p<.05) or 
highly significant (p<.01) p-values. Also, even with standardized values, a test of joint 
significance rejects the null hypothesis in Models 2, 3 and 4. 
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Substantively, the coefficients suggest that low and high levels of inequality decrease the 
likelihood of choosing a more liberal political regime as compared to average levels. The 
maximum of the quadratic curve (i.e. the maximum positive effect) is estimated to occur at 
inequality levels of between 50.1 and 52.2 across models:, while in my sample displays 
values ranging between 18 and 79, and both median and average values are at about 45. 
Therefore, the estimated “peak liberalization effect” is just above average values. 
This appears to be broadly consistent with my theoretical model, but also with Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s (2001, 2006) and other political economy models based on a conflict between 
citizens and elites. In turn, this finding appears to contradict Boix’s (2003) model suggesting 
that more liberal regimes should be more likely when inequality is low. I consider this to be 
an important finding because it broadens the scope of the effects of inequality, moving from 
democratization to liberalization levels. 
Hypothesis 3 postulated that the post-Cold War period (which I define as a country being in 
the 1990-2007 period) enhanced the incentives for liberalisation, encouraging autocrats to 
lead (even incomplete) liberalizations. Empirically, I find the relationship between the post-
Cold War period and more liberal regime types to be highly significant: the 1990-2007 period 
has countries around 3 times as likely to choose more liberal political regime levels than 
during the two decades between 1970 and 1989. 
As to Hypothesis 4b, acknowledging an indeterminate relationship between resource rents 
and liberalization levels, the models appear to show that there is a significant and negative 
relationship between the two. For each standard deviation increase in political leverage of 
rents, a country has significantly less chances to liberalize: its chances drop on average by 
between 10% and 17% in our four models. Given that a country like Saudi Arabia has average 
levels of fuel rents at around 40% throughout the sample period, and that one standard 
deviation increase in fuel rents is roughly equivalent to an 11% increase, this suggests that 
Saudi Arabia is today 40% to 87% less likely to be democratic than if it had no hydrocarbon 
rents. 
Turning to Hypothesis 5, relating levels of economic development to levels of liberalization, 
I fail to reject it too: indeed, I find that for each standard deviation increase in log GDP per 
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capita at purchasing power parity, the chances of a political system landing in a more liberal 
category increase by between 19% and 33%. 
As for Hypothesis 6, which is concerned with political regime types clustering in space, this 
appears to be the case and to confirm that less liberal political regimes are mostly likely to 
be found in Sub-Saharan Africa, the MENA region, and within Post-Soviet countries (see the 
appendix to this Chapter). 
Finally, as for Hypothesis 7a, which states that specific years might have been more 
conducive than others to liberalisation due to a domino-like contagion effect that is not 
dependent on other socio-economic correlates, I do not report year dummies for lack of space, 
but I describe here the patterns that appear from the estimation. In particular, I find support 
only for liberalising and not for anti-liberalising waves (across models, only 1998 flares up 
as a year of significant autocratic retrenchment – and this only in Model 4). Liberalising 
waves tend to be consistent across models, with a cluster of significant pro-liberalising years 
between 1986 and 1991. However, this finding is starkly different from Huntington’s account 
of a “third wave” of democratization starting in 1974 and still occurring at the time of writing 
(1991): the “pure” domino effect that I can account for in my model is much smaller and is 
overwhelmingly concentrated around the end of the Cold War and the early Nineties. 
It is interesting to note that, while pro-liberalisation years appear to cluster in what I 
categorized as still being the Cold War period, and then stop abruptly after 1991, still the 
post-Cold War period reports a much higher likelihood for polities to choose in favour of 
more liberal regimes. This goes some way to showing that, at least for the period 1991-2007, 
while no new “political regime wave” has occurred, countries liberalized steadily throughout 
the period – and that there was not just a domino-like effect at play, but a host of other causes 
that are being picked up by the correlates included in the models. 
  
 
 
 Model 5 
DV: democracy (CGV) 
Model 6 
DV: democracy (CGV) 
Model 7 
DV: democracy (CGV) 
Model 8 
DV: democracy (CGV) 
Regimet-1 (lag of DV) 2,142 (574) *** 156 (46) ***     
Regimet-5 (lag of DV)     3.12 (.74) *** 1.84 (.41) ** 
Inequality (std) 1.00 (.12)  0.59 (.15) * 0.79 (.15)  0.80 (.15)  
Inequality squared (std) 0.97 (.07)  1.04 (.12)  0.85 (.08) . 0.87 (.08)  
Hydroc. exports rents per cap. (std) 0.69 (.11) * 0.71 (.40)  0.41 (.14) ** 0.44 (.19) * 
GDP pc PPP (logged, std) 1.26 (.16) . 0.17 (.22)  2.01 (1.23)  0.32 (.37)  
Political violence (std) 0.93 (.11)  0.65 (.12) * 0.78 (.10) . 0.72 (.10) * 
Post-Cold war 4.38 (3.71) . 120 (159) *** 12.4 (8.2) *** 27.0 (19.9) *** 
South & Central America 2.15 (.91) .   42.7 (107)    
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.50 (.19) .   0.00 (.01) **   
Middle East & North Africa 0.27 (.12) **   0.00 (.00) ***   
South Asia 0.94 (.54)    5.31 (17.2)    
East Asia 0.99 (.64)    1.54 (8.54)    
South-East Asia 0.73 (.34)    0.32 (.98)    
Europe 3.68 (1.69) **   3,158 (7,351) ***   
(constant) 0.01 (.01) ***   0.01 (.01) ***   
Year dummies YES  YES  YES  YES  
Fixed effects NO  YES  NO  YES  
Average RVI 0.15%  1.22%  0.70%  1.40%  
Largest FMI 3.3%  14.4%  8.4%  23.6%  
Observations 5,101  2,089  4,490  1,791  
 
Notes. Results of logit models. The table reports odds ratios. Standard errors adjusted for 153 clusters (countries) in parentheses. (std) 
variables have been standardized to facilitate interpretation. The initial dataset has been imputed 10 times. 
Significance levels: *** = .001 ** = .01 * = .05  . = .10 
Table 6.3. Determinants of democracy and democratization. 
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After reporting the results for my main models, I compare the correlates of liberalization and 
liberal retrenchment to the correlates of democracy and autocracy. I therefore use the 
Dictatorship and Democracy dataset (or CGV, for Cheibub et al. 2010), which divides the 
political regime space between democracies and non-democracies. 
Models 5 to 8 (see Table 6.3) report results for a logit regression with the CGV variable for 
democracy as the dependent variable. Models 6 and 8 also employ fixed effects.First of all I 
find that, again, political regimes tend to be highly static and inertial, as the highly significant 
lag of regime type shows. The very high levels of regime resilience convinced me to test for 
Models 7-8 that employ a five-year instead of a one-year lag, so as not to totally soak up 
variability due to a potential unit root process. 
Differently from findings about liberalisation levels, and irrespective of the chosen model, 
inequality does not appear to have a significant effect upon the choice between democracy 
and autocracy. This goes a long way to show the importance of choosing the appropriate 
research question, and of gauging liberalization levels as well as democratization levels: 
movements within autocracies towards higher or lower liberalization levels would go 
unnoticed in models only relying upon transitions towards and away from democracy – as in 
this case. 
On the contrary, fuel rents appear to have an even larger anti-democratic effect, decreasing 
the probability of a polity to be democratic by around 30% as they increase by one standard 
deviation in Model 5, and by a whopping 55-60% in Models 7 and 8. Going back to my Saudi 
Arabia example, if the country had no fuel rents it would be expected to be about 3 to 6 times 
more likely democratic. What is interesting to note here is that, even after controlling for 
fixed effects, the correlation is still significant and highly negative, implying that the anti-
democratic consequences of fuel rents are present even within and not just between countries. 
In particular, movements towards democracy are estimated to be 55% less likely as fuel rents 
increase by one standard deviation. 
Interestingly as well, in this democracy-autocracy setting I find smaller support for the 
modernisation theory effect. Model 5’s estimated 26% higher likelihood of being democratic 
for a one standard deviation increase in GDP per capita PPP is at the higher range of the 19%-
33% spectrum previously estimated for liberalization, but has less significance overall. What 
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is even more daunting is that, within countries, the effect disappears overall (even changing 
in sign). 
On the other hand, the “incentives to democratization” hypothesis appears to be standing 
even in this setting, as the models suggest an even higher likelihood of choosing a democratic 
regime type (or, for fixed effects, transitioning towards democracy) than just liberalising. 
As for “regime waves”, again I find support in favour of a single democratic wave in the 
1985-1990 period. In the models with country-fixed effects, two “autocratic moments” are 
suggested in 1998 and 2004, but this finding is unsupportive of any cluster of autocratic 
waves. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that political violence appears to have a role – especially 
within countries. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in the level of political 
violence appears to discourage transitions towards democracy by between 28% (Model 8) 
and 35% (Model 6). 
 
 
6.3.2.  Levels of liberalisation and democracy  
 
In this section, I move back to interval-level measures of political regime openness and 
democracy. While I am interested in checking whether some effects appear to be robust and 
consistent to attempts at gauging political regimes in a more fine-grained way, caution must 
be applied due to the fact that attempts at such a refined analysis may in fact fail to capture 
subtle regime changes and may be more likely to be affected by expert judgment bias and 
expert disagreement (Martinez i Coma and van Ham 2015, Gervasoni 2010). 
Again, I report fixed effects results, but see benefits and liabilities of fixe effects in section 
6.3.1. However, it may be interesting to see whether results change when moving from one 
modelling framework to the other. 
Starting with levels of regime openness, Models 9 to 12 (see Table 6.4) show the results of a 
linear model with panel-corrected standard errors, with Models 9 and 11 using the whole 
sample of country-years, and Model 10 and 12 only sticking to determinants of the level of 
regime openness within autocracies. Models 11 and 12 also employ fixed effects. 
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As in Models 1 to 8, regime levels appear to be highly resilient across time, so that the one-
year lag of regime openness has a significant and substantive effect over the expected current 
level of regime openness. 
Moving on to inequality, the quadratic relationship appears to be significant both in Model 9 
and 10, with the relation being more significant when considering changes in liberalization 
levels within autocracies rather than for the whole sample. Substantively, the maximum 
“liberalization effect” is estimated to appear at an inequality level of 55 for the whole sample, 
or at 57 for autocracies (in Model 12 employing fixed effects, the effect for autocracies 
remains significant, but the peak is estimated to take place at 47). These are all just-above 
sample average levels, so that I again fail to refute Hypothesis 2 even considering 
liberalisation levels. 
Fuel rents display an interesting pattern. While they appear to have a small anti-liberal effect 
across countries, when I switch to fixed effects, i.e. to the role they have within countries, 
their effect is estimated as being slightly liberalizing and highly significant. While this may 
be interpreted in the context of the controversial effect fuel rents may have in the interplay 
between autocrat and citizen in the model expounded in Chapter 2, one needs to keep in mind 
the huge problems we face in interpreting fixed effects, especially in terms of short-term data 
reliability, and the widely different abilities of governments to smooth the effects of fiscal 
shocks over a longer period of time. 
Moving on, I find support for the modernization theory only when considering the whole 
sample, and not when constraining the analysis to autocracies. Meanwhile, the incentives to 
democratization appear to have a significant, high and consistent effect across models. Also, 
regional clustering and time effects appear to be present (with the only wave again being a 
democratic one, occurring between 1986 and 1991). 
  
 
 
 
 
 Model 9 
DV: regime 
openness  
Model 10 
DV: regime openness 
(autocracies only) 
Model 11 
DV: regime openness 
Model 12 
DV: regime openness 
(autocracies only) 
Regimet-1 (lag of DV) .887 (.013) **
* 
.886 (.014) *** .789 (.016) *** .709 (.029) *** 
Inequality .026 (.013) * .059 (.022) ** .017 (.020)  .058 (.031) . 
Inequality squared -.0002 (.0001) . -.0005 (.0002) * -.000 (.000)  -.001 (.000) * 
Hydroc. exports rents per cap. -.005 (.001) ** -.004 (.002) . .007 (.003) ** .010 (.003) ** 
GDP pc PPP (logged) .031 (.009) ** .028 (.020)  -.119 (.077)  -.062 (.127)  
Political violence -.012 (.011)  -.022 (.015)  -.049 (.018) ** -.059 (.028) * 
Post-Cold war .415 (.119) ** .516 (.187) ** .750 (.157) *** .892 (.273) ** 
South & Central America .043 (.062)  .147 (.118)      
Sub-Saharan Africa -.097 (.066)  .149 (.062) *     
Middle East & North Africa -.320 (.106) ** .007 (.130)      
Post-Soviet countries .070 (.070) ** .430 (.116) ***     
South Asia -.212 (.115) . -.233 (.160)      
East Asia -.007 (.070)  .395 (.133) **     
South-East Asia -.106 (.081) * .120 (.132)      
Europe .005 (.058)  .488 (.137) ***     
(constant) .378 (.347)  -1.314 (.547) *     
Year dummies YES  YES  YES  YES  
Fixed effects NO  NO  YES  YES  
Average RVI 1.15%  1.38%  11.03%  5.31%  
Largest FMI 9.65%  3.84%  13.88%  8.68%  
Observations 5,101  2,946  5,101  2,946  
 
Notes. Results of linear regression models. Standard errors adjusted for 153 clusters (countries) in parentheses. The initial dataset has been 
imputed 20 times. 
Significance levels: *** = .001 ** = .01 * = .05  . = .10 
Table 6.4. Determinants of the choice and change of political regime openness.  
  
 
 
 
 
 Model 13 
DV: polity2 (fixed) 
Model 14 
DV: UDS 
Model 15 
DV: polity2 (fixed) 
Model 16 
DV: UDS 
Regimet-1 (lag of DV) .94 (.01) *** .95 (.01) *** .88 (.01) *** .87 (.01) *** 
Inequality .001 (.003)  .000 (.000)  -.007 (.006)  -.001 (.001)  
Hydroc. exports rents per capita -.006 (.001) *** -.001 (.000) *** .003 (.003)  .000 (.000)  
GDP pc PPP (logged) .038 (.014) * .006 (.002) *** -.346 (.144) * -.032 (.015) * 
Political violence -.006 (.012)  -.005 (.001) *** -.025 (.023)  -.008 (.002) *** 
Post-Cold war .691 (.181) *** .012 (.025)  1.49 (.29) ** .113 (.033) ** 
South & Central America .040 (.096)  -.006 (.012)      
Sub-Saharan Africa -.310 (.111) * -.039 (.013) *     
Middle East & North Africa -.542 (.141) *** -.057 (.016) ***     
Post-Soviet countries -.575 (-.180) ** -.059 (.018) **     
South Asia -.334 (.162) * -.031 (.014) *     
East Asia -.237 (.217)  -.032 (.024)      
South-East Asia -.286 (.138) * -.029 (.018)      
Europe .120 (.088)  .029 (.012) *     
(constant) -.042 (.238)  -.025 (.028)  4.68 (1.71) * .447 (.175) * 
Year dummies YES  YES  YES  YES  
Fixed effects NO  NO  YES  YES  
Average RVI 0.91%  0.52%  14.0%  10.5%  
Largest FMI 7.31%  6.85%  9.71%  12.1%  
Observations 5,058  5,101  5,058  5,101  
 
Notes. Results of linear regression models. Standard errors adjusted for 153 clusters (countries) in parentheses. The initial dataset has been 
imputed 20 times. 
Significance levels: *** = .001 ** = .01 * = .05  . = .10 
Table 6.5. Determinants of the choice and change of democracy levels. 
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Finally, also of note is that, within countries, the occurrence of political violence appears to 
have a significantly anti-liberalising effect, pushing them to reduce their liberalization level 
both in the whole sample and within autocratic types. 
Leaving levels of liberalization aside and moving to levels of democracy, in Models 13 to 16 
(see Table 6.5) I rely upon my two chosen measures of democratic level, i.e. my recoding of 
polity2 and the Unified Democracy Scores. Models 15 and 16 also employ fixed effects. 
I continue to find that actual regime levels tend to be highly resilient to previous regime 
levels. In addition, I find additional support for regional clustering and “democracy waves” 
effects. Also, the incentives towards democratization implied by the Post-Cold war period 
appear at work here as well. 
In terms of important covariates, inequality does not appear to have any bearing on levels of 
democracy, both in its linear and in quadratic form (results for the quadratic are not reported, 
but are available upon request). On the opposite, fuel rents appear to have a consistently 
negative effect upon democracy, continuing to show their anti-democratic effect. 
Especially of note, finally, are findings concerning the modernisation hypothesis. While 
across countries levels of economic well-being appear to have a consistently positive, pro-
democracy effect, when I move the analysis to the within-country effect, an increase in GDP 
per capita PPP appears to have a completely different effect, decreasing the polity2 
democracy score by one third of a point for each one-unit (logged) increase in GDP. The 
effect appears to be quite strong, and prima facie it is hard to tell whether it is driven by 
unreliable data containing lots of noise or data is sufficiently reliable and that is a true effect. 
 
 
6.4. Correlates of regime stability and change 
 
In this section I shift my research question and ask: what affects the probability of political 
regime change? Are correlates of regime stability similar or different to the correlates of 
political regime type? 
These questions are especially relevant since, as I consistently found in section 6.3, political 
regimes tend to be highly inertial, suggesting that once a polity settles for one of such 
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regimes, it is then difficult to change it unless some particular conditions occur, even as 
covariates change (considerably) over time. 
Among other things, there could be an important interactive effect at work. This may be the 
case if I find that some factor that increases the likelihood of a regime to change in the first 
place, also influences the choice of a political regime once regime change occurs, possibly 
shifting the long-run equilibrium in favour of liberalization/democratization, or anti-
liberalization/autocratization. On the other hand, the correlates of regime change may be too 
different from the correlates of regime liberalization to suggest any potential long-run 
equilibrium. 
 
 
6.4.1.  What makes a regime “change”? 
 
For models 17-20 (see Table 6.7), I use my operationalisations of regime types (see Chapter 
4) but I create new variables from them. First, I build a dummy variable taking the value 1 
whenever a political regime within a particular country changes compared to the previous 
period. Over my four operationalisations of political regime types, I find that regime change 
occurs between 6% and 6.6% of the time for the tripartite variables, and as expected it occurs 
a (slightly) larger amount of time (7.8%) for my quadripartite variable, regime4.  
Given that from now on events become increasingly rare, it will also become difficult to 
pinpoint correlations. As King and Zeng 2001 show, logistic regressions are especially likely 
to underestimate the probability of rare events. Although the multiple imputation setting does 
not allow me to correct for such underestimation, I am comforted by the fact that, whenever 
I find significant results, they will remain significant or become even more significant in a 
rare-event setting. My analysis will therefore be more conservative, allowing me to tease out 
the most robust effects only from the rest. 
Table 6.6 reports the correlation between the four regime change measures, showing some 
interesting variability between them. Ultimately, different thresholds at which I set the 
difference between closed and open autocracies make all the difference here (see Chapter 4). 
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 ∆ regime1 ∆ regime2 ∆ regime3 ∆ regime4 
∆ regime1 1    
∆ regime2 0.89 1   
∆ regime3 0.74 0.77 1  
∆ regime4 0.91 0.83 0.87 1 
 
Table 6.6. Correlation table between measures of political regime change. 
 
I also create a “regime duration” variable: for each country-year, this variable takes the value 
of the number of years any particular “regime openness level” has been in place in a given 
country until that year. Basically, this is a count variable that resets to 1 each time a regime 
change event occurs. 
Note that here the regime change and regime duration variables do not describe the durability 
of specific regimes, such as a military regime leaving the stage to a civilian dictatorship or a 
democracy. Whenever a highly-illiberal military regime cedes power to a highly-illiberal 
civilian dictatorship, my coding does not pick this up as a regime change. Meanwhile, if the 
same highly-illiberal military regime decides to move to an open autocracy setting while no 
actual institutional transition takes place, this will be coded as a “regime change” by my 
variables. 
Therefore, the question that I am asking here is not whether a certain type of autocracy or 
democracy is more resilient to “failures” (i.e. to give ground to other political regimes in 
terms of institutions governing the system), but whether any regime in any country is more 
or less likely to open up or retrench, going down liberalization or anti-liberalisation paths, as 
conditions change and irrespective of whether that political regime also changes the 
institutional setting in the meantime. 
  
 
 
 
 
 Model 17 
DV: ∆ regime1 
Model 18 
DV: ∆ regime2 
Model 19 
DV: ∆ regime3 
Model 20 
DV: ∆ regime4 
Regime duration 0.98 (.009) * 0.99 (.010)  1.02 (0.01)  0.98 (0.01) * 
Semi-presidential democracy (CGV) 3.00 (1.22) ** 2.97 (1.23) ** 5.14 (2.44) ** 3.24 (1.35) ** 
Presidential democracy (CGV) 2.28 (0.88) * 2.48 (0.99) * 3.98 (1.81) ** 2.35 (0.92) * 
Civilian autocracy (CGV) 1.51 (0.52)  1.22 (0.44)  0.49 (0.22)  1.79 (0.63) . 
Military autocracy (CGV) 3.07 (1.05) ** 2.90 (1.02) ** 2.90 (1.15) ** 4.82 (1.67) *** 
Royal autocracy (CGV) 1.31 (0.64)  1.04 (0.55)  0.89 (0.59)  2.22 (1.05) . 
Inequality (std) 1.11 (0.10)  1.11 (0.11)  1.11 (0.14)  1.11 (0.10)  
Hydroc. export rents per capita (std) 1.06 (0.11)  1.05 (0.13)  1.12 (0.18)  1.01 (0.11)  
GDP pc PPP (logged) (std) 0.63 (0.13) * 0.52 (0.13) ** 0.41 (0.13) ** 0.62 (0.12) * 
GDP growth (std) 0.80 (0.07) * 0.80 (0.07) * 0.74 (0.08) ** 0.82 (0.07) * 
Life expectancy (std) 0.83 (0.14)  0.83 (0.15)  0.87 (0.21)  0.84 (0.14)  
Political violence (std) 1.15 (0.08) * 1.21 (0.09) * 1.26 (0.12) * 1.20 (0.08) * 
GDP growth * political violence 1.03 (0.03)  1.03 (0.02)  1.04 (0.03)  1.03 (0.02)  
Post-Cold war 0.80 (0.49)  0.84 (0.53)  0.33 (0.24)  0.53 (0.32)  
South & Central America 1.38 (0.55)  1.47 (0.65)  0.99 (0.60)  1.43 (0.60)  
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.70 (0.27)  0.65 (0.28)  0.63 (0.39)  0.77 (0.31)  
Middle East & North Africa 1.08 (0.45)  1.35 (0.64)  0.87 (0.59)  1.07 (0.47)  
South Asia 1.71 (0.77)  1.59 (0.81)  1.10 (0.83)  1.61 (0.80)  
East Asia 1.88 (0.97)  1.53 (0.94)  0.77 (0.74)  1.51 (0.89)  
South-East Asia 0.82 (0.37)  0.72 (0.37)  0.42 (0.32)  0.72 (0.35)  
Europe 0.80 (0.38)  1.08 (0.56)  0.52 (0.36)  0.85 (0.43)  
(constant) 0.02 (0.01) *** 0.02 (0.01) *** 0.01 (0.01) *** 0.03 (0.01) *** 
Year dummies YES  YES  YES  YES  
Observations 5,101  5,101  5,101  5,101  
 
Notes. Results of logit models. All regressors lagged one year. The table reports odds ratios. Standard errors adjusted for 153 clusters 
(countries) in parentheses. The initial dataset has been imputed 10 times. 
Significance levels: *** = .001 ** = .01 * = .05  . = .10 
Table 6.7. Determinants of change in political liberalization levels.
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The models presented here and in the following sections will be panel-data logistic 
regressions. In this section, the dependent variable is the dummy for the occurrence of regime 
change, in any direction. All independent variables have been lagged one year in order to 
avoid mixing up the causes and consequences of regime change/transitions. 
Results show, first, that the regime duration variable is only slightly significant and shows 
odds ratios below but very near to 1. This lends only marginal support to the hypothesis that 
regimes tend to consolidate over time (at least in terms of liberalization levels, not as regards 
their peculiar institutional settings). Therefore, the chances that any liberalization or anti-
liberalization movement takes place within a country depend only slightly on the years that 
have passed under the previous regime.  
Second, results show that some political regimes, this time classified according to their 
institutional setting (i.e. military, civilian or royal autocracy, and different democratic 
political systems) are significantly more likely to undergo changes in their liberalization level 
as compared to a parliamentary democracy (our baseline): namely, military autocracies, 
semi-presidential democracies and presidential democracies are the most prone to changes in 
their openness level. Although no conclusive evidence can be drawn from these results, this 
appears to show more risk towards autocratic retrenchment than towards liberalization 
openings, given that presidential and semi-presidential democracies can only fail 
“downwards” to lower levels of liberalisation, while an “open military autocracy” in principle 
may move in both directions. 
Importantly, results also show that many of the correlates of political regime choice that have 
been found to be significant in section 6.3 do not matter at all in enhancing or stifling the 
probabilities of regime change. Inequality, the political leverage of rents, and incentives to 
democratization all disappear from significance, as do regional dummies for geographic 
clusters and time dummies. 
On the opposite, three variables stand out for significantly and consistently affecting the 
likelihood of political regime changes: the level of economic well-being, GDP growth, and 
the intensity of political violence. The two economic variables both have a negative impact 
on the likelihood of political regime failure. As economic well-being increases by one 
standard deviation, the likelihood of a political regime change occurring is estimated to 
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decrease on average by between 37% and 56% (see 6.4.2 for the decomposition of this effect 
and a discussion of the modernization hypothesis in light of this result). At the same time, as 
GDP growth increases by one standard deviation, the likelihood of political regime change 
drops by between 20% and 26%. 
I also find that the occurrence of political violence significantly increases the chance of 
political regime change by between 15% and 26%. While political violence may well be 
endogenous to regime transitions, meaning that it may not be a trigger but a consequence of 
many such transitions, recall first that I lagged all variables in order to assuage the 
endogeneity problem. A second valid criticism could be that political violence is not just an 
“enabler” for political regime change, but may also be triggered by a set of covariates. This 
would again suggest endogeneity and, in turn, would make the model biased for lack of 
available instruments. 
Note however that when dropping the political violence variable, all other model findings are 
consistent. Moreover, what I am most interested in this section is to find correlates of regime 
transitions that may allow me to gauge the likelihood of an actual transition occurring; in a 
prediction setting, endogeneity problems should be less prevalent than in a causal relationship 
setting. 
All this notwithstanding, in order to further assuage potential problems caused by 
endogeneity, I interacted GDP growth and political violence, so that the two variables are left 
to influence each other (we may expect that as political violence increases, GDP growth 
decreases, and vice versa) and I can recover cleaner estimates of the direct effect of the two. 
To conclude, I am left with a very interesting picture about the correlates to regime transitions 
from one level of regime liberalization to another, whereby political institutional settings, 
short-term (GDP growth) and longer-term (economic well-being) economic variables, and 
political violence all contribute to bolster or stifle the chances of transitioning from a level 
of political liberalization to another. 
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6.4.2.  Explaining liberalization and political retrenchment 
 
Section 6.4.1 paints an interesting picture of the set of correlates with regime transitions, and 
allows me to maximize the frequency of rare events in my dataset (political regime 
transitions) and recover better estimates. At the same time, I am still left wondering whether 
the correlates of transitions differ significantly with the direction of the transition itself. In 
this section I ask: are correlates of regime liberalization the same or different to correlates of 
liberal retrenchment? 
Models 21-28 (see Tables 6.8 and 6.9) try to disentangle the two. Again, these are panel-data 
logistic regressions. This time, however, the dummy for occurrence of political regime 
change takes the value of 1 only whenever the level of liberalization of the political regime 
succeeding the “failed” one is lower (Models 21-24, Table 6.8) or higher (Models 25-28, 
Table 6.9). The regime duration variables are recalculated accordingly. 
Political regime change events become even rarer this way. For movements away from 
democracy and towards a more autocratic setting, occurrences across models only vary 
between 1.2% and 1.7%. For changes away from closed autocracy and towards more liberal 
forms of autocracy or democracy, occurrences range from 4.8% and 6.1% of total 
observations within the sample. Again, recall that given that I am not correcting standard 
errors for the rarity of such events, the following tests will be interesting insofar as they will 
return a conservative picture of what potential real effects might be. 
Results show that there indeed appears to be different forces at work: this allows me to 
distinguish between correlates of upwards movements towards liberalization, and correlates 
of downwards movements towards autocracy. More interesting still is the fact that most 
variables of potential interest disappear from significance, and we are left with just a handful 
of them that manage to withstand the higher significance threshold set by the fact that 
transitions are rare events. 
The single common cause decreasing the likelihood of any political regime transitions, either 
upwards or downwards, is the very duration of a political regime: for every year that any 
level of liberalization has been present in a country, the probability that that country 
transitions upwards or downwards decreases (on average) by between 2% and 4% in both 
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cases. This lends credit to the path-dependency hypothesis as interpreted by the comparative 
politics literature (see section 1.2.1): as regimes endure, they consolidate, requiring 
increasingly larger forces in order for change to occur in the first place. 
On the other hand, while political violence was found to be correlated with the overall 
likelihood of regime transitions in the preceding section, it now remains significant only as 
an explanation for autocratic retrenchment, not pro-liberal transitions: as political violence 
increases, the likelihood of transitioning towards a more autocratic regime increases by 10-
11%. This suggests that liberalization requires a concerted effort by many actors and some 
degree of consensus away from political violence to occur, while the more unrest spreads 
within a country, the less that country will be likely to liberalize during the transition process. 
The main variable that is found to be significantly correlated with autocratic retrenchment is 
GDP growth. My models consistently find that as economic growth increases by one standard 
deviation, the likelihood of experiencing autocratic retrenchment decreases on average by 
43-44%, and vice versa for periods of economic recession. 
Therefore, while an economic recession may increase the chances of a political regime 
change, this change usually brings about an autocratic retrenchment, and is not the harbinger 
of progressive change for the country overall that it could have been expected to be at first. 
As a substantive example in reality, the near-default of Venezuela in 2015-2016 has been 
hailed as an opportunity for change in the country after over a decade of autocratic 
mismanagement, but according to my models the steep recession (not to mention the 
increasing inequality level, which is today estimated to be higher than my sample average) 
makes it much less likely that the country will be able to democratise in case the current 
Maduro regime embarks upon regime change or leaves the stage to other actors. 
  
 
 
 
 
 Model 21 
DV: ∆ regime1 (to 
less liberal) 
Model 22 
DV: ∆ regime2 (to 
less liberal) 
Model 23 
DV: ∆ regime3 (to 
less liberal) 
Model 24 
DV: ∆ regime4 (to 
less liberal) 
Regime duration 0.95 (0.01) ** 0.97 (0.01) * 0.96 (0.01) ** 0.96 (0.01) ** 
Inequality (std) 1.16 (0.16)  1.06 (0.14)  1.07 (0.15)  1.14 (0.14)  
Hydroc. export rents per capita (std) 0.91 (0.16)  0.90 (0.17)  0.93 (0.19)  0.87 (0.15)  
GDP pc PPP (logged) (std) 0.88 (0.24)  0.82 (0.23)  0.77 (0.25)  0.85 (0.22)  
GDP growth (std) 0.58 (0.08) *** 0.58 (0.08) *** 0.58 (0.09) *** 0.57 (0.08) *** 
Life expectancy (std) 0.85 (0.20)  0.80 (0.19)  0.92 (0.24)  0.88 (0.19)  
Political violence 1.10 (0.06) * 1.11 (0.06) * 1.11 (0.06) * 1.10 (0.05) * 
GDP growth * political violence 1.05 (0.03)  1.03 (0.03)  1.03 (0.03)  1.05 (0.32)  
Post-Cold war 0.44 (0.48)  0.45 (0.50)  0.59 (0.67)  0.30 (0.33)  
South & Central America 1.24 (0.66)  1.82 (1.04)  1.54 (0.96)  1.25 (0.64)  
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.88 (0.49)  1.11 (0.67)  1.32 (0.84)  1.08 (0.57)  
Middle East & North Africa 1.14 (0.68)  1.75 (1.09)  1.26 (0.89)  1.33 (0.74)  
South Asia 1.99 (1.24)  2.34 (1.56)  3.36 (2.27)  2.22 (1.31)  
East Asia 1.46 (1.26)  0.89 (1.01)  1.01 (1.02)  1.23 (1.07)  
South-East Asia 0.97 (0.62)  1.11 (0.78)  1.11 (0.84)  0.80 (0.50)  
Europe 0.22 (0.17)  0.19 (0.22)  0.19 (0.21)  0.23 (0.19)  
(constant) 0.04 (0.02) *** 0.02 (0.02) *** 0.02 (0.02) *** 0.05 (0.03) *** 
Year dummies YES  YES  YES  YES  
Average RVI 0.81%  1.18%  1.05%  0.96%  
Largest FMI 13.3%  12.5%  15.4%  18.1%  
Observations 3,914  4,819  3,523  4,021  
 
Notes. Results of logit models. All regressors lagged one year. The table reports odds ratios. Standard errors adjusted for 153 clusters 
(countries) in parentheses. The initial dataset has been imputed 20 times. 
Significance levels: *** = .001 ** = .01 * = .05  . = .10 
Table 6.8. Determinants of political retrenchment.  
  
 
 
 
 
 Model 25 
DV: ∆ regime1 (to 
more liberal) 
Model 26 
DV: ∆ regime2 (to more 
liberal) 
Model 27 
DV: ∆ regime3 (to more 
liberal) 
Model 28 
DV: ∆ regime4 (to 
more liberal) 
Regime duration 0.98 (0.01) * 0.97 (0.01) ** 0.97 (0.01) *** 0.96 (0.01) *** 
Inequality (std) 1.01 (0.10)  1.07 (0.11)  0.95 (0.10)  1.01 (0.09)  
Hydroc. export rents per capita (std) 1.13 (0.13)  1.08 (0.14)  1.07 (0.14)  1.11 (0.11)  
GDP pc PPP (logged) (std) 0.53 (0.11) ** 0.52 (0.12) ** 0.63 (0.15) * 0.59 (0.11) ** 
GDP growth (std) 0.96 (0.10)  0.95 (0.10)  0.89 (0.11)  0.99 (0.09)  
Life expectancy (std) 0.80 (0.15)  0.84 (0.16)  0.84 (0.17)  0.79 (0.13)  
Political violence (std) 1.06 (0.08)  1.07 (0.08)  1.03 (0.09)  1.02 (0.07)  
GDP growth * political violence 1.03 (0.03)  1.06 (0.03)  1.06 (0.04)  1.03 (0.03)  
Post-Cold war 1.73 (1.31)  2.32 (1.84)  0.94 (0.80)  1.02 (0.71)  
South & Central America 2.42 (1.04) * 2.23 (0.96) . 2.06 (0.90) . 2.24 (0.86) * 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.92 (0.41)  0.86 (0.38)  0.99 (0.45)  1.05 (0.41)  
Middle East & North Africa 1.46 (0.70)  1.37 (0.67)  0.97 (0.51)  1.51 (0.64)  
South Asia 1.55 (0.78)  1.58 (0.79)  1.38 (0.72)  1.75 (0.79)  
East Asia 2.43 (1.41)  1.96 (1.20)  1.11 (0.80)  1.87 (1.04)  
South-East Asia 0.90 (0.48)  0.75 (0.41)  0.98 (0.55)  0.97 (0.46)  
Europe 1.88 (0.98)  2.06 (1.08)  1.29 (0.69)  1.72 (0.82)  
(constant) 0.01 (0.01) *** 0.01 (0.01) *** 0.02 (0.01) *** 0.03 (0.01) *** 
Year dummies YES  YES  YES  YES  
Average RVI 0.57%  0.60%  0.89%  0.63%  
Largest FMI 10.4%  7.8%  13.5%  10.3%  
Observations 4,971  5,101  4,667  5,101  
 
Notes. Results of logit models. All regressors lagged one year. The table reports odds ratios. Standard errors adjusted for 153 clusters 
(countries) in parentheses. The initial dataset has been imputed 20 times. 
Significance levels: *** = .001 ** = .01 * = .05  . = .10 
Table 6.9. Determinants of political liberalization.
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Finally, moving to causes for political change in favour of liberalization, I find that GDP 
growth stops being significant, as well as political violence, while a different economic 
variable becomes highly and consistently significant: the level of GDP per capita PPP.  
However, the expected effect is exactly the opposite than modernization theory would 
suggest: a one-standard-deviation higher level of economic wellbeing is significantly 
associated to a decrease in the likelihood of transitioning towards more liberal political 
regimes by a substantive amount, on average by between 37% and 45%. 
This has deep implications for the extension and testing of modernization theory to a 
liberalization setting: while we consistently find that, across countries, more liberal political 
regimes tend to be associated with significantly higher levels of economic well-being, the 
same higher well-being levels may increasingly stifle the likelihood of transitioning towards 
more democratic levels. For example, a country finding itself in a condition of open autocracy 
will have less and less chances of democratizing further as its income per capita grows. This 
may for example be the case for China, Russia, Singapore, Malaysia, Azerbaijan – all 
countries that have experienced strong economic growth over the 2005-2014 decade, but that 
according to all of my measures are still stuck in an open autocratic regime. This also does 
not bode well for closed autocratic regimes that have been increasing average income levels 
very fast over the last decade and a half: namely, Gulf countries and other rentier states, at 
least until the 2014 oil price crash. 
One mechanism to explain this apparent contradiction is that, while economic well-being 
brings with it a number of socio-economic transformations that make any polity more likely 
to call for increasing participation and representation in political activity, increasing income 
levels at the same time bolster state capacity, making it less likely that the government of a 
country can be overturned – or undergo a liberalizing transition. 
This is an important result, highlighting the complex relationship between some of the 
covariates of liberalization. While some of them proved to be crucial in determining the 
political regime choice in the first place, other factors appear to be at play when it comes to 
regime transitions. These “enablers” may sometimes overlap with covariates that have a 
substantive effect upon political regime type choices in the first place; other times, they may 
interact in unpredictable ways, as those correlates that make a country more likely to become 
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more liberal, may also make it less likely to change its current liberalization level in the first 
place. 
In the end, this does not mean that a polity will in some cases be stuck for a long time with 
its initial choice of regime type; it just goes to restate once more that the likelihood of any 
regime transition is low, and that most of the times it will be the specific circumstances of a 
polity that determine the timing of a regime transition, not structural covariates. Only then 
will correlates of political regime choice, posited in my formalization in Chapter 2 and 
investigated through the empirical models in section 6.3, be able to come into play.  
 
 
6.4.3.  Further dissecting type-to-type transitions 
 
This section embarks upon a final, but still provisional, attempt at refining the investigation 
of the correlates of regime transitions. I develop six models relating to the three different 
regime types that I conceptualized in my theoretical model: closed autocracy, open autocracy, 
and democracy. Each model uses the regime2 variable in order to identify the cut point 
between closed and open autocracy, but results are consistent whether I rely either on regime1 
or regime3 instead (the regime4 variable is excluded because it posits a quadripartite division 
of the political regime space). 
I partition the political space in the three regime categories: democracy (D), open autocracy 
(OA), and closed autocracy (CA). I then ask whether there are some specific correlates 
explaining transitions from a particular regime type to a particular other, obtaining 6 possible 
transitions. Under this empirical setting, transitions become rarer still and significant 
correlations should get rarer as well. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 29 
DV: transition from D 
to OA 
Model 30 
DV: transition from OA 
to CA 
Model 31 
DV: transition from D to 
CA 
Inequality (std) 1.78 (0.92)  1.18 (0.20)  1.14 (0.34)  
Hydroc. export rents per capita (std) 1.08 (0.84)  1.05 (0.24)  1.90 (0.65)  
GDP pc PPP (logged) (std) 0.44 (0.23)  0.49 (0.12) ** 0.22 (0.08) *** 
GDP growth (std) 0.74 (0.33)  0.65 (0.07) *** 0.47 (0.10) ** 
Political violence (std) 1.16 (0.42)  1.31 (0.15) * 1.49 (0.37) . 
Post-Cold war 1.21 (1.06)  0.40 (0.14) ** 0.24 (0.12) ** 
(constant) .002 (.003)  0.02 (0.01) *** 0.01 (0.01) *** 
Year dummies YES  YES  YES  
Average RVI 3.92%  3.65%  0.92%  
Largest FMI 20.1%  13.1%  3.9%  
Observations 2,115  1,759  2,115  
 
Notes. Results of logit models. All regressors lagged one year. The table reports odds ratios. Standard errors adjusted for 153 
clusters (countries) in parentheses. The initial dataset has been imputed 20 times. 
Significance levels: *** = .001 ** = .01 * = .05  . = .10 
 
Table 6.10. Unpacking political retrenchments. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 Model 32 
DV: transition from CA 
to OA 
Model 33 
DV: transition from OA 
to D 
Model 34 
DV: transition from CA 
to D 
Inequality (std) 1.13 (0.16)  0.70 (0.19)  1.04 (0.24)  
Hydroc. export rents per capita (std) 0.88 (0.17)  0.01 (0.01) * 0.65 (0.22)  
GDP pc PPP (logged) (std) 0.65 (0.12) * 1.90 (0.74) . 1.15 (0.34)  
GDP growth (std) 1.16 (0.11)  0.89 (0.14)  0.83 (0.17)  
Political violence (std) 1.11 (0.12)  1.05 (0.24)  0.90 (0.19)  
Post-Cold war 4.01 (1.19) *** 3.45 (1.74) * 2.49 (1.10) * 
(constant) 0.03 (0.01) *** .002 (.002) *** 0.01 (0.01) *** 
Year dummies YES  YES  YES  
Average RVI 2.58%  1.43%  1.39%  
Largest FMI 8.2%  6.3%  5.0%  
Observations 1,227  1,759  1,227  
 
Notes. Results of logit models. All regressors lagged one year. The table reports odds ratios. Standard errors adjusted for 153 
clusters (countries) in parentheses. The initial dataset has been imputed 20 times. 
Significance levels: *** = .001 ** = .01 * = .05  . = .10 
 
Table 6.11. Unpacking political liberalizations. 
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Models 29 to 31 (see Table 6.10) show the three transitions towards less liberal regimes: 
Model 29 studies transitions from democracy towards open autocracy, Model 30 accounts 
for transitions from open to closed autocracy, while Model 31 is concerned with transitions 
from democracy directly to closed autocracy. 
As shown by the models’ results, these three types of autocratic retrenchment appear to be 
correlated to different variables with different strength, although most of them appear to push 
in the same direction. Model 29 finds no significant relationship between transitions from 
democracy to open autocracy and my covariates. However, this may be due to the fact that 
in the period 1970-2007 such transitions happen just 7 times over 2,115 country-years, which 
is a mere 0.3% of the sample. Transitions from open to closed autocracy instead happen 48 
times over 1,759 country-years (around 2.7% of the sample), while transitions from 
democracy to closed autocracy happen 27 times (which is about 1.3% of the sample). 
These latter two types of transitions are found to be discouraged both by a growth in 
economic well-being and by GDP growth. On the opposite, political violence appears to 
increase their likelihood. The estimated average effect of the economic variables seems to be 
much higher for democracies, meaning that the same increase in economic well-being or 
GDP growth discourages autocratic retrenchment more than in an open autocratic case. 
What is interesting here is that economic well-being goes back to showing a significant (and 
substantial) impact in discouraging transitions towards less liberal regimes. This appears to 
add even further complexity to my findings around the modernization hypothesis in 6.3.2, 
given that in this setting modernization is found to discourage all transitions, but mostly those 
occurring in the “wrong” way, from more liberal to less liberal regimes. 
Finally, both here and in the next three models studying transitions towards more liberal 
political regimes, I continue to find evidence that the post-Cold War period was especially 
fertile for transitions towards more liberal regimes, and discouraged transitions towards less 
liberal ones. 
Moving to Models 32-34 (see Table 6.11), pro-liberal transitions are more frequent in the 
1970-2007 sample period; however, correlations almost disappear. I record 75 transitions 
from closed to open autocracy (6.1% of the sample), 44 transitions from open autocracy to 
democracy (2.5%), and 33 transitions from closed autocracy straight to democracy (2.7%). 
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Results show that fuel rents appears to stifle pro-liberal transitions only from open 
autocracies to democracy, but given the incredibly strong result this is likely an artefact that 
no transitions from open autocracy to democracy occurred in rentier countries over the 
sample period. 
Meanwhile one finding in particular appears to shed light over how and when, more 
precisely, higher economic well-being may stifle transitions towards more liberal regimes. 
Specifically, Model 32 shows that GDP per capita PPP has a significant and negative effect 
on the likelihood of transitioning from closed to open autocracy, with the effect being 
substantively large (one standard deviation in economic well-being decreases the likelihood 
of transitioning by 35%), while it does not appear to stifle any other pro-liberal transition.  
 
 
6.5. Conclusions and general considerations 
 
To conclude and summarize: this Chapter shows the importance of discriminating between 
political liberalization and democratization trends. Some correlates of democracy appear to 
be even stronger in explaining levels of political regime liberalization. The effort to go 
beyond dichotomous partitions of the political regime space, while at the same time treating 
these new categories as ordinal and not interval-level “degrees” of liberalization, proved 
crucial in explaining what makes actors within a polity choose a more liberal political regime 
(including but now limiting to democracy) and what instead decreases the likelihood that this 
happens. I am also able to tell apart the correlates of liberalization from the correlates of anti-
liberal transitions, and the two from the correlates of regime stability. 
In general, I find support for all seven hypotheses that I brought forward in Chapter 2 (see 
below), which also allows me to conclude that my theoretical model appears to be able to 
consistently explain political regime choice over the last four decades. 
Going into further detail, the most important findings of this chapter are: 
 I find support for the hypothesis that higher political liberalisation levels should be 
found at average levels of inequality, and that the probability of encountering more 
liberal regime types decreases both at low and high levels of inequality. This supports 
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my theoretical model and agrees with Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) model, while 
decreasing support for Boix’s (2003) hypothesis as extended to liberalization, i.e. that 
only low levels of inequality make countries more likely to be liberal; 
 I find that gains in economic well-being have a controversial effect over the likelihood 
of a country to be more liberal, complicating the modernization hypothesis. On the 
one hand, higher levels of GDP per capita PPP are found to have a liberalizing effect 
overall. On the other hand, the same higher levels of economic well-being 
significantly decrease the likelihood of regime transitions, strengthening even less 
liberal countries. The two forces appear to balance each other out, and it is hard to 
say in practice which will prevail and when; 
 I find support for theories arguing that hydrocarbon resources are a "political curse", 
stifling movements towards higher liberalisation levels. However, they appear to still 
retain a controversial and contrary effect at the within-country level (with the caveats 
for fixed effects that have been discussed at length throughout this chapter); 
 I find support only for one “pure” democratic wave in the late Eighties-early Nineties, 
while there does not appear to be any other temporal clustering in my sample, neither 
towards liberalization nor against it; 
 I find support for the hypothesis that the post-Cold War era was a fertile period for 
liberalisation. I link this to increasing international incentives for autocratic elites to 
lead liberalisation movements (including incomplete democratic transitions); 
 I find support for the hypothesis that political regime types, be they democracies, open 
or closed autocracies, appear to cluster in space even after controlling for a host of 
spatially-clustered correlates (such as economic well-being, inequality, economic 
growth, and others). 
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Introduction 
 
Since the late Seventies of the last century, when the “Third Wave” of democratization 
was just at its onset,4 a small but growing portion of comparative politics studies has 
focused on the external causes of democratic transitions.5 Similar studies had always been 
confined to a niche, both because of their difficult position between comparative politics 
and international relations and because of a lack of adequate statistical tools. Moreover, 
periodic spells of skepticism cast serious doubts on the fact that even the most advanced 
statistical tools could detect any correlation between international factors and the 
domestic process of democratization in the different countries of the international system. 
During the late Nineties, for example, an influential study on the causes of 
democratization by Przeworski and Limongi found that transitions towards democracy 
appeared to have been random events: only “democratic stability” could be significantly 
predicted by any set of indicators (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). 
                                                 
4 For the hypothesis that transitions towards democracy tend to come in waves, clustering in time 
when not in space, see Huntington (1991). 
5 Ross and Homer (1976) state that: “Because of interactions among units, especially among modern 
nation-states, it is difficult to think of any case where correlation between two traits or behaviours could be 
attributed only to processes internal to those societies, or 'pure' functions”. O’Donnell et al. (1986) find that 
out of 61 countries that had by then shifted towards democracy, 58 presented “varying degrees of external 
influence promoting the transition”. Something similar to exogenous influences was already proposed in 
Rustow (1970). 
The historical interactions between the international environment and the internal institutional form of 
political regimes had already come under scrutiny in the late XIX century, and had been a central them of 
the Machtstaat school; see A. Colombo (2011). 
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With their reliance on domestic variables, Przeworski and Limongi seemed to endorse 
the preference of comparative researchers towards internal factors in order to explain the 
dynamics of regime change. Their work fitted neatly in a literature that implicitly 
“assum[ed] that external events and processes in other countries do not affect the political 
institutions of a country or the likelihood of transitions”, bar, at times, foreign military 
interventions (Gleditsch and Ward 2006). Reversing this trend, in a 1998 seminal study 
on democratic diffusion a group of geographers, political scientists and statisticians aimed 
at systematically studying the international dimension of democratic transitions 
(O’Loughlin et al. 1998). 
As of today, a large (although seemingly declining today) body of literature has been 
devoted to exploring the concept of “democratic diffusion” in the way O'Loughlin et al. 
first proposed it, introducing causal mechanisms that might be at work at the non-
domestic level and developing models to test the hypotheses that can be derived from 
their theoretical framework. In the view of these authors, diffusion is “an encompassing 
term that in its general form simply indicates that there are enduring, cross-boundary 
dependencies in the evolution of policies and institutions”. External factors “can change 
the relative balance of power between regimes and opposition forces as well as the 
preferences and relative evaluations that different groups hold over particular forms of 
governance” (Gleditsch and Ward 2006). 
During the last decade and a half, researchers have constantly and consistently verified 
that, while domestic development indicators are robust predictors of democracy, “their 
predictive power fades with the inclusion of diffusion variables” (Wejnert 2005). At the 
same time, we must account for the fact that Galton’s problem (see below) might be 
soaking up some variability that is in fact due to the spatial dependence of domestic 
variables themselves, without any “diffusion” process being actually ongoing.  
Despite this important caveat, the success in the empirical testing of the diffusion 
hypothesis pushed  Przeworski and Limongi to somewhat recanting their conclusions on 
the randomness of democratic transitions. In their 2000 book, the authors produced 
empirical evidence that democracy is more likely to survive in a country that is in a more 
democratic region than elsewhere (Przeworski et al. 2000). At the same time, endogenous 
explanations were put into question from a purely theoretical point of view. In 2004 Hans 
Schmitz proposed a fully-developed agency-based model that described some of the 
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mechanisms that could link international pressures towards democratization to their 
domestic reception (Schmitz 2004). 
Although the debate on the causes of democratization is still raging on, to set the stage 
for the following discussion we must take some steps back from it, considering the 
problem from a somewhat wider perspective. First of all, the subject of interest in the 
literature seems nowadays to be evolving in the direction of the study of regime 
transitions as a whole, both toward and away from democracy, and not just on the process 
of democratization per se (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2015). Secondly, regime diffusion 
stems from the verifiable recurrence of spatial dependence of regime types; that is to say 
that all regimes, not just democracies, tend to cluster in space. 
 
 
Measuring and assessing regime spatial clustering 
 
To say that all regimes tend to cluster in space is equivalent to say that countries at a 
certain democratic (or autocratic) level tend to be found geographically closer to, rather 
than farther from, countries at similar democratic levels. Exploratory Space Data Analysis 
(ESDA) allows for a measurement of the global spatial clustering of regimes and for a 
preliminary visualization of local clustering in space. In this section I also propose a 
preliminary statistical analysis of spatial clustering. 
To measure democratic levels I relied on the polity2 variable in the Polity IV dataset, 
which aggregates autocracy and democracy scores and ranges from -10 to +10. It seems 
preferable to treat the polity score as continuous rather than using any sort of threshold to 
dichotomize or trichotomize the variable, because the hypothesis I want to test is that 
positive spatial autocorrelation involves countries at similar levels of democratic 
development (or autocratic retrenchment), and not just countries above or below some 
democratic level. The dataset used here employs annual data for the period 1980-2009, 
and a range of 94-120 countries in the different years. For the following spatial analyses 
I use the CShapes dataset (Weidmann et al. 2010), calculating the centroids' coordinates 
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of each country for each year (accounting for border modifications). I then generate a 
row-standardized spatial weights matrix and the eigenvalues for each year.6  
Specifically, to generate the weights I rely upon inverse quadratic distances, not 
contiguity-based criteria. The distance matrix is fairly complex, being an i by i matrix 
(where i is any country in the dataset for a specific t, or year) that has no zero values. 
Albeit we suppose that the influence that each country can exert on each other decreases 
quadratically, the smallest amount of influence may be exerted by New Zealand upon 
Italy. Given that quadratic distances fall quite rapidly to zero, it would be possible to 
indicate a cutoff point and impose zero values after that point, but at this stage I prefer to 
let everything be led by data rather than choosing an arbitrary cutoff. 
Conversely, a contiguity matrix would be an i by i matrix filled with a series of 1 and 0: 
generally, overwhelmingly zeros. A cell would take the value of 1 when the row and the 
column country are neighbors, and 0 otherwise. Specifically, among the different criteria 
to select which countries are actually neighbors, the most straightforward and evident is 
the queen contiguity matrix, meaning that a country is considered to be neighbor to 
another whenever the two any portion of the border. 
I find choosing inverse distances instead of any contiguity criteria to be both 
methodologically sound and theoretically valid. First, a distance matrix increases the 
resolution of the spatial analysis. Second, it avoids a problem that arises for contiguity 
matrixes related to countries when analyzing the whole world, and which is created by 
the presence of oceans. In a contiguity matrix, Africa and Eurasia would be isolated from 
the Americas, or from Oceania (not to mention that Great Britain would be separated from 
Europe, Ireland from Great Britain, Japan from China and South Korea, et cetera!). By 
generating discontinuities, this creates “spatial islands” that cannot influence each other. 
This, in turn, poses huge issues both at a theoretical level (is a sea border sufficient to cut 
off from influence two countries that would be pretty near otherwise, such as Morocco 
and Spain?) and at a technical one (“islands” prevent any estimation procedure employing 
spatial dependence to converge towards a finite value for the spatial lag; Drukker et al. 
2013). 
                                                 
6 To do so, I use Stata's spatwmat command included in Maurizio Pisati's sg162 package. I generate a row-
standardized spatial weights matrix and the eigenvalues for each year. 
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Finally, using a distance matrix is theoretically valid because a diffusion hypothesis 
implies that it is not just first- or second-order neighbors’ choice of political regime that 
influence a country's regime, but potentially any countries’ positions relative to many 
other countries in the system, and specifically a “region” around the country should have 
the most influence irrespective of whether countries belonging to this region are 
effectively neighbors or just near to each other. 
With the inverse distance matrix, I can calculate yearly values for the Moran's I score for 
cross-sections of all political regimes in the world, for each year in my sample. I is a 
classical index of global spatial autocorrelation: it compares the expected value for the 
null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation, along with its standard deviation, to the real 
autocorrelation that is estimated to be present in the data, thus allowing for z-tests for 
significance. The expected value for the null hypothesis of no spatial correlation is always 
negative but, for a sufficient number of cases, very close to zero. A non-significant I value 
as recovered within the dataset would mean that political regimes are randomly 
distributed in space. A positive and significant value of the index indicates  positive 
spatial autocorrelation, this in turn meaning that countries tend to be geographically closer 
to others that display similar polity2 scores (i.e., democracies tend to be nearer to other 
democracies; autocracies tend to be nearer to other autocracies). 
By calculating the yearly value of I, I can track down the dynamics of global regime 
clustering, if any. 
Figure 6.3 shows that in the 1980-2009 period countries have tended to significantly 
cluster around other countries with similar levels of political regime. Moreover, this 
positive autocorrelation has tended to increase with time, so that while in 1980 I was 
estimated at being below 0.09, in 2007 it reached 0.19. Figure A.1 also shows that the 
tendency of regimes to cluster in space has increased somewhat constantly spiking in the 
1989-1991 period of rapid democratization of Eastern Europe, while abruptly decreasing 
right after that, falling back onto the previous path. 
This slowly increasing trend may be interpreted as an indication that there is no real 
tendency towards convergence in different “regions” of the world. In fact, autocratic 
countries that are nearer to other autocratic countries tend to discourage the 
democratization of their neighbors. Finally, in the last decade the clustering seems to have 
somewhat plateaued, sensibly decreasing in the last two years. 
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Figure 6.3 – Moran's I value over time (1980-2009) 
 
Note: Moran's I expected value (not reported) ranges from a minimum of -0.011 in 1980 to a maximum of 
-0.008 in 2009. Standard deviation for each year is around 0.02, so that every value is significant at the 
p=0.001 level. The red dashed line is the average value for the period. 
 
Now that I have recovered an overall measure of spatial dependence between political 
regimes, and know how it trended over recent decades, I am interested in disentangling 
whether there are any specific regions of the world that “drive” the positive 
autocorrelation between political regimes. I therefore turn to local spacial indicators, and 
specifically to Anselin's LISA (Local Indicator of Spatial Association). LISA allows us 
to assign a “clustering value” to each country, and to tell us whether this value is 
significantly different from 0. The higher the number of political regimes with similar 
values are around a country, the higher the likelihood that this country is a “positive 
clustering” country. Vice versa, the higher the number of political regimes with very 
different values to a country’s are around it, the higher the likelihood that this country can 
be considered a “negative clustering” country. 
By mapping significant countries, we can check the geographic position of clusters of 
positive (or negative) spatial autocorrelation. To show how this works in practice, see the 
map in Figure 6.4, which refers to 2009 political regime types. In the map, the prevalence 
of clusters of democracies and autocracies as opposed to countries that display a negative 
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autocorrelation (because they are democratic while having autocratic neighbors, or vice 
versa) clearly hints at the global positive autocorrelation. Democratic clusters are found 
where we would expect: in Europe, North and South America. Autocracies tend instead 
to cluster in the Middle East, in Central Asia, and in Central Africa.7 
Although from this analysis it seems reasonable to conclude that spatial clustering might 
be the result of non-domestic forces, shaping each country’s tendency towards or away 
from democracy, diffusion processes are actually very difficult to pin down, because “it 
is hard to distinguish true diffusion from illusions of diffusion created by global trends, 
correlated disturbances, or the regional clustering of domestic factors” (Brinks and 
Coppedge 2006). For example, if domestic factors such as GDP per capita tend to cluster 
in space, then regime clustering could be trivially correlated to the clustering of GDP per 
capita. This issue is common knowledge in the literature, and is classically referred to as 
Galton's problem.8 
Examples of variables that may theoretically affect the levels of democracy and that tend 
to cluster in space range from the level of economic or social development to different 
types of institutional configurations, from dummies of a common colonial past to 
continuous variables measuring differences in size and population levels. The best a 
researcher can do to account for this problem is to control for many domestic variables in 
multivariate spatial models, and to check whether the regimes' positive spatial 
autocorrelation is robust to different specifications. Not doing so would cause a grave 
omitted variable problem, because there might exist a domestic variable that is not only 
significant but also clusters enough in space to render international spatial clustering 
dynamics irrelevant. At the same time, any domestic omitted variable that clusters in 
                                                 
7 The map also shows how difficult it is to solve between different spatial matrices. By choosing a 
matrix based on distances, that do not control for terrain formation or body of water separating countries, 
we can generate some weird inconsistencies. In this case, most of Western Europe does not belong to 
Europe’s democratic cluster because Italy, France, Spain and Portugal are nearer to some Northern African 
countries with very low democratic levels than to democratic European neighbors. Also, the presence of 
some missing data in the northern part of South America (Polity IV does not rank Suriname and French 
Guyana, and GeoDa assigns a “0” value to missing data as a best guess between +10 and -10), is enough 
for Brazil to disappear from a democratic cluster. 
8 In a recent reformulation, “[a] crucial challenge for empirical research (…) is the great difficulty 
distinguishing true interdependence of units' actions, on the one hand, from the impacts of spatially 
correlated unit-level factors, of common or spatially correlated exogenous-external factors, and of context-
conditional factors involving interactions of unit-level and exogenous-external explanators on the other” 
(Franzese and Hays 2007). 
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space risks to show us regime spatial clustering as a force of its own, while there are 
background domestic forces at work driving this relationship. 
 
Figure 6.4 – Local clusters of democracy scores (2009) 
Note: image obtained with GeoDa using 5-nearest neighbors weights matrix. Dark red are democratic 
clusters (countries that have more democratic neighbors than the world average plus one standard 
deviation); dark blue are autocratic clusters. Light red (Russia, Pakistan and Thailand) are regimes that in 
2009 were reported as being more than one standard deviation more democratic than their neighbors (given 
Russia's proximity to highly authoritarian regimes, this is not surprising), while light blue (Belarus) are 
regimes that were one standard deviation more autocratic than their neighbors. 
 
 
Using 2009 data, as a preliminary attempt at controlling for internal factors, Table 6.12 
reports the results of a spatial regression that includes some domestic predictors. I choose 
to model a spatial lag regression, which takes the general form: 
 
𝑌 = 𝑿𝛽 + 𝜌𝑾𝑌 + 𝜖 
 
Where 𝑌 denotes a 𝑁 × 1 vector of observations on our outcome variable (political 
regime types), 𝑿 denotes a 𝑁 × 𝑗 matrix of observations of the regressors, 𝛽 denotes a 
𝑗 × 1 vector of coefficients, 𝑾 denotes the 𝑁 × 𝑁 spatial weights matrix, 𝜌 is our 
estimated spatial lag (autoregressive) parameter, and 𝜖 is a 𝑁 × 1 vector of normally-
distributed, homoscedastic, and uncorrelated errors. 
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 Model 1 
DV: polity2 
Model 2 
DV: polity2 
GDP pc PPP (logged) 1.38 (0.15) *** 1.26 (0.36) *** 
Oil rents -0.85 (0.11) *** -0.64 (0.13) *** 
Oil rents (squared) 0.07 (0.00) *** 0.01 (0.00) ** 
Mineral rents 0.24 (0.18) 0.13 (0.12) 
Land area (logged) 0.74 (0.30) ** 0.46 (0.35) 
Population (logged) -0.18 (0.07) ** -0.29 (0.45) 
Political violence 0.13 (0.08) . 0.18 (0.12) 
(constant) -3.26 (3.92) -9.31 (6.87) 
Spatial lag (rho)  0.78 (0.16) *** 
R-squared 0.492  
Squared correlation  0.557 
Sigma  4.20 
N 120 120 
 
Note: Results for linear (left) and spatial lag regressions. 
Significance levels: *** = .001 ** = .01 * = .05  . = .10 
Table 6.12. Levels of democracy and space. 
 
The model assumes that there is an autocorrelation between the observed political regime 
of a country and other political regimes within this dataset, and that this autocorrelation 
depends on a spatial weights matrix that must be chosen by the investigator.9 If we did 
not take the spatial lag into account, the autocorrelation would end up in the error term, 
and our model would be biased towards overestimating the influence of regressors. At the 
same time, we could not recover an estimate of the autocorrelation, which most of the 
time (as in this case) is of substantive interest. 
The result of our spatial lag model shows that some economic domestic variables are 
highly significant: the level of economic wellbeing in a country (measured via the log of 
the GDP per capita at purchasing power parity) is positively correlated with democracy 
levels, as implied by the modernization theory. Oil rents over GDP tend to have a strong 
negative impact upon democracy levels, although the quadratic term implies that the 
effect moderates as a country is already dependent from oil rents. 
On the contrary, and very importantly, other variables that are found to be significantly 
correlated with levels of democracy in a linear model, including a demographic variable 
                                                 
9 In my case, not shown, the multivariate model proves robust to many different specifications of the 
distance matrix, with or without cut off points, and to the substitution of the distance matrix with a 𝑘-nearest 
neighbors matrix where only a number 𝑘 of nearest countries is considered to determine the spatial 
relationship (in my robustness checks, I let 𝑘 vary between 5 and 10). 
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(the log of the population), as well as the size of a country (the log of the land area), 
disappear from significance. 
The spatial component, rho, is found to be not only highly significant but near the higher 
limit of its range (1.0).10 Also, adding the spatial lag term appears to produce a somewhat 
better model in terms of its power to explain variation in the dependent variable. Indeed, 
a traditional linear regression without the spatial lag can explain around 49% of the 
variation in the data, while a spatial lag model explains 56%. 
 
 
From regime clustering to regime diffusion: theory and causal mechanisms 
 
Because of the complexity of spatial modeling, detailing huge matrixes of country-to-
country dependences, the description and explanation of regime spatial clustering can 
only be achieved by using static, cross-sectional models. 
Meanwhile, the literature on diffusion processes explicitly refers to dynamic process, so 
that time-series cross-section analyses should be preferred. Shifting from static to 
dynamic processes generates theoretical and methodological problems that studies on 
regime diffusion are forced to face. For example, the literature often uses regime 
transitions as a proxy measure of regime diffusion. “The global distribution of democracy 
as well as transitions to democracy cluster in time and space”, say Gleditsch and Ward, 
adding that “taking a local or regional perspective can provide more insight into how 
external factors influence democratization and transition processes than an exclusive 
focus on global level influences” (Gleditsch and Ward 2006). The authors continue 
explaining that, although a large number of studies has found empirical evidence of 
“diffusion” processes at work, in the sense of spatial and temporal clustering in the 
distribution of democracy and transitions, “it is less clear what this stems from, and what 
it is about democracy in one state that influences the prospects for democracy in another” 
(Gleditsch and Ward 2006). 
                                                 
10 Note that a model with just the intercept yields a rho = .92. What is even more striking is that such 
a model explains alone 33.6% of the variance in the data. Keep in mind though that in this model rho 
includes by construction both the non-domestic, international pressures for political regimes to cluster in 
space, and the (almost certain) spatial clustering of many domestic factors. 
Appendix – Political Regimes: From Spatial Dependence to Regime Diffusion 
225 
 
In order to clarify the mechanisms that might be at work, from a purely theoretical and 
point of view, one can regard diffusion processes as international social processes 
composed of four elements: (1) innovation, (2) communicated through channels, (3) over 
time, among members of a (4) social system (Rogers 2003). Diffusion models are based 
on the non-independence of events, which “includes not only a temporal dimension but a 
spatial one as well”. “The use of diffusion models makes a number of rather strong 
assumptions about the world in terms of behavior and behavioral processes and the 
interaction of agents and structures” (Starr and Lindborg 2003). Indeed, one element of 
diffusion processes is the emulation of some type of behavior within one unity of a system 
by other units (here, the propensity within countries in the international system to adopt 
some type of regime rather than another). This emulation can be driven by domestic as 
well as external factors, and diffusion analysis focuses on the external dimension: it links 
“behavior based on internal readiness [to] external cues” (Starr and Lindborg 2003). 
Pinpointing the necessary elements of any definition of diffusion is obviously not 
sufficient to explain the links between international pressures and domestic outcomes, 
such as (rapid or gradual) regime change. To address this shortcoming, one of the most 
important studies on diffusion proposed four causal mechanisms, neither mutually 
exclusive nor exhaustive, through which national political elites might be conditioned 
into following the preferences of a set of other (neighbor) countries (Simmons et al. 
2008).  
The first mechanism is outright coercion, whereby the dominant actors in the system or 
sub-systems impose political institutions or cease to uphold others.11 The second is 
competition: some institutions might end up being more effective than others for domestic 
political purposes. The third is learning: a progressive change in beliefs about the world 
might be happening at the national and international levels. For the study’s authors, the 
latter mechanism is unidirectional, as influence towards democratization comes from 
some sort of Bullian 'anarchical society' and its contemporary international organizations, 
but one may argue that learning is a bidirectional process, and that democratic practices 
may be always supplanted by the “example” of a well-functioning autocratic polity (think 
of China or Singapore today, or South Korea before democratization; Bull 1977). Finally 
                                                 
11 See also the concept of “leverage” in Levitsky and Way (2006). In this case, 'leverage' is defined 
only in the direction of democratization, as the “authoritarian governments' vulnerability to external 
democratizing pressure”, but it shouldn't be difficult to conceptualize an inverse relationship. 
Appendix – Political Regimes: From Spatial Dependence to Regime Diffusion 
226 
 
a fourth, residual category is called social emulation, and described by the authors as “the 
way in which policies are voluntarily instantiated”. At a closer analysis this does not 
appear as a very solid category, and apparently refers to Alexander Wendt's (1999) 
famous theorization of international politics. 
Recently, scholars have drawn the attention upon the theoretical problems of such causal 
explanations, arguing that “[n]one of [those] processes clearly signals that geographically 
proximate actors should be the most important external influences on a state” (Goodliffe 
and Hawkins 2011). Another possibility, then, is to conjecture that states exist 
internationally “in dependence networks with each other” and that those networks 
“provide pathways for influence on a state's domestic political institutions”. In this 
conceptualization, a state's dependence network is “a set of partner states with whom [that 
state] regularly engages in exchanges of valued goods”, where these valued goods might 
be anything from commodities to ideas (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2011). Put in this way, 
the idea of a dependence network does away with any geographical determinants, so that 
any state in the world might potentially be part of any other state's dependence network, 
according to one or more chosen variables of interest, identified as driving the 
“influencing” relationship. Yet, few steps might be needed in order to acknowledge that 
the networks themselves tend to cluster in space, given that both the exchange of 
commodities and that of ideas are much more frequent (and, anyway, the possibility that 
they happen is generally greater) among nearer rather than farther countries, even in our 
globalized world (Gleditsch and Ward 2006). 
Goodliffe and Hawkins even go as far as to explicate the possible mechanisms that might 
link these external dependence networks to domestic preferences on political regimes, 
conjecturing that the processes at work here might be at least three: 
 
(1) domestic actors in government seek to gain rewards and avoid punishments 
offered by network partners for adjusting their domestic institutions 
appropriately; 
(2) domestic actors in government and opposition gain resources useful in domestic 
power struggles through their interactions with network partners;  
(3) domestic actors in government learn how to adjust domestic institutions by 
observing network partners. 
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Most studies fall short from offering precise and structured causal mechanisms such as 
these. Brinks and Coppedge, for example, propose a “neighbor emulation” mechanism, 
which they describe as “the tendency for neighboring countries to converge towards a 
shared level of democracy or nondemocracy” (Brinks and Coppedge 2006). It's not hard 
to notice that this is a tautological description of diffusion, not a causal mechanism per 
se. All in all, we seem to be still lacking a complete theory on regime diffusion dynamics, 
one that coherently and consistently links international pressures to domestic preferences, 
with Elkink's attitude diffusion model possibly coming closest to it (Elkink 2009). 
 
 
Regime diffusion: empirical findings 
 
As recently as 2011, a researcher in the field of democratic diffusion lamented that  
“[e]xplaining democracy with reference to factors external to societies (…) has a solid 
theoretical framework, but lacks clear empirical proof” (Lidén 2011).12 Considering that 
most of the published articles on the topic in the last decade has actually produced sound 
and consistent empirical evidence, this hardly seems to be the case. Wejnert (2005), for 
example, found that at a global scale diffusion is a central predictor of democracy, even 
after controlling for economic development. As the democratic diffusion thesis by itself 
seems to be losing ground (because of an increasing risk that free countries fall back into 
“less free” categories, as opposed to a decreasing risk of non-free countries to land on 
higher ground13), support has continuously been found for regime diffusion as a general 
process that includes the influence of any political regime on any other. Brinks and 
Coppedge (2006), for example, find that the average regime score of neighbors affects in 
a significant and positive way the direction and magnitude of political regime change in 
any target country.14 Even Goodliffe and Hawkins's (2011) study, which focuses on 
                                                 
12 Lidén’s (2011) paper provides a good review of the previous literature, but his proposed model 
specifications fail to provide any improvements whatsoever over earlier models. 
13 “[p]ost-cold war growth in democracy might be more fragile than we suspect”; say Starr and 
Lindborg 2003. 
14 The authors do not try to estimate whether the international environment also influences the 
probability of a target country of incurring in regime change. In fact, they posit it as unpredictable and 
impossible to identify in large-N studies. 
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dependence networks, consistently finds that “geographic proximity” facilitates “and thus 
proxy for some of these interactions”, and that these interactions in turn promote regime 
diffusion. 
Also interesting is the impact that transitions themselves might have on neighbors’ 
propensity at regime change (domino/contagion effects). Starr and Lindborg (2003) find 
that “[o]f the 273 governmental transitions that occurred” in the period 1974-1996, “106 
experienced some type of BGT [‘bordering governmental transition'] treatment”. As this 
proportion is significant at the .001 level, this should demonstrate a “positive spatial 
diffusion effect” of transitions. 
 
 
Pending methodological issues 
 
Given the variety of possible approaches to the issue of regime diffusion, some discussion 
around the different methods employed by different authors seems in order. Trying to 
measure diffusion processes poses the problem of which variable can best serve to 
measure the spread of political regimes. Simple measures of spatial autocorrelation are of 
little to no use, given that spatial regression only allows for time-static considerations in 
order to be feasible and its estimated being liable to use for prediction, while the study of 
diffusion clearly involves temporal dynamics.15 The diffusion variable is typically a 
variable that tries to capture some sort “pressure” exerted by the international spatial 
distribution of political regimes over each different country. Once created, this 
“international pressure” measure can be included in regression analyses in order to control 
for its influence over (a) the propensity for regime change in the target country and/or (b) 
the direction of that change, given its occurrence. 
This “international pressure” variable can be computed in several ways, with two of the 
most common in the literature being: 
 
(1) taking the weighted or unweighted mean of the democracy score of neighboring 
countries. In this case, the authors usually construct a contiguity matrix, with cells 
                                                 
15 Some models of space-time dependence can be found in recent literature (Franzese and Hays 2008, 
Baltagi and Pirotte 2012), but they still lack finite-sample properties amenable for prediction, they have a 
huge problem of efficiency, and their output is near-to-impossible to interpret. 
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that take value of 1 when two states are neighbors, and 0 otherwise (Brinks and 
Coppedge 2006; O’Loughlin et al. 1998). The use of weighted means is a very 
recent feature, and the authors that resort to it employ it “in order to capture [each 
partner's] differing potential for influence” (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2011); 
(2) employing inverse distance weights, that imply that the influence of each country 
over the political regime of any target country decreases linearly with distance. 
 
Much of the literature follows the first approach, only testing for “neighbor emulation” 
(O’Loughlin et al. 1998). However, choosing contiguity over distance poses important 
questions that are seldom answered, mainly because this would expose the fact that results 
are liable to huge sources of model dependence. This is so because the way in which one 
operationalizes who is neighbor to whom is not as straightforward as it might seem at 
first. 
Take for example the UK, Australia, Japan, or any Pacific or Caribbean island: do we 
exclude these states from the analysis, or do we suppose they have neighbors at some 
threshold distance from their coast? And if we tend towards the latter solution, what will 
this threshold be, and shouldn't we adopt it also for continental countries? Thailand and 
Vietnam, for example, are separated only by a short strip of Laos; Ghana is even less far 
away from Benin. 
What about, then, the number of neighbors: does the fact that Portugal will only be 
influenced by Spain (or by Morocco, at some minimum threshold distance), while China 
will be affected by all of her fifteen neighbors, compromise the statistical analysis in some 
serious way? One extreme example of this level of model dependence is offered by 
O'Loughlin et al.'s article, in which the US and the UK are coded as contiguous countries 
“based on cultural and political similarities” (O’Loughlin et al. 1998). 
Contiguity and neighborhood seem thus to be highly insufficient and problematic 
conceptualizations, and preference should be given to studies employing some kind of 
(power-weighted) inverse spatial matrix.16 Using a row-standardized matrix could also 
take into account the number of states at different distances from the country, meaning 
that “country density” in the whereabouts of each target country would also be considered 
                                                 
16 However, one should note that operationalizations of the concepts of power or, even more so, of 
threat, are usually highly ambiguous, there being no consensus in the literature as to which variables or 
indicator best describes the different dimensions of those terms. 
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to be relevant by the researcher. Namely, countries in high-density neighborhoods would 
undergo less pressure from each of their neighbors than states in low-density 
neighborhoods. On the contrary, leaving the matrix non-standardized would allow an 
equal influence by each neighboring country, irrespective of density. 
How one operationalizes the diffusion variable also matters, as many authors until the 
first half of the 2000s have tended to focus on democratic diffusion only (from autocracy 
towards anocracy, or from autocracy and anocracy towards democracy) and not on 
processes of regime diffusion per se. For example, after taking note that “[p]ossible 
diffusion effects were found for the analysis of all governmental transitions”, Starr and 
Lindborg focus only on transitions towards democracy (Starr and Lindborg 2003). 
Another very serious issue is related to any contemporary study that has to do with the 
measurement of democracy. Leaving aside questions on how to “unpack” some of the 
most common democracy-score indexes (Pemstein et al. 2010), some studies on 
democratic diffusion employ the Freedom House scores and consider it as an interval-
level variable that may be treated as continuous (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Lidén 2011).  
Finally, most studies do not hesitate to develop and include in the models new (and 
sometimes exotic) variables. For example, Brinks and Coppedge employ a “superpower 
influence” dummy and a “measure of global trends” variable. In another study, the authors 
introduce a “world-system position” variable (taking up the values: periphery; 
semiperiphery; core) that is straightforwardly derived from dependency theory but 
assigns core/periphery positions in a static and seemingly arbitrary manner. The same 
authors introduce a “spatial density” variable, described as “the sum of democratic 
countries in a world region divided by the total number of countries in the region” 
(Niemeyer et al. 2008). One is left to wonder whether there is a real necessity to introduce 
a subjectively-assigned regional position in spatial models that have historically struggled 
to develop objective measures such as country distances. 
To conclude, we can have a look at the models as a whole. Many analyses do not use 
time-series cross-section methods but simple regressions, so that they might obtain an 
efficient estimate of their coefficients but their standard errors will certainly be biased 
towards overconfidence. 
A second problem in these models is selection bias. The difficulty in doing a global 
analysis of changes in democracy for a series of years “lies in sample selection. Most 
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countries simply do not change in most years. (…) Including only the observations with 
a change raises obvious sample selection issues” (Brinks and Coppedge 2006). To 
summarize the problem, including all cases risks underestimating the impact of the 
explanatory variables – mostly so if one hypothesizes a 'triggering domestic condition' 
that must come into effect in each target country before international spatial pressures can 
have any effect on the direction of change – but selecting only those cases in which change 
actually occurs introduces potential selection bias, censoring all international effects that 
never passed from potential to actual outcome. 
To conclude: a number of stumbling blocks is still left in the way of anyone willing to 
include spatial dependence within regression models. Most of these problems still need 
to be tackled in any meaningful way, and the solutions at hand are not efficient enough, 
or we do not know the large-sample properties of some estimators. In general, people 
trying to include spatial dependence in their models are left with the need to use some 
“tricks”, like generating variables of neighbor influence instead of relying on spatial 
dependence matrixes. While being already a second-best option in itself, this also 
generates a problem of endogeneity in the models: spatial regression models account for 
this endogeneity in the spatial lag or spatial error estimator, but linear or logistic/probit 
regression models with a “neighbor’s dependent value” variable do not. The only way to 
avoid this endogeneity problem, but still rely upon traditional regression analysis that is 
unbiased and consistent, would be to resort to some set of regional dummy variables. 
 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis, I proposed a novel way to look at and analyse political regime types. My 
analysis moved from the identification of a gap in current research on democratization 
and autocratic stability, namely that both these literatures tend to disregard intra-
autocratic dynamics towards more or less liberal political regimes. This makes theoretical 
models and empirical tests blind to an important part of the political spectrum, banishing 
some open autocracies to a middle ground of “hybrid regimes” that fails to explain their 
resilience. According to my measures, open autocracies today account for almost a third 
of the global political regime spectrum. 
Having acknowledged this gap, I proposed a formal theory that could go beyond 
democratization and analyse correlates of political liberalization across the board. I 
developed a game-theoretic model that assumes rational autocrats in search for a more 
precise signal from their citizens. This allowed me to derive a number of hypotheses over 
why some countries decide to veer towards a more open autocratic system, while some 
stick to repressive autocracy, and other still end up democratizing. 
I proposed a new way to gauge levels of regime openness, and map this onto a tripartite 
political space of closed autocracies, open autocracies, and democracies. I improved 
robustness by setting a number of different thresholds to place autocratic regimes in each 
category. I also proposed an improvement in measuring political leverage from fuel rents. 
Finally, in setting up my empirical model, I relied on multiple imputation techniques to 
minimize bias (doing away with listwise deletion) and maximize robustness (by adding 
uncertainty, only stronger results remain significant). 
My empirical findings showed the usefulness to think about political liberalization as 
movements both away from and within autocratic regimes. I managed to extend most 
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findings on the correlates of democratization to the analysis of political liberalization, and 
found that the same correlates are much more robust in a liberalization context, while 
they tend to lose in significance in an analysis of the correlates of democratization. 
In particular, studying political liberalization allowed me to retrieve support both for my 
and other models’ prediction that more liberal regimes should be found at average levels 
of inequality. Competing theories suggest that they should be found at low levels, and 
this is unsupported both when looking at political liberalization and at outright 
democratization. 
Another important finding is related to the modernization theory. Namely, I found that 
while increases in economic well-being tend to be associated with more liberal political 
regimes, they also tend to be associated with much more resilient political regimes across 
the board, decreasing the likelihood that a country experiences a political transition in the 
first place. This is crucial because it brings to the fore the role of agency and chance, and 
may be useful in explaining recent findings that appear to disprove the modernization 
hypothesis when employing fixed effects models that only account for within-country 
variation. A series of other important empirical findings is listed in section 6.5. 
My work also faced some crucial challenges, that I leave to future research to attempt to 
solve. First, by adding a further layer of complexity to empirical models, multiple 
imputation methods reduce the range of models that one can rely upon at the estimation 
stage. This is an important weakness, because some models that have been recently 
proposed and which appear to go beyond fixed effects while partially accounting for the 
omitted variable bias (see section 6.3) cannot be used in a multiple imputation setting. 
Further studies are needed in order to show that the large sample properties of these 
models make them suitable for use in a multiple imputation setting, and how to calculate 
standard errors through a consistent estimator. 
Second, while my measure of political liberalization accounts for some de jure and some 
de facto conditions of a polity, it only measures them after they occur. While surely the 
inauguration of a legislature can be traced back to a precise year, other changes may take 
place over multiple years, such as the discussion and adoption of a new constitution. My 
measure fails to capture multiple-year processes, and only “fires up” once their outcome 
is known. 
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Third, by advancing a proposal to create a tripartite typology of political liberalization 
levels, I am making the study of transitions from one level to another increasingly more 
complicated. Transitions become rarer, and the political space becomes more complex – 
especially in an ordinal variables setting which does not completely trust interval-level 
analyses. On the opposite, others may be convinced that my measure is not complex 
enough. It can be argued that political liberalization is an even harder process to describe 
as compared with democratization. Surely, further studies on different measures of this 
latent concept are warranted. 
Fourth, and related to this, given that my political liberalization measure is novel, I cannot 
validate it against other indexes. For example, my measure of regime openness is only 
loosely correlated with the main indexes of democracy (Pearson’s correlation values 
range between 0.55 to 0.67). However, this does not tell me anything about the validity 
or reliability of my measure. 
Finally, and like in most other studies on political regime choice and change, I did not 
employ empirical methods that allow me to defend the link from correlation to causation, 
apart from the classical Granger causality method of lagging my independent variables. 
In the end, while I find a series of crucial findings, these risk to remain confined to the 
realm of correlates. I do develop a theoretical model in order to justify the inclusion of 
some covariates within my empirical models, while at the same time other covariates are 
drawn from the literature: this helps me in the quest for robust findings and linking 
correlation to causation, but cannot be definite evidence of that. In the end, until today 
the discipline on political regimes choice and change has lacked valid and useful 
instrumental variables to exclude endogeneity, while even natural experiments are rare 
and often teeter at a closer look. Going from correlation to causation is still an open 
research question that needs to be addressed by the comparative politics literature. 
Despite such challenges and weaknesses, I believe my findings can be useful to scholars 
of international politics and policymakers alike. First, they suggest that national 
policymakers and the international community should think twice before supporting 
abrupt democratization attempts, which may have a higher likelihood of failing whenever 
structural conditions are not there. Sometimes, political liberalization within autocracies 
could be preferred. 
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Second, while GDP growth is correlated with changes in political liberalization levels, in 
fact economic recessions are only found to increase the likelihood of autocratic 
retrenchment. Policymakers arguing that economic sanctions might persuade the 
governments of target countries to change policy are advised to take into account that the 
most likely outcome is for the existing government – or for a different government 
succeeding it – to veer towards a less liberal political regime. Current sanctions against 
Russia and Syria (not to mention North Korea) may be a case in point. 
Third, findings emphasize the role of agency. Structural relations within a polity do not 
perfectly determine political regime choice and change, and the same trend can have 
controversial effects over the likelihood of choosing a more liberal political regime and 
the likelihood of transitioning in the first place. Therefore, whenever policymakers and 
the international community are determined into “nudging” a country into a more liberal 
political regime, they are advised to concentrate over specific actors – e.g. governments 
in exile, oppositions within and outside the country, the military, etc. – and work with 
them towards a common objective. The bottom line is: while economic sanctions appear 
to be the easiest way to coordinate international action against an illiberal government, 
broader political action, while more costly, has a higher chance to succeed in the longer 
run. 
Fourth, political regime transitions are associated to a higher degree of political violence. 
Whenever politicians, or the public opinion, side in favour of regime change in illiberal 
countries, they should be aware that this may not come at a small cost in terms of human 
lives or infrastructural damage. As conflicts in Syria and Libya that are dragging on since 
the 2011 Arab Spring show, attempted transitions may degenerate into longstanding 
violent confrontations. 
Finally, as Egypt’s autocratic retrenchment shows, any regime transition “resets the 
clock” of a regime’s durability, making it more likely to change again within the next few 
years. At the same time, both Egypt on the one hand and Tunisia on the other are evidence 
that, apart from differing structural conditions, the main actors of a polity are the ultimate 
source of political regime choice and change. 
 
To conclude, I believe that my work makes a series of important contributions to the 
current literature on political regime choice and change, filling some gaps while leaving 
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other to future research. In particular, to look at political regimes by shifting from a 
democratization to a political liberalization setting is useful in order to answer questions 
as to whether and to what extent common causes drive both processes, and points at a 
potential way forward for a host of new studies. 
Our understanding of the political reality through modelling and empirical testing will 
always be limited, especially in an environment of rare events in which unmodelled 
agency choices can drive the results. But we, as social scientists, are on a mission to 
explain political behaviour. Hopefully, this thesis has contributed with a few, small steps 
at improving the way in which we observe the political world. 
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